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ABSTRACT 
 
David Seung Huh: Essays on Sellers’ Incentive for Information Disclosure 
(Under the direction of William P. Putsis) 
 
 
This dissertation attempts to provide a framework for understanding information 
asymmetry in markets by verifying the economic incentives for sellers with low-quality products 
to fully disclose their types, through analytic models, experimental analysis, and market data 
analysis. This study achieves this goal by focusing on how risk intermediaries such as third-party 
certifications can reduce the perceived risk of customers and encourage sellers to voluntarily 
reveal weaknesses of their products or services. 
Essay 1 explains whether, when, and how a seller with a low-quality product can disclose 
quality information to enhance his profitability and also increase the market demand through an 
analytic model and lab experiments. Essay 2 confirms the predictions of Essay 1 by verifying the 
economic incentives to disclose low-quality information from the sales data of various collectible 
items, and also shows that revealing weaknesses helps sellers more when they are selling 
products of higher than average quality, and that this incentive for information disclosure differs 
across different market circumstances. Essay 3 explicitly investigates the effect of certifications 
of different qualities on various market outcomes through an analytic model and an economic 
experiment and finds that an inaccurate certification is worse than no certification for sellers but 
beneficial to buyers. This essay also shows that using certification and fully disclosing quality 
information is the best way to increase profit under information asymmetry.  
iv 
 
Overall, this dissertation aims to contribute to both academia and industry through 
presenting an important theoretical basis and empirical evidences regarding various market 
dilemmas under information asymmetry, as it is one of the first attempts to analyze the economic 
incentives for sellers with low-quality products to reveal their types and understand how to 
design an optimal certification system to solve adverse selection issues.  
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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Motivation 
What should sellers do with negative aspects of their products or services that customers 
cannot easily find out? Conventional wisdom holds that sellers should conceal negative 
information as much as possible in order to maximize profit, particularly in markets where the 
level of information asymmetry is high. In other words, people generally believe that revealing 
low quality hurts, and thus most sellers try to claim higher than actual quality when possible. For 
example, when more than 500 new cars in the U.K. market were tested for their fuel figures in 
2012, 95.5 percent showed lower miles per gallon (MPG) than officially claimed figures even 
under manufacturers’ suggested driving conditions.1 In this case, most car manufacturers were 
found to be concealing the fact that actual MPG figures were smaller than their claims, believing 
that customers would not be able to fully test MPG figures under proper conditions. Fraud in the 
olive oil market was also found to be a big issue, as a recent study found that 69 percent of 
imported olive oils labeled “extra virgin” did not actually meet the standard (Frankel et al. 2010). 
In this case, sellers were hiding the fact that the actual grades of their olive oils were lower than 
“extra virgin,” since most customers could not accurately evaluate the grade. Similar examples 
of incomplete information disclosure under informational asymmetry can be readily observed in 
many other markets.  
What we find interesting is that it is also not uncommon to witness sellers voluntarily 
disclosing unfavorable information about their products and services. Many online retailers, 
                                                 
1
 http://www.whatcar.com/car-news/car-true-mpg-winners-losers/1200728 
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including Amazon.com, disclose information about weaknesses of the products they offer 
through various routes such as customer reviews on their own websites. Woot.com is especially 
famous for its preemptive revelation of the disadvantages of listed products. On their website 
they clearly state that they would prefer that customers not buy from them than to have 
customers regret their purchases.
2
 Traditional firms also show willingness to communicate 
weaknesses about their products to customers. In 2012, Four Seasons Hotels renovated their 
websites and included customer reviews for each of their 80+ properties directly from Twitter, 
Facebook, and TripAdvisor, without censoring any of the unfavorable comments. Chipotle 
Mexican Grill's website not only explains positive aspects of their ingredients, but also clearly 
indicates drawbacks of the ingredients through a “Room for Improvement'” section. Perhaps one 
of the most successful examples of communicating information about low quality with customers 
is the case of Hans Brinker Hotel in Amsterdam, the Netherlands. Hans Brinker is famous for its 
strategy of honestly revealing its low quality to customers, and actively explaining negative 
aspects of their services such as rooms without a view and no hot water, through pictures and 
detailed descriptions. Nevertheless, a lot of travelers visiting Amsterdam still choose to stay at 
this hotel and leave positive reviews.
3
 
As these examples show, some sellers do voluntarily share information about weaknesses 
of their products or services, thereby raising a question: When and how can sellers benefit from 
such disclosures? The question is both interesting and important, as some of the decisions to hide 
unfavorable information in markets often cause various issues to customers, sellers, and the 
society. However, the incentive for the sellers with low-quality products (“low-type” sellers) to 
                                                 
2
 http://www.woot.com/faq?ref=ft\_wiw\_faq (accessed on November 14, 2015). Archived version: 
https://archive.is/b9cxI 
 
3
 http://abcnews.go.com/Travel/proud-worlds-worst-hotels/story?id=17696356 (accessed on November 14, 2015). 
Archived version: https://archive.is/N9ZhL 
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fully disclose quality information has not been investigated much in the literature. This 
dissertation thus attempts to question this conventional wisdom regarding sellers’ hiding 
weaknesses and provide more precise understanding about the incentive for low-type sellers to 
voluntarily reveal their types. 
1.2 Literature Review 
Some primary understandings about the market failures caused by information 
asymmetry have been provided by Akerlof (1970)’s argument on “the market for lemons.” 
Akerlof (1970) has claimed that the adverse selection caused by information asymmetry will 
drive good products out of the market and significantly undermine buyers’ willingness to pay, 
eventually leading to a market failure. More specifically, he has used an example of used car 
markets where the sellers have more knowledge about the quality of a car than the buyers. In this 
market, good cars and bad cars are sold at the same price since buyers cannot tell the difference 
between a good car and a bad car. Therefore, the owners of good cars do not want to participate 
in this market as they cannot receive the true value of their cars, resulting in bad cars driving 
good cars out of the market. He has also argued that the situation can be really disastrous if the 
grades of the products are more continuous, as the market eventually reaches the condition where 
no sellers would want to trade their products. He has shown this result using an analytic model 
where the demand for the products depends on the price of the product and the average quality of 
the products in the market, and both the supply of the products and the average quality depend on 
the price. He has assumed that the quality of the products is uniformly distributed and that the 
sellers have more knowledge about the quality of the products than the buyers. The analysis of 
this model has shown that, under information asymmetry, the average quality of supplied 
products at any given price will be low enough to make the total demand in the market zero. In 
 4 
 
other words, information asymmetry makes the sellers provide the products with lower than a 
certain quality level at a given price, causing both the price and the average quality to decline 
until no trade takes place in the market. He has also applied this adverse selection issue to the 
insurance market and explained that the average medical conditions of insurance applicants 
deteriorate as the price increases. In other words, just as the average quality of used cars falls as 
the price decreases, only those people who are increasingly certain that they need the insurance 
will insure themselves as the price level rises, and the price eventually reaches the level at which 
no one would purchase insurances. Through these findings, Akerlof (1970) has shown that 
information asymmetry in markets will cause adverse selection issues which may eventually 
harm the entire market structure. He has listed guarantee, brand names, chains, and licensing as 
possible institutions which will solve adverse selection issues.  
Since this seminal work, there have been numerous studies in economics and marketing 
that have attempted to provide possible solutions to the lemon problems from various 
perspectives. These studies have investigated what types of mechanisms are keeping the market 
system alive, and more specifically, under what circumstances sellers may resolve the problems 
occurring from information asymmetry in markets.
4
  
1.2.1 Full Disclosure 
The series of studies on information disclosure has first shown how verifiable disclosure 
can solve the adverse selection problems of Akerlof (1970), arguing that full disclosure naturally 
happens in markets under information asymmetry. The most important findings have come from 
the seminal studies of the Grossman-Milgrom framework (Grossman and Hart 1980; Grossman 
1981; Milgrom 1981), which is also very closely related with this dissertation. The main result of 
                                                 
4
 Dranove and Jin (2010) have provided a more detailed literature review on information disclosure and quality 
certification. 
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these three studies is that the seller will voluntarily reveal the quality information as long as 
fraudulent disclosure is prohibited and information disclosure is costless. 
First, Grossman and Hart (1980) have provided a theoretical finding that mandatory 
disclosure is not necessary to solve adverse selection issues as long as making false statements is 
prohibited. They have analyzed the standard information asymmetry case where sellers know the 
quality of the product while prospective buyers have no information about the quality, and 
buyers only know that the sellers have the information about the quality. In particular, there are 
many buyers and many sellers providing different products, and the price is assumed to follow 
the quality level where the product with the lowest quality has the lowest price and the product 
with the highest quality has the highest price. More importantly, the cost of information 
disclosure is assumed to be negligible in this case. They have shown that, under these 
circumstances, the only possible disclosure is full disclosure where the seller provides the true 
quality information because of the following logic. If the seller does not disclose the quality, then 
the buyer will assume that the quality is the lowest in the set of possible quality levels, since the 
seller could have made more profit by disclosing true quality and charging higher price if the true 
quality is not the lowest in the subset. They have also shown that a full disclosure is forthcoming 
even when the seller does not have perfect information about the quality, as the seller will still 
try to be as optimistic as possible regarding his claim. Therefore, as long as fraud is illegal and 
the cost of disclosing information is negligible, sellers will fully disclose quality information 
even without mandatory disclosure policy. One interesting aspect of their finding is that it does 
not require the buyers to be particularly sophisticated or have repeated interactions with sellers, 
as a very simple understanding that sellers will always try to be as optimistic as possible will let 
the buyers determine the pattern of sellers’ information disclosure. In a subsequent analysis, they 
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have relaxed the assumption of negligible disclosure cost and found out that only those sellers 
with higher than certain quality will fully disclose quality information and none of the bad sellers 
will pay the cost of information disclosure, as the sellers have to consider the fact that the price 
they can charge differs according to the true quality of the product. With these findings, 
Grossman and Hart (1980) have provided a primary theoretical understanding of full disclosure 
by showing that the market will always end up with voluntary full disclosure of the quality. More 
specifically, they have argued that no mandatory disclosure is necessary as hiding information 
will always be interpreted as having low quality, as long as there is a law against lying. However, 
their assumption of no lying or negligible disclosure cost is somewhat strong, and the literature 
on mandatory disclosure, which is examined in a following section, thus argues that a full 
disclosure is not forthcoming in real markets.  
Second, Grossman (1981) has developed the idea of full disclosure further by considering 
the monopoly situations where the monopolistic seller has the greatest incentive to mislead 
consumers by less than full disclosure since consumers have had no experience with the seller 
before and the product is sold at the consumer’s reservation price. He has first assumed that the 
monopolistic seller’s statement about the quality is not costly to communicate or verify ex post. 
For this assumption, he has provided the example of a diamond seller making statements about 
the weight of the diamond he is selling. As consumers can check the actual weight of the 
diamond after purchase, this statement about the weight of a diamond is ex post verifiable. He 
has shown that, under these circumstances, consumers with rational expectations will suppose 
that the monopolistic seller has the worst possible product if he does not make a full disclosure, 
and this makes the monopolist engage in a full disclosure. He has also considered the situation 
where the monopolistic seller’s statement about the quality is costly to communicate or verify ex 
 7 
 
post. However, even in this case, he argues that there should be certain attributes that are 
observable and related with true quality, and it is thus still possible for sellers to make ex post 
verifiable statements about the quality. According to his example, a patient may not fully 
understand the medical care he receives from a doctor, but he can at least observe the recurrence 
of an illness after the treatment. Therefore, although it is very costly to communicate the 
information about the actual medical treatment to the patient without proper medical knowledge 
(compared to the situation where a diamond seller shares information about a diamond’s weight), 
the doctor can still communicate the quality of his service through ex post verifiable patient’s 
status. He has shown that, even with the non-negligible cost of communicating and verifying true 
quality, the seller can still make ex post verifiable statement about the quality, and the consumers 
with rational expectations will thus conclude that the monopolistic seller tries to mislead the 
customers when he does make less than a full disclosure. Therefore, he has shown that even a 
monopolistic seller will voluntarily engage in full disclosure either because ex post verification 
of true quality is not costly for consumers or because there is at least some characteristic of the 
product which is observable, even when ex post verification of true quality is costly. In other 
words, he has basically considered the case where the product has certain attributes of which 
consumers can verify the true quality either directly or indirectly.
5
 Another important assumption 
behind his analysis is that he has restricted his attention to truthful disclosure and does not 
consider fraudulent disclosure, which is still a strong assumption. These results and assumptions 
are also consistent with Grossman and Hart (1980).  
Third, Milgrom (1981) has explained that full disclosure is forthcoming by observing the 
incentive for the sellers with high quality product to communicate favorable information. More 
                                                 
5
 This can be regarded as the case of search or experience attributes which is explained more in detail later in this 
dissertation.  
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specifically, he has provided a way to model how a signal follows true quality by incorporating a 
single unknown variable representing “quality” or “intrinsic value” and showing how this 
variable influences signaling. The model has explained that even when a party cannot observe 
the true quality, one can still observe the signals that are influenced by the actual quality levels, 
thus a full disclosure is naturally forthcoming. He has then applied this model to various different 
settings and shown how signaling good quality leads to favorable results for the interested party. 
First, he has analyzed how public announcement of good news about the future returns on a 
security affects the stock price. In his comparison of the effect from a favorable signal and an 
unfavorable signal, a favorable signal affects the expected value of random return more 
positively, and thus leads to higher prices. Second, he has considered the principal-agent problem 
where an agent expends a certain effort level and then influences the profit. In this case, as the 
actual effort level is unobservable, there is the possibility of moral hazard and a contract based 
on a specified level of effort is not enforceable. However, the principal can instead observe the 
profit level of the venture which is influenced by the effort. Therefore, the agent with higher 
effort level is willing to signal that information through achieving higher profit, which leads to 
the fee schedule increasing in the profit level. Third, a more general case of persuasion game, 
where one party tries to influence a decision maker by providing relevant information, has been 
analyzed. The interested party is assumed to have several pieces of data and may report or 
conceal any of these, but is not allowed to misreport them either because the information is 
verifiable or lying is prohibited by laws. The model shows that, at equilibrium, any withhold 
information by the interested party is regarded as unfavorable since the decision maker adopts 
the strategy of extreme skepticism, and the interested party’s best strategy to persuade the 
decision maker is thus a full disclosure. Therefore, through providing the relevant model and 
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application to different settings, Milgrom (1981) has shown that signaling effectively shows true 
quality or intrinsic value and thus encourages the interested party to communicate favorable 
information as much as possible, leading to a full disclosure in markets. Throughout the analysis, 
he has assumed that lying is impossible either because of the verification or regulations, just like 
the other studies on full disclosure reviewed above. 
In summary, these three seminal studies have provided an important finding that 
mandatory disclosure is not necessary to solve adverse selection issues, as rationality of 
consumers or the effectiveness of signaling mechanism encourages the sellers to fully disclose 
quality information. However, these papers have based their findings on one strong assumption 
that lying is not possible either because it is prohibited by laws or ex post verification is readily 
available. Therefore, we believe that one of the potential contributions of this dissertation is 
relaxing the no-lying assumption and considering the situation where sellers can fraudulently 
disclose false information. Moreover, while these studies on full disclosure have focused on the 
incentive for the sellers with high quality products (“high-type” sellers) to engage in a full 
disclosure (i.e., the incentive to communicate favorable information), this dissertation attempts to 
find whether voluntary disclosure can still solve adverse selection issues without the no-lying 
assumption by analyzing the incentive for the sellers with low-quality products to disclose 
quality information (i.e., the incentive to communicate unfavorable information). The potential 
contributions of this dissertation are discussed more in detail in a following section.   
Other than these seminal studies, several other studies have also argued that voluntary 
disclosure is forthcoming in markets. Jovanovic (1982) has even argued that more than the 
optimal amount of disclosure will happen in the market when there is disclosure cost and thus the 
government should encourage sales without disclosure. This finding is based on the assumption 
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that it is impossible for the seller to lie about the quality of his product, not because there is a law 
against lying but because the sellers worry about future business or litigation. Viscusi (1978) has 
called it an “unraveling process” when the disclosure of information happens top down, in such a 
way that full disclosure starts from the player with the highest quality and goes down to players 
with lower quality until the cost of information disclosure exceeds the benefit. This study has 
shown that unraveling happens not only in the product market with lemons but also in the labor 
market with potentially hazardous jobs, as the firms with better job outcomes will first invest in 
revealing true characteristics. Overall, the studies predicting full disclosure suggest that 
voluntary disclosure can solve adverse selection problems of Akerlof (1970), based on the 
assumption that sellers do not lie. These findings are summarized in Table 1.1.  
 
  
 
1
1
 
Table 1.1: Literature on Voluntary Disclosure 
 
Literature Key Findings Assumptions 
Grossman and Hart 
(1980) 
The market will always end up with voluntary full disclosure of the quality 
as hiding information will be interpreted as having low quality. If there is 
cost for disclosure, then only the sellers with product quality higher than a 
certain level will disclose. 
 Lying is prohibited by law.  
 There is no mandatory disclosure.  
 The cost of disclosure is either positive or zero. 
Grossman (1981) 
A monopolistic seller always makes a full disclosure about the quality of 
his product, as rational consumers will assume that the seller’s product has 
the worst possible quality if he makes less than a full disclosure.  
 Lying is prohibited. 
 Customers can verify seller’s statement ex 
post. 
 Disclosure cost is negligible. 
Milgrom (1981) 
Favorable information works as an effective signaling method which 
communicates true quality information. This favorable effect is shown in 
four different situations: a share price, an agent’s bonus, a buyer’s 
expectation about products, and a bidder’s expectation in a sealed-bid 
auction. Sellers are thus willing to commit to a full disclosure. 
 Lying is prohibited by law.  
 There is no cost of disclosure. 
Jovanovic (1982) 
More than the optimal amount of disclosure will happen in the market 
when there is disclosure cost, and thus the government should encourage 
sales without disclosure.  
 It is impossible for the seller to lie about the 
quality of his product, not because there is a 
law against lying but because the sellers worry 
about future business or litigation. 
Viscusi (1978) 
The disclosure of information happens top down in an “unraveling 
process”, in such a way that full disclosure starts from the player with the 
highest quality and goes down to players with lower quality until the cost 
of information disclosure exceed the benefit. The unraveling also happens 
in the labor market with potentially hazardous jobs. 
 There is no lying.  
 The cost of disclosure is positive. 
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1.2.2 Incomplete Disclosure 
Although the studies reviewed above have claimed that sellers will voluntarily commit to 
full disclosure, there is also a substantial literature that finds evidence that disclosure cannot be 
complete if it is not mandatory. These studies have listed various market factors such as 
disclosure costs, cost of acquiring quality information, customer’s misunderstanding of seller’s 
disclosure, customer’s ignorance, and market structure as possible reasons why voluntary 
disclosure is not sufficient to solve adverse selection problems.  
Disclosure cost. Basically, the Grossman-Milgrom framework (Grossman and Hart 1980; 
Grossman 1981; Milgrom 1981) reviewed above has claimed that the firms will follow full 
disclosure if the disclosure cost is negligible, implying that full disclosure is not possible with a 
certain level of disclosure cost as only the sellers with product quality higher than a certain level 
will disclose. Verrecchia (1983) has argued that the disclosure cost provides noise in interpreting 
firm’s disclosure effort. More specifically, when there is disclosure cost and certain information 
is withheld, the observers are unsure whether the information is bad or just not as good for the 
seller to incur disclosure costs. Therefore, there exists an equilibrium threshold level of 
disclosure. Although Viscusi (1978) has explained how unraveling happens and most firms 
disclose, the paper also explained that if disclosure is costly, then only sellers with quality higher 
than a threshold level will disclose relevant information.  
Market structure. Board (2009) has considered the competition in the market to explain 
the failure of full disclosure. This paper has shown that a firm may not disclose information in a 
competitive environment, as disclosing information may lead to stronger competition. Therefore, 
when one high-quality firm discloses, other firms should compare the cost of increased 
competition when they also disclose with the cost of reduced perceived quality when they do not 
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disclose. This paper thus has argued that it is possible that only high-quality firms choose to 
disclose, suggesting the need for mandatory disclosure. Cheong and Kim (2004) have argued that 
no firm will disclose information as the number of competing firms becomes infinity and the 
market is almost perfectly competitive, since the difference in the quality across different 
products becomes less evident. In other words, as there are more firms in the market, the benefit 
from information disclosure gets smaller due to price competition. Guo and Zhao (2009) have 
added another perspective to the consideration of the competition in understanding information 
disclosure by examining the sequential disclosing behavior in a duopoly setting. They have 
found that the leader reveals less information under sequential disclosure case than under 
simultaneous disclosure situation, while the follower may reveal more or less information 
depending on the disclosure cost. Hotz and Xiao (2013) have focused on the heterogeneity in the 
market in terms of product attributes and customer preferences. They have shown that neither 
high-types nor low-types would disclose information, as more information results in more elastic 
demand, which in turn leads to increased price competition among the firms. Therefore, they 
suggest that government intervention or mandatory disclosure may benefit customers in the 
market.  
Overall, these studies have shown that competition leads to less information disclosure, 
which is somewhat counterintuitive. However, the literature has mixed opinion on the impact of 
competition on disclosure. Unlike other studies that have basically argued that competition leads 
to less information disclosure, Stivers (2004) has shown that when customers do not know that 
the quality information is commonly available among sellers, an increased number of sellers and 
stronger competition will lead to more information disclosure not only because the probability of 
all sellers having quality below a critical level and concealing relevant information falls, but also 
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because sellers are willing to reveal information and make competitors look worse in this 
condition.  
Ignorance. Fishman and Hagerty (2003) have questioned the assumption that all 
customers understand the seller’s disclosure and analyzed the case where only some customers 
understand it. They have found that voluntary disclosure is not forthcoming when the ratio of 
customers who understand the disclosure is low, and mandatory disclosure is thus necessary for 
the markets where the product information is difficult for customers to fully understand.  
Cognitive errors. On the other hand, Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh (2004) have focused on 
the observer’s limited attention and cognitive processing power. Therefore, instead of the 
assumption that people cannot understand the disclosed information, they have assumed that 
people neglect either the signal or the implications of non-disclosure, which has resulted in less 
than full information disclosure and excessive amount of optimism about the quality. Schwartz 
(2008) has come up with similar findings focusing on the cognitive errors of customers, in that 
some customers are more naïve and prone to err than others. Therefore, the naïveté of customers 
discourages the firms from disclosing relevant information, and the likelihood of socially 
desirable disclosure increases with the number of sophisticated customers in the market.  
Customer’s confusion. Focusing on the case of eco-labels, Harbaugh, Maxwell, and 
Roussillon (2011) have shown that when customers are unsure of the disclosed information, then 
full disclosure may not be forthcoming. More specifically, they have shown that consumer 
confusion is aggravated when the label is used by a product with bad reputation, when there is 
proliferation of the label, and when the firms strategically use it based on the customer doubt. 
According to this finding, mandatory labeling may be one way to reduce the confusion and solve 
disclosure issues.  
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Cost of quality assessment. Both Matthews and Postlewaite (1985) and Shavell (1994) 
have provided an interesting finding by considering the case of sellers having to incur costs to 
test their own products and acquire quality information. These studies have found that even 
certain imperfect mandatory disclosure laws can actually reduce the amount of information 
disclosed by the firm, as the firms do not invest in obtaining quality information because they 
worry that negative information might be revealed. For example, a car manufacturer may not 
invest in the research to find potential defects if they have to disclose all of their findings.  
Seller’s risk averseness. Milgrom and Roberts (1986) have indicated the seller’s concern 
of affecting customer’s knowledge of quality distribution as the reason for why voluntary 
disclosure is not happening. According to their explanation, sellers do not always know what 
information is favorable, and they worry that any information revealed will downgrade all 
possible alternatives in the market as customers become more skeptical. For this reason, firms 
may be reluctant to disclose any kinds of information.  
Reputation of reticence. Grubb (2011) has focused on the dynamic context and provided 
an interesting explanation about why some sellers try to conceal even favorable information. 
Sellers may try to get the reputation of reticence, withholding some good information either to 
improve the credibility of prior nondisclosures or to make the customers less skeptical of future 
nondisclosures.  
Seller capacity. Gavazza and Lizzeri (2007) have focused on the public sector settings 
and shown that high-quality service providers may be reluctant to disclose quality information, 
as doing so can lead to increased demand for their services and cause capacity issues, which 
makes it different from the outcome for private sector firms. They have suggested some reforms 
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of the incentives facing the bureaucrats and claimed that this may also be applied to some private 
sectors where prices do not fully adjust.  
Strategic decision on multi-dimensional product. Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat (2012) 
have examined the monopolistic market where a seller sells a good with two characteristics and 
found the following: When there is an exogenous change in the cost of information gathering and 
the relevant information becomes easier to obtain, that change may affect customer welfare 
negatively. If an intermediary appears to reduce risk on one characteristic, it affects the firm’s 
investment in such a way that it only improves the dimension that it has to disclose the 
information about, and reduces investment on the other dimension, thereby hurting some 
customers’ welfare. Therefore, even a standard mandatory disclosure may not solve this problem 
unless the relevant policy considers this multi-dimensional aspect of the product and firm’s 
strategic considerations.  
Overall, these studies have provided various reasons why full disclosure is not easily 
observed. In other words, contrary to the primary findings of the literature which predict full 
disclosure, there seem to be considerable amount of issues in markets that suggest the need for 
mandatory disclosure. Moreover, several studies (Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat 2012; Matthews 
and Postlewaite 1985; Shavell 1994) reviewed above have even argued that imperfect mandatory 
disclosure can worsen the situation. These studies are summarized in Table 1.2.  
 
  
 
1
7
 
Table 1.2: Literature Supporting Mandatory Disclosure 
 
Literature Key Findings Reason for Failed Disclosure 
Verrecchia (1983) 
The disclosure cost provides noise in interpreting a firm’s disclosure effort and creates an 
equilibrium threshold level of disclosure. 
Disclosure cost 
Viscusi (1978) 
If disclosure is costly, then only sellers with quality higher than a threshold level will 
disclose relevant information. 
Board (2009) 
A firm may not disclose information in a competitive environment, as disclosing 
information may lead to stronger competition. Therefore, it is possible that only high-
quality firms choose to disclose. 
Market structure 
(Competitive environment) 
Cheong and Kim 
(2004) 
No firm will disclose information as the number of competing firms becomes infinity and 
the market is almost perfectly competitive, since the difference in the quality across 
different products becomes less evident. 
Guo and Zhao (2009) 
In a duopoly setting, the leader reveals less information under sequential disclosure case 
than under simultaneous disclosure situation, while the follower may reveal more or less 
information depending on the disclosure cost. 
Hotz and Xiao (2013) 
Neither high-type nor low-type would disclose information, as more information results in 
more elastic demand, which leads to increased price competition among the firms. 
Therefore, a government intervention or mandatory disclosure may benefit customers in the 
market. 
Stivers (2004) 
When customers do not know that the quality information is commonly available among 
sellers, increased number of sellers and stronger competition will lead to more information 
disclosure because sellers are willing to reveal information and make competitors look 
worse in this condition. 
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Table 1.2: Literature Supporting Mandatory Disclosure (Continued) 
 
Literature Key Findings Reason for Failed Disclosure 
Fishman and Hagerty 
(2003) 
Voluntary disclosure is not forthcoming when the ratio of customers who understand the 
disclosure is low, and mandatory disclosure is thus necessary for markets where the 
product information is difficult for customers to fully understand. 
Ignorance 
Hirshleifer et al. (2004) 
When customers have limited attention and cognitive processing power and thus either 
ignore the signal or the implications of non-disclosure, there is less than full information 
disclosure and an excessive amount of optimism about the quality. 
Cognitive errors 
Schwartz (2008) 
The naïveté of customers discourages the firms from disclosing relevant information, and 
the likelihood of socially desirable disclosure increases with the number of sophisticated 
customers in the market.  
Harbaugh, Maxwell, 
and Roussillon (2011) 
Consumer confusion is aggravated when the ecolabel is used by a product with bad 
reputation, when there is proliferation of the label, and when the firms strategically uses 
it based on the customer doubt. According to this finding, mandatory labeling may be 
one way to reduce the confusion and solve disclosure issues. 
Customer’s confusion 
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Table 1.2: Literature Supporting Mandatory Disclosure (Continued) 
 
Literature Key Findings Reason for Failed Disclosure 
Matthews and 
Postlewaite (1985); 
Shavell (1994) 
Imperfect mandatory disclosure law can reduce the amount of information disclosed by firms, as 
the firms do not invest on obtaining quality information out of concern that negative information 
might be revealed.  
Cost of quality 
assessment 
Milgrom and Roberts 
(1986) 
Sellers do not always know what information is favorable, and they worry that any information 
revealed will downgrade all possible alternatives in the market as customers become more 
skeptical.  
Seller’s risk averseness 
Grubb (2011) 
Sellers may try to get the reputation of reticence, withholding some good information either to 
improve the credibility of prior nondisclosures or to make the customers less skeptical of future 
nondisclosures. 
Reputation of reticence 
Gavazza and Lizzeri 
(2007) 
High-quality public sector service provider may be reluctant to disclose quality information as it 
can lead to increased demand for their services and cause capacity issues. 
Seller capacity 
Bar-Isaac, Caruana, 
and Cuñat (2012) 
If an intermediary appears to reduce risk on one characteristic, it affects the firm’s investment in 
such a way that it only improves the dimension that it has to disclose the information about, and 
reduces investment on the other dimension, thereby hurting some customers’ welfare.  
Strategic decision on 
multi-dimensional 
product 
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1.2.3 Empirical Findings on Information Disclosure 
The literature on information disclosure is more focused on theoretical analysis, as is 
shown in the reviews above, and the number of empirical studies is relatively small. Most of 
these empirical studies on information disclosure have claimed that mandatory disclosure is 
necessary to solve adverse selection issues of Akerlof (1970), while some studies have shown 
how voluntary disclosure can be an effective solution for information asymmetry in market.  
Need for mandatory disclosure. Mathios (2000) has examined the information disclosure 
of the salad dressings market before Nutrition Labeling and Education Act (NLEA) and found 
that while all of the sellers of low-fat dressings voluntarily disclosed fat content information, 
only 9 percent of the sellers of high-fat dressings did so. From this result, he has argued that 
mandatory disclosure of relevant product information will have a positive impact on consumer 
behavior and health. Edelman (2009) has observed adverse selection with trust certifications 
used by many Internet websites. He has examined SiteAdvisor’s measurement data of various 
websites’ safety and found that TRUSTe-certified websites are actually more than twice as likely 
to be untrustworthy as uncertified sites. He has explained that this happens because a trust 
authority currently benefits from that error and thus ignores it. Therefore, he has suggested 
policies to alter the authorities’ behavior such as sanctions, laws, or regulations. Jin (2005) has 
shown why voluntary disclosure is not complete, focusing on the competition effects. She has 
observed health maintenance organizations’ (HMOs) voluntary disclosure of product quality and 
found that the disclosure decision differs depending on the level of competition. HMOs use 
information disclosure as means to differentiate themselves and disclosure propensity declines 
with the degree of competition, which is consistent with some of the theoretical findings about 
the impact of competition on information disclosure reviewed above. Jin and Leslie (2003) have 
 21 
 
done an interesting natural experiment by comparing health inspection scores, consumer 
demands, and the number of foodborne illness hospitalizations before and after Los Angeles 
County forced restaurants to display hygiene quality grade cards. They have found a lot of 
evidence of positive impact of mandatory disclosure, such as increased health inspection scores 
and decreased hospitalizations due to foodborne illness. Bennear and Olmstead (2008) have also 
found similar positive effects of mandatory disclosure. They have studied how 517 drinking 
water suppliers in Massachusetts provide customers with the information about the quality of 
drinking water they purchase and found that the suppliers who serve more than 10,000 customers 
and thus are mandated to directly mail the reports had significantly lower violations of drinking 
water standards, and also reduced health violations by 40 to 57 percent. Xiao (2010) has 
investigated the effect of quality accreditation in the childcare market through a structural model 
of demand allowing consumers to gather quality information from both accreditation status and 
firm reputation. The result has shown that consumers do not get meaningful information out of 
accreditation status considering the effect of reputation, and its contribution to consumer welfare 
is merely 2 percent, suggesting overall ineffectiveness of the accreditation mechanism. 
Jin and Kato (2006) have shown evidences that voluntary disclosure may not work in an 
online setting, and is very closely related with the Essay 2 of this dissertation. By analyzing sales 
data of collectible baseball cards from eBay and also purchasing and observing the actual 
products, they have found that while higher-quality claim cards yield price premium, the average 
quality from high-claim cards is indistinguishable from cards with more modest claims, and 
reputable sellers do not provide better-quality products either. These results have shown that 
there is actually a considerable amount of fraud in this online market under information 
asymmetry and the information disclosure mechanisms do not work properly to prevent adverse 
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selection issues in this marketplace. In particular, this study has some similarities with Essay 2 of 
this dissertation, as both use the data from same product category and investigate the relationship 
between claimed quality and information disclosure. However, the focus and findings are 
different, as Jin and Kato (2006) basically show how low-type sellers fraudulently claim higher 
quality (i.e., conceal their types) and achieve higher profit, while Essay 2 explains how low-type 
sellers fully disclose quality information and increase profit. More detailed discussion on the 
comparisons between these papers is followed in a later section. 
Support for voluntary disclosure. Lewis (2011) has examined the effect of online 
information disclosure through observing nearly 50,000 car transactions on eBay Motors. The 
study found that text and photos posted online work as enforceable contract and thus alleviate 
information asymmetry, strongly influencing prices. It has also found that disclosure cost affects 
how much information a seller decides to post. Li, Srinivasan, and Sun (2009) have investigated 
how product quality indicators such as picture postings and money-back guarantees and seller 
credibility indicators such as seller rating and third-party payment alleviate dual information 
asymmetry (uncertainty about product quality and seller credibility) in an auction setting by 
observing eBay’s paintings and silver plates market. They have found that those indicators 
encourage bidder participation, and the effect is even stronger when both types of indicators are 
used simultaneously.  
Overall, while most of the empirical findings have argued that mandatory disclosure is 
necessary, some other studies have shown that voluntary disclosure may help alleviate 
information asymmetry in markets. These mixed results are summarized in Table 1.3.  
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Table 1.3: Empirical Literature on Information Disclosure 
 
Literature Key Findings Context 
Support for Mandatory 
Disclosure 
Mathios (2000) 
While all of the sellers of low-fat dressings voluntarily disclosed fat content information, only 9% 
of the sellers of high-fat dressings did so without mandatory disclosure. Therefore, mandatory 
disclosure of relevant product information will have positive impact on consumer behavior and 
health. 
Salad dressings Yes 
Edelman (2009) 
TRUSTe-certified websites are actually more than twice as likely to be untrustworthy as 
uncertified sites. This happens because a trust authority currently benefits from that error and thus 
ignores it.  
Internet websites Yes 
Jin (2005) 
Health maintenance organizations (HMOs) use information disclosure as a means to differentiate 
themselves and disclosure propensity declines with the degree of competition. 
Healthcare service Yes 
Jin and Leslie 
(2003) 
After Los Angeles County forced restaurants to display hygiene quality grade cards, a lot of 
evidence of positive impact of mandatory disclosure have been observed, such as increased health 
inspection scores and decreased hospitalizations due to foodborne illness. 
Restaurants Yes 
Bennear and 
Olmstead (2008) 
The drinking water suppliers who serve more than 10,000 customers and thus are mandated to 
directly mail the reports had significantly lower violations of drinking water standards, and also 
reduced health violations by 40–57%. 
Drinking water Yes 
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Table 1.3: Empirical Literature on Information Disclosure (Continued) 
 
Literature Key Findings Context 
Support for Mandatory 
Disclosure 
Jin and Kato (2006) 
There is a considerable amount of fraud in the online collectible goods market under information 
asymmetry, and the information disclosure mechanisms do not work properly to prevent adverse 
selection issues in this market. 
Collectible goods 
(Online) 
Yes 
Xiao (2010) 
Consumers do not get meaningful information out of accreditation status considering the effect of 
reputation, and its contribution on consumer welfare is merely 2%, suggesting overall 
ineffectiveness of the accreditation mechanism. 
Childcare service Yes 
Lewis (2011) 
In an online car market, text and photos posted online work as enforceable contract and thus 
alleviate information asymmetry, strongly influencing prices. Disclosure cost affects how much 
information a seller decides to post. 
Used cars (Online) No 
Li, Srinivasan, and 
Sun (2009) 
In eBay’s paintings and silver plates market, product quality indicators such as picture postings 
and money-back guarantees and seller credibility indicators such as seller rating and third-party 
payment alleviate dual information asymmetry (uncertainty about product quality and seller 
credibility).  
Antiques (Online) No 
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1.2.4 Literature on Certification 
The literature has indicated that the consequence of information disclosure depends 
mostly on the effectiveness of signaling methods employed by sellers. Among various signaling 
methods, information disclosure literature has focused on the effect of third-party certifications, 
as reputation is not easy to establish in the short run, a seller’s own signaling is generally not 
trustworthy, and warranty is usually not appropriate for credence attributes that customers cannot 
evaluate. Some studies on certification have empirically checked the effectiveness of 
certification and focused on whether it solves adverse selection issues in a market or not, and 
some other studies have explained what makes the mechanism work poorly.  
The effect of certification. Anderson, Daly, and Johnson (1999) have investigated 514 
publicly held firms that obtained ISO 9000 certificates and found that the firms used the 
certificates in order to send a credible public signal about their quality management practices and 
not simply sought to meet some regulatory standards, which is contrary to the views of critics of 
ISO 9000. Therefore, this study has shown that certification works as an effective risk 
intermediary. On the other hand, Xiao (2010), as reviewed above, has shown that the effect of 
accreditation in the childcare market is not significant, by observing that consumers do not get 
meaningful information out of accreditation and its contribution on consumer welfare is merely 2 
percent.  
The bias of certifiers. Feinstein (1989) has investigated the result of more than 1,000 
Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspections of nuclear power plants over three years and 
found that NRC inspectors’ rates of detecting violations differ significantly. Interestingly, 
detection rates increased abruptly after Three Mile Island incident in 1979. They have also found 
that these undetected violations had a significant impact on the number of abnormal occurrences 
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at the power plants, indicating that the biased certification system caused by incompetent 
certifiers may harm the entire system. As is explained above, Edelman (2009) has observed the 
trust certifications of Internet websites and shown that TRUSTe-certified websites are actually 
more untrustworthy than uncertified sites because a trust authority benefits from that error and 
ignores it. Prendergast (2007) has explained that some government certifiers show bureaucratic 
bias depending on whether they advocate for the clients or the principal.  
The analysis of third-party certifiers in the finance industry has also shown interesting 
findings. By analyzing the career concerns of security analysts, Hong and Kubik (2003) have 
found that optimism helped the analysts covering stocks underwritten by their houses more than 
accuracy did. The analysts who issue more optimistic forecasts on the stocks are 38 percent less 
likely to move down the hierarchy and 90 percent more likely to move up. This suggests that 
analysts who care about their careers may have some positive bias on their forecasts. On the 
other hand, Lim (2001) has argued that the reason financial analysts make optimistic and 
inaccurate forecasts is that they try to obtain management access and improve their overall 
forecast precision. He has also provided empirical evidence supporting this argument by 
examining forecasts of quarterly earnings reported by analysts at more than 300 brokerage firms. 
This has suggested that the positive bias actually comes from the analysts’ rational and strategic 
consideration to improve their overall performances. Michaely and Womack (1999) have shown 
that “buy” recommendations by affiliated underwriters are biased and thus inferior to the 
recommendations by unaffiliated, non-underwriters because of the investment bank’s 
relationship with the IPO firm, thus making suboptimal effects to the public. This suggests that 
conflict of interest among the analysts, their firm, and the investing clients may be the reason for 
the bias of the analysts. 
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A similar conflict of interest can be found in Waguespack and Sorenson (2011) in a 
different industry. They have found that the Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)’s 
parental guidance classification of movies is biased in that movies distributed by its own 
members or created by more influential producers or directors are classified more leniently than 
others. This again suggests that conflict of interest may bias the third-party certification 
mechanism, leading to negative impact on the public, and in particular in this case, on 
independent movie distributors or producers.  
Other reasons of certification ineffectiveness. Other than the certifier’s own concern, the 
literature has listed customer-side issues and market structure as reasons why certification is not 
effective. As reviewed above, Harbaugh et al. (2011) have shown that consumer confusion is 
exacerbated when the certification is used by a product with a bad reputation, when there is 
proliferation of the label, and when the firm strategically uses it based on the customer doubt, 
leading to a less trustworthy certification mechanism. Lizzeri (1999) has explained that the 
competitive environment for risk intermediary impacts the quality of certification. Its analytic 
model has shown that a monopoly certifier would only disclose whether the quality is above 
certain standard, while competition encourages full disclosure. 
 Overall, the literature on certification has explained that many factors related with 
certifier, customer, and market structure can impact the effectiveness of a certification 
mechanism, and some have recommended mandatory disclosure for resolving possible adverse 
selection issues under information asymmetry. These results are summarized in Table 1.4.  
  
 
2
8
 
Table 1.4: Literature on Certification 
 
Literature Key Findings Context Subject 
Anderson et al. 
(1999) 
The firms have used the certificates in order to send a credible public signal about their quality 
management practices and not simply sought to meet some regulatory standards, which is 
contrary to the views of critics of ISO 9000.  
ISO 9000 certificates Certification effectiveness 
Xiao (2010) 
Consumers do not get meaningful information out of accreditation and its contribution to 
consumer welfare is merely 2%. 
Childcare service 
Certification 
ineffectiveness 
Feinstein (1989) 
The Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) inspectors’ rates of detecting violations differ 
significantly. Interestingly, detection rates increased abruptly after Three Mile Island incident in 
1979. These undetected violations had a significant impact on the number of abnormal 
occurrences at the power plants, indicating that the biased certification system caused by 
incompetent certifiers may harm the entire system. 
Nuclear power plants 
Bias of certifier 
Edelman (2009) 
TRUSTe-certified websites are actually more untrustworthy than uncertified sites because a 
trust authority benefits from that error and ignores it. 
Internet websites 
Prendergast (2007) 
Some government certifiers show bureaucratic bias depending on whether they advocate the 
clients or the principal. 
Public service 
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Table 1.4: Literature on Certification (Continued) 
 
Literature Key Findings Context Topic 
Hong and Kubik 
(2003) 
The analysts who issue more optimistic forecasts on the stocks are 38% less likely to move 
down the hierarchy and 90% more likely to move up. This suggests that analysts who care 
about their careers may have some positive bias on their forecasts. 
Financial advisory 
service 
Bias of certifier 
Lim (2001) 
The reason financial analysts make optimistic and inaccurate forecasts is that they try to 
obtain management access and improve their overall forecast precision. This suggests that the 
positive bias actually comes from the analysts’ rational and strategic consideration to improve 
their overall performance. 
Financial advisory 
service 
Michaely and 
Womack (1999) 
“Buy” recommendations by affiliated underwriters are biased and thus inferior to the 
recommendations by unaffiliated, non-underwriters because of the investment bank’s 
relationship with the IPO firm, thus making suboptimal effects to the public.  
Financial advisory 
service 
Waguespack and 
Sorenson (2011) 
The Motion Picture Association of America (MPAA)’s parental guidance classification of 
movies is biased in that the movies distributed by its own members or created by more 
influential producers or directors are classified more leniently than others.  
Movie rating 
Harbaugh et al. 
(2011) 
The consumer confusion is exacerbated when the certification is used by a product with bad 
reputation, when there is proliferation of the label, and when the firm strategically uses it 
based on the customer doubt, leading to less trustworthy certification mechanism. 
Theoretical Consumer confusion 
Lizzeri (1999) 
The competitive environment for risk intermediary impacts the quality of certification. Its 
analytic model has shown that a monopoly certifier would only disclose whether the quality is 
above certain standard, while competition encourages full disclosure.   
Theoretical Competitive environment 
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1.3 Contribution of the Dissertation 
1.3.1 Economic Incentive for Disclosing Low Quality 
As is explained above, the literature has provided diverse understanding regarding how 
information disclosure may or may not solve the adverse selection issues in markets. This essay 
attempts to provide another perspective to the literature that has not been considered but is very 
important in understanding information asymmetry in markets. More specifically, this 
dissertation investigates the economic incentive for sellers with low-quality products to 
voluntarily disclose quality information.  
The inclination of low-type sellers to conceal quality information has been regarded as 
one of the fundamental reasons why full disclosure is not forthcoming in reality. As is explained 
above, the literature supporting mandatory disclosure has argued that full disclosure does not 
happen because low-types try to withhold quality information under various circumstances, such 
as high disclosure cost (Verrecchia 1983; Viscusi 1978), highly competitive environment (Board 
2009; Cheong and Kim 2004; Guo and Zhao 2009; Hotz and Xiao 2013; Stivers 2004), irrational 
customers (Fishman and Hagerty 2003; Harbaugh, Maxwell, and Roussillon 2011; Hirshleifer, 
Lim, and Teoh 2004; Schwartz 2008), and others (Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat 2012; Gavazza 
and Lizzeri 2007; Grubb 2011; Matthews and Postlewaite 1985; Milgrom and Roberts 1986).  
The literature has also generally agreed that there exist incentives for high-type sellers to 
reveal their types, but not for low-type sellers. In his seminal paper, Spence (1973) has suggested 
the education as signaling strategy and shown that high-quality employees always try to separate 
themselves from low-quality employees through higher education. Milgrom (1981) has called it 
a monotonicity property that higher-quality types always try to signal or disclose information 
more than lower-quality types, as disclosing the information about low quality will result in 
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lower valuation than no disclosure. Akerlof (1976) has shown how more talented workers try to 
work faster than the socially optimal pace to differentiate themselves from less talented workers. 
Milgrom and Weber (1982) have developed a model of competitive bidding in an auction setting 
and shown that although more information improves revenues on average and thus disclosure 
generally helps, unfavorable news will decrease revenues below a non-disclosure situation.  
Moreover, the findings from the literature on voluntary disclosure are somewhat limited 
in explaining what happens in real markets, as they have basically assumed that lying is 
impossible either because it is prohibited by law (Grossman and Hart 1980; Grossman 1981; 
Milgrom 1981) or because sellers care about reputation (Jovanovic 1982). In particular, the 
reputation or trust motive in a market relationship has also been supported throughout various 
studies in economics and marketing. Some have claimed that repeated purchases and reputations 
can solve the “lemons” problem since firms prefer to maintain their reputations and thus honestly 
share quality-related information (Farrell 1980; Heal 1976; Riordan 1986; Shapiro 1982, 1983; 
Smallwood and Conlisk 1979; Wilson 1985). Shapiro (1983) has analyzed the market where 
customers cannot evaluate the quality of products before purchase and shown that, although 
sellers can benefit from reducing quality and not disclosing in the short run, the sellers who sold 
high-quality products in the past have an incentive to maintain their reputation as they will be 
rewarded with high prices and high profits. On a similar note, the studies on trust in marketing 
relationships have also provided further insight about why sellers try to be honest to maintain 
relationships with other players in the market. According to Geyskens, Steenkamp, and Kumar 
(1998), most of major empirical studies about trust in marketing channel relationships have 
specified honesty as an operational factor of trust. However, the explanation based on reputation 
or trust in relationships may not apply to one-off purchase or non-repeated purchase situations, 
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and even under repeated-purchase situations where reputation matters, it seems that many sellers 
are actually myopic and do overstate their product qualities possibly because they only care 
about short-term profit. Moreover, the regulatory mechanism to prevent deceit of sellers may not 
work well either, as we can still observe numerous cases of seller-side frauds, including the 
examples shown at the beginning of this dissertation. Sellers’ fraud has also been verified by the 
empirical investigation of Jin and Kato (2006), who have observed a considerable amount of 
fraud in the market for collectible baseball cards. Accordingly, if low-type sellers fraudulently 
mislead customers, then the no-lying assumption is hard-pressed to withstand the challenges 
from reality and the argument of full disclosure thus becomes invalid. 
Therefore, if we can figure out whether, why, and under what circumstances low-type 
sellers voluntarily disclose their types, a full disclosure argument can be supported even without 
no-lying assumptions. The understanding of the economic incentives for low-type sellers to 
disclose quality information will provide useful knowledge on how we can encourage voluntary 
disclosure and achieve full disclosure in the market, and whether mandatory disclosure and 
government intervention are really necessary to solve adverse selection problems. Nevertheless, 
there have not been sufficient efforts to understand how unfavorable information helps sellers or 
the existence of economic incentive for low-types to voluntarily reveal their qualities, except for 
a few recent studies. Berger, Sorensen, and Rasmussen (2010) have shown the circumstances 
where negative publicity can benefit sellers. In their study, they have found that negative reviews 
in the New York Times actually raised awareness of some less-known books, resulting in the 
increased sales. Tadelis and Zettelmeyer (2015) have found that negative information can act as 
a matching mechanism and increase sales for low-quality products when there exist separate 
markets for products with different quality levels. While these papers have focused on the special 
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cases, such as when the product has low awareness or there is a separate market for the 
customers who prefer low-quality products, a more universal explanation on the incentive for 
low-type sellers to voluntarily disclose unfavorable information in markets is still lacking. 
Facing these gaps in the literature, this study attempts to provide a different framework 
for understanding information asymmetry in markets through verifying the economic incentives 
for low-type sellers to fully disclose their types. We especially believe that an important missing 
piece in the stream of related research is the understanding of the effect of customer’s perceived 
risk of purchase since newly revealed information, either positive or negative, is expected to 
influence the perceived risk of a customer and affect customer’s purchasing decisions. As we 
focus on the effect of perceived risk on purchase, we also consider the role of risk intermediaries, 
such as third-party certification, that can affect the perceived risk of purchase. Moreover, we 
investigate the effect of the risk propensities of customers, as some customers are more sensitive 
to risk from purchase than others. We believe the findings from this study can be generally 
applied to most market situations where sellers have to deal with the information about their 
weaknesses, and thus provide better advice on the need for mandatory vs. voluntary disclosure 
and how to solve adverse selection issues in the market for lemons (Akerlof 1970).  
1.3.2 Impact of Certification on Information Disclosure 
In addition to examining the incentive for information disclosure for low-type sellers, this 
study examines how the characteristics of a third-party certification help the market achieve full 
disclosure. As explained above, the literature on certification mostly focuses on the conditions 
under which certain certification is biased or provides inaccurate information. More specifically, 
they have listed the bias of human certifiers (Edelman 2009; Feinstein 1989; Hong and Kubik 
2003; Lim 2001; Michaely and Womack 1999; Prendergast 2007; Waguespack and Sorenson 
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2011), consumer confusion (Harbaugh, Maxwell, and Roussillon 2011), and the competitive 
environment (Lizzeri 1999) as reasons why certification does not function effectively. However, 
there has not been sufficient understanding regarding how specific types of certification impact 
market outcomes, and the optimal design of the certification that accomplishes full disclosure. 
Therefore, after investigating how low-type sellers can benefit from information disclosure 
through information intermediary such as certification, this study investigates how the noise of 
certification affects seller and customer decisions under information asymmetry, with the 
intention of providing guidance on the design of effective certification mechanism. Once we can 
figure out both the incentive for low-type sellers to disclose their types and the optimal design of 
certification for full disclosure, then we may find whether mandatory disclosure or government 
intervention is necessary to solve adverse selection problems.  
1.4 Dissertation Structure and Preview 
This dissertation pursues this research object theoretically, experimentally, and 
empirically. In Essay 1, we attempt to provide a new theoretical understanding about the 
information asymmetry in markets by showing that there exist economic incentives for low-type 
sellers to fully disclose their types. The essay explains whether, when, and how a low-type 
seller’s information disclosure can enhance both sellers’ profitability and customers’ welfare and 
also increase the market demand and the demand for the high-type seller through an analytic 
model and observations from lab experiments. This essay is thus expected to present an 
important theoretical basis to solve various market dilemmas under information asymmetry, 
possibly supporting the literature on voluntary disclosure. Essay 2 primarily confirms the 
counterintuitive predictions from Essay 1 through observing sales data of collectible baseball 
cards, coins, and stamps from one of the major online sellers in the U.S., focusing on measuring 
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and comparing the sizes of economic incentives to disclose vs. conceal low-quality information. 
This essay also relaxes the original assumption of uniform distribution of customers’ risk 
sensitivity and shows that voluntarily revealing weakness is more effective when selling higher-
than-average-quality products than when selling lower-than-average-quality products. One more 
interesting finding from this essay is that the incentive for full disclosure and the effect of 
certification differ across different markets, which provides a motivation for the next essay. 
Based on this observation, Essay 3 attempts to assess the effect of certifications of varying 
qualities on various market outcomes such as seller profit, buyer profit, and the level of 
information disclosure. Through the analytic model and economic experiments, this essay finds 
that an inaccurate certification is even worse than having no certification for sellers, as it 
provides the lowest profit, but it helps buyers through increasing their profits as sellers disclose 
more information than when there is no certification, even though the certification is inaccurate. 
By analyzing various drivers of seller and buyer profit under information asymmetry, this essay 
also suggests that using certification and disclosing information is generally the best method to 
increase profit for sellers under information asymmetry. Therefore, the result of Essay 3 is 
consistent with the findings from previous essays that the certification provides economic 
incentives for sellers to fully disclose and increases social welfare, and that the economic 
incentive for information disclosure differs across different product categories.  
Overall, this study has important implications, ranging from the analysis of “lemons” 
markets to regulatory policies about market frauds, as this is one of the first attempts to 
understand the economic incentives for low-type sellers to reveal their quality, and suggest the 
optimal design of certification to solve various issues in markets under information asymmetry. 
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This dissertation concludes with more detailed discussion of the contributions and managerial 
implications. 
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2. ESSAY 1: THE ECONOMIC INCENTIVE FOR LOW-TYPE SELLERS’ 
INFORMATION DISCLOSURE 
2.1 Introduction 
As explained in the previous chapter, this essay attempts to provide a theoretical 
framework for understanding sellers’ disclosure of quality information to customers. In particular, 
we are interested in whether, when, and how sellers of low-quality products disclose quality 
information. In order to do that, this essay focuses on the effect of the customer’s perceived risk 
of purchase, as newly shared information influences the perceived risk of a customer and affects 
her purchasing decisions. Therefore, the concepts of perceived risk of purchase and search, 
experience, and credence attributes, which are discussed more in detail in a following section, 
play key roles in developing the theories and analytic models of this essay. 
 Ever since Bauer (1960) first identified the concept of risk as a major influence on 
customer choice, various researchers have produced some general understanding about perceived 
risk of purchase (Dowling 1986; Markin, Jr. 1974; Ross 1975; Stone and Winter 1985; Taylor 
1974). Perceived risk of purchase has been generally defined as the function of the probability of 
possible loss and the size of loss from purchase (Dowling 1986; Markin, Jr. 1974; Peter and 
Ryan 1976; Peter and Tarpey, Sr. 1975; Ross 1975; Srinivasan and Ratchford 1991; Taylor 
1974). Perceived risk has a pseudo-vertical characteristic since customers usually try to decrease 
the probability rather than the size of loss when attempting to reduce the risk before purchase 
(Cox 1967; Markin, Jr. 1974; Peter and Ryan 1976; Ross 1975). Therefore, information search is 
an often-used risk-reduction method by customers since the probability of loss diminishes with 
more information. This linkage between information search and risk and how information 
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acquisition affects a customer’s purchase decision process have been explained in various studies 
(Murray 1991; Putsis, Jr. and Srinivasan 1994; Srinivasan and Ratchford 1991; Zeithaml 1981).  
 In this essay, we examine the impact of the low-quality seller’s information disclosure 
through an analytic model that investigates the tradeoff between expected benefit and perceived 
risk from purchase. The model observes a duopoly situation where there is one seller who always 
claims high quality and another seller with low-quality products who claims either high quality 
(incomplete disclosure) or low quality (full disclosure). This allows us to analyze the impact 
when a low-type seller shares his quality information and reveals his type. Moreover, we assume 
the sellers are myopic and base all of the analyses on a non-repeating, one-time purchase 
situation in order to eliminate the effect of reputation motive. We also assume that price is fixed 
because we observe only one stage and want to focus on the factors of interest of this essay such 
as perceived risk and claimed quality level. We relax the assumption of fixed price in Essay 3. 
2.2 Analytic Model 
2.2.1 Risk-Return Framework 
 For the analytic model, we adopt the concept of perceived risk from marketing literature 
and use the risk-return framework (Sarin and Weber 1993; Weber, Blais, and Betz 2002), where 
the impacts of both the expected benefit and perceived risk on customer’s utility are considered, 
and in particular, where perceived risk is treated as a separate variable. The utility function when 
a buyer i purchases a product j has the following elements.  
2.2.1.1 Claimed Quality and Price 
First, the utility from purchase will be determined by the expected value of the claimed 
quality of product j (  
 ) and its price (  ) (where   
    ).  
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2.2.1.2 Perceived Risk 
The perceived risk of purchase also affects the utility level of this buyer, as he or she will 
prefer the product with less perceived risk. Applying the definition of perceived risk explained 
above, perceived risk is represented here as the function of the probability of loss and the size of 
loss from purchase, i.e., the expected loss from the purchase. We assume that the buyer worries 
about possible purchase failure of product j, which will cost   
 (cost of purchase failure). 
Therefore,      
   represents the perceived risk in this case. 
 We have also defined    as the probability of purchase failure of product j (       , 
and the total perceived risk from the purchase can be represented as      
         
  . 
Moreover, when the probability of purchase failure is   , then the probability that the actual 
quality of product j equals the claimed quality is       . Therefore, the expected value of the 
claimed quality can be denoted as     
            
 .  
2.2.1.3 Risk Sensitivity 
The level of risk sensitivity of the buyer i is denoted as    and is equivalent to the concept 
of perceived-risk attitude from Weber and Milliman (1997) and risk repugnance from Yates and 
Stone (1992). If a buyer is more risk-sensitive and    is higher, then the same perceived risk will 
impact the total utility more negatively than the case of a less risk-sensitive buyer with lower   . 
For our analysis, we suppose that no customer is risk-loving and therefore     . We assume 
that the customers are uniformly distributed in terms of their risk sensitivities, and therefore    
follows        with unit frequency, where S denotes the risk sensitivity of the customer with 
highest risk sensitivity in the market. 
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2.2.1.4 Information Search Cost 
 Our model has also included an element that represents information search cost. More 
specifically,   
  is defined as the information search cost for the product j. As is explained above, 
to reduce the perceived risk before purchase, customers usually try to decrease the probability of 
loss rather than the size of loss (Cox 1967; Markin, Jr. 1974; Peter and Ryan 1976; Ross 1975), 
and information search is an often-used risk-reduction method as the probability of loss 
diminishes with more information. Therefore, we also examine the effect of information search 
cost on the information disclosure of sellers.  
 More specifically, we employ the framework of search, experience, and credence 
attributes, which has been introduced by Nelson (1970) and Darby and Karni (1973), who have 
used information search cost to distinguish product attributes. According to Nelson (1974), a 
customer can determine search attributes prior to purchase but cannot determine experience 
attributes prior to purchase. Darby and Karni (1973) have also contributed to this approach and 
referred to those attributes that cannot be evaluated even after purchase as “credence attributes.” 
Therefore, we regard the search cost related to credence attributes to be almost infinite 
(         
    , because, by definition, customers can never find out the information about 
credence attributes even after purchase. On the other hand, we regard the search cost related to 
search or experience attributes to be positive and smaller than the search cost for credence 
attributes (0        
             
 <          
 ). By observing how market outcome differs 
between search, experience, and credence attributes, we expect to understand the effect of 
information search cost on the incentive for information disclosure.  
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2.2.2 The Model  
 Based on this framework, we present the utility function when a buyer i purchases a 
product j as follows:  
         
           
       
   
 
          
          
       
  
As explained, the probability of purchase failure of the product (  ), the claimed quality 
of the product (  
 ), the price of the product (  ), the risk sensitivity of the customer (  ), the 
information search cost related with the product (  
 ), and the cost of purchase failure (  
 ) 
determine the utility from purchase. In particular, the same level of perceived risk (     
 ) has 
higher negative impact with higher risk sensitivity of the customer (higher   ) or higher 
information search cost in the market (higher   
 ).  
We first apply this utility function to a simple monopoly case and then analyze a duopoly 
situation to understand the incentive for low-type sellers to disclose their types.  
2.2.3 Application 
2.2.3.1 Monopoly Case 
2.2.3.1.1 Overview 
There is only one seller in this market and the customers either choose to purchase this 
product or not, according to their utility levels; that is, a customer will purchase the product if the 
utility from purchase is positive. In the utility function presented above, there is only one 
variable that is heterogeneous among various customers, which is the sensitivity to risk (  ). As 
other factors are same for all customers (such as probability and cost of purchase failure, claimed 
quality and price of the product, and information search cost), the level of sensitivity to risk will 
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differentiate the purchase decisions for the same product. In Figure 2.1, the equilibrium point in 
this market is represented by the risk sensitivity of the indifferent customer,   .  
2.2.3.1.2 Market Equilibrium 
The indifferent customer with risk sensitivity    has the same utility from either 
purchasing the product or not purchasing the product. This is the situation where a customer 
decides whether to make a purchase or not according to the level of perceived risk of the product, 
since a customer’s information stock can affect her purchase/no purchase decision (Putsis, Jr. 
and Srinivasan 1994). For example, some people hesitate to visit car mechanics since they do not 
know much about their cars and want to avoid the possibility of getting “ripped off.” Therefore, 
the customers who have lower risk sensitivity than    will all purchase the product, while none 
of the customers who have higher risk sensitivity than    will make a purchase in this market. 
This represents the equilibrium point of this market.  
Figure 2.1: Equilibrium of Monopoly Market
 
   
  denotes the claimed value and    denotes the probability of purchase failure for this 
monopoly product M. As explained, the price and information search cost of the product are 
fixed at   and    throughout our analysis. We will also fix the cost of purchase failure at   , as 
we assume the same product category for our analysis. Then the utility of the indifferent 
customer with the risk sensitivity of    from purchasing product M is calculated as follows: 
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 As explained, the utility of this customer equals zero as this customer is indifferent 
between purchasing and not purchasing in this market. From this equation, we can calculate the 
market demand as follows: 
∴ Market demand6  
      
          
   
        
 
 We can find some primary observations about the demand for the product from this result. 
The demand for the monopolistic seller’s product will be larger as the probability of purchase 
failure (  ) is smaller and the claimed quality of the seller’s product (  
 ) is higher. Moreover, 
the demand will be larger as the information search cost (  ) gets smaller. Therefore, it is better 
for the monopoly firm to increase the claimed quality and decrease the perceived risk of 
purchase, and the demand will be smaller for the products with credence attributes than those 
with search or experience attributes.  
2.2.3.2 Duopoly Case 
Now let’s investigate the duopoly case where one seller always claims high quality while 
the other seller either claims high or low quality. We first examine how various factors in our 
model, such as the perceived risk and the claimed quality, affect the demand for each seller and 
the entire market demand. 
                                                 
6
 We assume that the price is low enough to make the market demand positive. In other words, we assume the 
condition that             
  to hold for our analysis. We discuss more about this assumption in a following 
section.  
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2.2.3.2.1 Observation on the Size of Demands 
2.2.3.2.1.1 Market Equilibrium under Information collusion 
In this first case of duopoly, we assume that both firms claim high quality and the low-
quality seller does not disclose its type. In other words, it is just as if both firms engage in tacit 
collusion in terms of negative information sharing, and we call this scheme as “information 
collusion.” Information collusion can be found in many instances in real market situations, 
especially with respect to those attributes with high information search costs. The examples 
presented in the previous chapter, the overstated fuel figures of the cars in the U.K. market and 
the unreliable grades of olive oils, are good examples of how “information collusion” actually 
works in practice. Therefore, these products have high claimed quality (  
 ) and also have high 
level of perceived risk with high chance of purchase failure (  ), compared with the market 
without information collusion which is analyzed in the following section. Figure 2.2 illustrates 
the equilibrium of this duopoly market with information collusion. 
Figure 2.2: Equilibrium of Duopoly Market with Information Collusion 
 
Market equilibrium. Let’s assume that the indifferent customer in this market has the risk 
sensitivity of   . From analyzing the utility of this indifferent customer, we can find the level of 
   as follows. 
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∴ Market demand7   
      
          
   
        
 
So far it is exactly same with the monopoly case. The only difference is that there are two 
products in this market, and therefore each product will take the half of the entire market demand. 
∴ Demand for each product 
 
 
 
    
          
   
        
  
Therefore, we can come up with the following proposition regarding market demand and 
the demand of each product. 
Proposition 1. In a duopoly market with information collusion, the market demand and 
the demand for each seller’s product will be larger as the perceived risk of the products of 
those sellers is smaller, the claimed quality of the products of those sellers is higher, and 
the information search cost is smaller.  
2.2.3.2.1.2 Market Equilibrium Under No Information Collusion 
In this second case of duopoly, we assume that a low-type seller reveals its type, shares 
its quality information, and decreases perceived risk of purchase through certain risk 
intermediaries such as quality certification. We examine the size of demand for the low-type 
seller in a market with no information collusion and then also observe the market demand and 
the demand for the other seller who maintains the claim of high quality. In the following section, 
                                                 
7
 Just like the monopoly case, we assume that the price is low enough to make the market demand positive. In other 
words, we assume the condition that              
  to hold for our analysis. The observation from the 
experimental analysis also confirms this assumption, as the demand for sellers under information collusion is always 
positive. 
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we observe how the sizes of demand change with this information disclosure by comparing the 
market with information collusion and the market with no information collusion. 
The product of the low-type seller who reveals his type now has low claimed quality 
(  
    
 ) and also has a low level of perceived risk with a low chance of purchase failure 
(      , compared with the market with information collusion. Figure 2.3 illustrates the 
equilibrium of this duopoly market without information collusion. 
Figure 2.3: Equilibrium of Duopoly Market Without Information Collusion 
 
Market equilibrium. In this market there are two types of indifferent customers.  
First, there is a customer who is indifferent to purchasing either product. Let’s assume 
that this indifferent customer has the risk sensitivity of   . From analyzing the utility of this 
indifferent customer, we can find the level of    as follows. 
        
         
                  
        
      
  
          
         
                  
        
      
  
     
          
           
 
             
 
Second, there is a customer who is indifferent between purchasing the low-type product 
and making no purchase. Let’s assume that this indifferent customer has the risk sensitivity of   . 
From analyzing the utility of this indifferent customer, we can find the level of    as follows. 
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From these results, we can figure out the sizes of market demand and the demand for 
both products in equilibrium as follows: 
Demand for the low-type product
8
 
         
         
   
        
  
          
           
 
             
 
  
 
  
    
         
   
     
  
          
           
 
           
  
Proposition 2. In a duopoly market without information collusion, the demand for the 
product of the low-type seller will be larger as the perceived risk of the product of the 
low-type seller is smaller, the claimed quality of the product of the low-type seller is 
higher, and the information search cost is smaller. 
Market demand
9
  
       
         
   
        
 
Proposition 3. In a duopoly market without information collusion, the market demand 
will be larger as the perceived risk of the product of the low-type seller is smaller, the 
                                                 
8
 We should note that    can be higher than    if price is higher than a certain level, and in this case the demand for 
the low-type seller’s product can be less than zero. Therefore, price should be lower than a certain level and we 
assume the condition   
     
       
         
    
  
     
 to hold for our analysis. The observation from the experimental 
analysis confirms this assumption, as the demand for the low-type seller’s product under no information collusion is 
always positive. 
 
9
 Just as explained above, we assume that the price is low enough to make the market demand positive. In other 
words, we assume the condition that             
  to hold for our analysis. The observation from the 
experimental analysis confirms this assumption, as market demand under no information collusion is always positive. 
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claimed quality of the low-type seller is higher, and the information search cost is 
smaller. 
Demand for the high-claim product
10
 
      
          
           
 
                
 
Proposition 4. In a duopoly market without information collusion, the demand for the 
product of the seller that claims high quality will be larger as the perceived risk of the 
product of the low-type seller is bigger, the claimed quality of the low-type seller is lower, 
and the information search cost is smaller.  
2.2.3.2.2 Impact of Low-Type Seller’s Information Disclosure 
Now that we have observed the duopoly markets under information collusion vs. no 
information collusion, we can figure out the effects of low-type seller’s information disclosure 
on market outcomes by comparing the sizes of demands between two market conditions.  
2.2.3.2.2.1 Impact on Demand for the Low-Type Seller’s Product 
We can calculate the impact of low-type seller’s information disclosure on his own 
demand by subtracting the demand under information collusion (IC) from the demand under no 
information collusion (NIC) as follows: 
                                         
                                                            
   
 
  
    
         
   
     
  
          
           
 
           
  
 
 
    
          
   
        
  
                                                 
10
 In order for the demand for the high-claim seller’s product to be positive, the condition that         
  
        
  should be met. Therefore, we assume that the expected value of the high-claim seller’s product is higher 
than the expected value of the low-type seller’s product for our analysis. The observation from the experimental 
analysis confirms this assumption, as the demand for high-claim seller’s product under no information collusion is 
always positive. 
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Therefore, from this result, we can establish some predictions regarding the impact on the 
demand for the low-type seller’s product as follows. 
Proposition 5. In a duopoly market with information collusion, when a low-type seller 
reveals its type, the change in demand for the product of the low-type seller will be larger 
as the perceived risk of the product of low-type seller is smaller and the claimed quality 
of the product of the low-type seller is higher, and the absolute size of the change will be 
higher with smaller information search cost. 
One important finding from this result is that, when a low-type seller reveals its type and 
reduces perceived risk sufficiently (so that     ), then the change in demand for the low-type 
seller’s product will be positive. In other words, the low-type seller can increase its own demand 
by disclosing its own type, when it can appropriately reduce the perceived risk.  
2.2.3.2.2.2 Impact on Market Demand 
We can calculate the impact of low-type seller’s information disclosure on market 
demand by subtracting the market demand under information collusion (IC) from the market 
demand under no information collusion (NIC) as follows: 
                                                             
 
         
   
        
    
          
   
        
 
  
 
  
 
         
   
     
 
          
   
     
   
Again, from this result, we can establish some predictions regarding the impact on market 
demand as follows. 
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Proposition 6. In a duopoly market with information collusion, when a low-type seller 
reveals its type, the change in market demand will be larger as the perceived risk of the 
product of the low-type seller is smaller and the claimed quality of the product of the 
low-type seller is higher, and the absolute size of the change will be higher with smaller 
information search cost. 
As in the case of low-type seller’s product, we can see that when a low-type seller reveals 
its own type and reduces perceived risk sufficiently (    ), then the change in market demand 
will be positive. In other words, the low-type seller can increase the market demand by 
disclosing its own type, when it can appropriately reduce perceived risk.  
2.2.3.2.2.3 Impact on Demand for the High-Claim Seller’s Product 
Again, we can calculate the impact of low-type seller’s information disclosure on the 
demand for high-claim seller’s product by subtracting the demand under information collusion 
(IC) from the demand under no information collusion (NIC) as follows: 
                                                   
                                                                      
 
          
           
 
                
  
 
 
    
          
   
        
  
 
 
  
  
          
           
 
           
  
          
   
       
  
From this result, we can establish some predictions regarding the impact on the demand 
for high-claim seller’s product as follows. 
Proposition 7. In a duopoly market with information collusion, when a low-type seller 
reveals its type, the change in the demand for the product of the firm which maintains a 
high-quality claim will be larger as the perceived risk of the product of the low-type 
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seller is bigger and the claimed quality of the product of the low-quality seller is lower, 
and the absolute size of the change will be higher with smaller information search cost. 
One interesting observation from this result is that, when the low-type seller cannot 
reduce the risk sufficiently and therefore       , the change in demand for the product of the 
firm which maintains a high-quality claim will always be positive, implying that the low-type 
seller’s information disclosure may help the other firm through increasing its demand.  
2.2.4 Summary 
Overall, through the analytic model we have established some predictions on the sizes of 
demand under information collusion and no information collusion, and the impact of low-quality 
seller’s information disclosure on market outcomes. The propositions are summarized in Table 
2.1 and Table 2.2. 
Table 2.1: Predictions on the Sizes of Demand 
  
Market 
Circumstances 
Demand  
of Interest 
Conditions for Higher Demand 
Perceived risk 
of low-type 
product 
Claimed 
quality 
of low-type 
product 
Information 
search cost of 
the market 
Proposition 1 
Information 
collusion 
Market   
Proposition 2 
No 
information 
collusion 
Low-type product   
Proposition 3 Market   
Proposition 4 High-type product   
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Table 2.2: Predictions on the Impact of a Low-Type Seller’s Information Disclosure 
 
  
Impacted  
Demand 
Conditions for Higher Impact 
Conditions for 
Higher Absolute 
Impact  
Net 
Impact Perceived risk 
of low-type 
product 
Claimed quality 
of low-type 
product 
Information 
search cost of 
the market 
Proposition 5 Low-type product     /  
Proposition 6 Market     /  
Proposition 7 High-type product     /  
 
2.3 Experimental Analysis 
With the results from the analytic model, we now attempt to analyze the impact of 
information disclosure on actual demands by observing customer choices through laboratory 
experiments with the aim of providing specific answers about exactly where suggested theories 
succeed or fail (Lucking-Reiley 1999). 
2.3.1 Procedure 
2.3.1.1 Overview 
For the experimental analysis, we suggested purchase scenarios to subjects and observed 
their purchase decisions, following numerous other marketing studies (Locander and Hermann 
1979; Jackson, Keith, and Burdick 1984; Mowen, Keith, Brown, and Jackson, Jr. 1985; Puto, 
Patton, and King 1985; Murray 1991; White, Varadarajan, and Dacin 2003). Using purchase 
scenarios fits our purpose very well since this allows us to manipulate variables and contexts that 
cannot be controlled in a real-life environment (Murray 1991), avoid unnecessary bias associated 
with the selection of an actual seller (Duhan et al. 1997), and test all subjects with a standardized 
stimulus (White, Varadarajan, and Dacin 2003).  
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2.3.1.2 Experimental Design 
 We have designed 2-by-2 between-subjects experiments to test the theoretical findings 
regarding the economic incentive for low-type sellers to disclose information in markets. Unlike 
the market data analysis in the following essay, the experimental setting enables us to manipulate 
all of the key factors in the analytic model, i.e., perceived risk (low versus high) and information 
search cost (low versus high).  
 We selected the used-car market as the product of choice since the context of a used-car 
purchase matches the purpose of this essay very well; the market for used cars shows a clear 
information asymmetry between customers and sellers and the products can be presented with 
various levels of perceived risk. We chose a foreign imported used car as our target product to 
control the level of perceived risk, as it is hard for customers to obtain third-party vehicle history 
reports for this particular product category unless provided by the seller. Therefore, perceived 
risk was controlled in such a way that the seller provides the certification from a third-party 
certifier (manufacturer or car mechanic) and reduces perceived risk in a low risk case (  ), while 
the seller does not provide any certification in a high risk case (  ). In order to control the 
information search cost (  ), the negative information was related with past accident history in a 
high-cost case (         
 ), while it was related with the noise from the car in a low-cost case 
(           
 ). The difference in these two conditions was supposed to control the level of 
information search cost, as accident history could be regarded as a credence attribute with 
extremely high information search cost while the noise from the car could be regarded as an 
experience attribute with moderate information search cost. In neither scenario was the negative 
information revealed by the seller at such a serious level that customers would regard it as a 
product failure. More specifically, the actual negative information provided to subjects was that 
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the car had “one minor accident in the past” in the high information search cost condition, and 
that the car had “a little noise that is not coming from the engine” in the low information search 
cost condition. This 2-by-2 design is explained in Table 2.3. 
Table 2.3: 2×2 Experimental Design 
 
Search Cost (  ) 
Past accidents 
(         
 )  
Noise  
(           
 ) 
Perceived Risk:   
 
Without certification (     )  
 High perceived risk 
 High info search cost 
 
 High perceived risk 
 Low info search cost 
 
With certification (     )  
 Low perceived risk 
 High info search cost 
 Low perceived risk 
 Low info search cost 
 
The subjects consisted of undergraduate students at a major public university in the 
southern United States, and 154 subjects for each experimental setting (616 subjects in total) 
were observed for this analysis. During these experiments, each subject was basically required to 
indicate which product he or she would like to purchase among the suggested options, or whether 
to postpone the purchase. More specifically, in each scenario, there were two used-car sellers 
selling the same products (i.e., same model, same color, same year, same mileage, etc.). Each 
subject was asked whether he or she wanted to purchase one of the products in the market under 
a first condition where there is information collusion (i.e., when both sellers claim high quality) 
and under a second condition where there is no information collusion (i.e., when a low-type 
seller discloses quality information).  
The responses were collected for four different situations and enabled us to observe how 
the impact of low-type seller’s information disclosure on demand varies according to the factors 
of our interest. Based on the subjects’ purchase choices observed from the experiments, we can 
analyze what happens to market outcomes (market demand, demand for the low-type product, 
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and demand for the high-type product) according to different levels of perceived risk and 
information search cost when a low-type seller discloses quality information, and test the 
propositions established by the analytic model. 
2.3.2 Results  
The analytic model has provided various predictions regarding the equilibrium demand 
when everyone claims high quality versus when one low-type seller discloses his type. By 
analyzing the results from the experiments, we can check whether those predictions are 
consistent with what we observe in a real market. We check the predictions on three different 
cases as follows. First, we have observed the impact of information search cost on the market 
equilibrium under information collusion (i.e., when everyone claims high quality) (Proposition 1). 
In this case, the impact of perceived risk cannot be investigated, as every seller has the same 
perceived risk under information collusion (i.e., no seller shows certification). Second, we have 
observed the impact of perceived risk and information search cost on the market equilibrium 
under no information collusion (i.e., when a low-type seller reveals his type) (Propositions 2, 3, 
and 4). Third, we have observed the impact of perceived risk and information search cost on the 
change in demand between two market equilibria (information collusion vs. no information 
collusion) in order to understand whether voluntarily disclosing quality information helps a low-
type seller (Propositions 5, 6, and 7).  
2.3.2.1 Market Equilibrium Under Information Collusion 
Proposition 1 of the analytic model has made several predictions regarding the size of 
market demand when everyone is claiming high quality. It predicted that the market demand will 
be bigger with lower information search cost and smaller with higher information search cost. 
The other factor, the level of perceived risk, is not controlled under information collusion since 
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no one is voluntarily disclosing information about low quality and thus everyone has same levels 
of perceived risk. Table 2.4 shows the observed market demand in the experiment, when 
everyone is claiming high quality.  
Table 2.4: Observed Market Demand (Information Collusion) 
 
Higher  
Info Search 
Cost 
Lower  
Info Search 
Cost 
Demand 109 150 
% 35.4 48.7 
NOTE: Percentage values are calculated based on the total market size of 308. 
According to the observed result, the market demand under information collusion shows 
the predicted pattern, as the demand is higher with lower information search cost (48.7% > 
35.4%). Moreover, the chi-square test shows the difference in demand in two conditions is 
statistically significant (p < 0.01), suggesting that the market demand under information 
collusion is affected by the information search cost of the market. In other words, when the 
information about the product attribute is easier to obtain, more customers decide to purchase the 
product even when the sellers do not fully disclose quality information, providing support for 
Proposition 1. 
2.3.2.2 Market Equilibrium Under No Information Collusion 
The results of the analytic model also provide several predictions regarding the size of 
demand when a low-type seller discloses quality information. We can estimate how the demand 
for the product of low-type seller, market demand, and the demand for the product of the seller 
who claims high quality are affected by the levels of perceived risk and information search cost.  
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2.3.2.2.1 Demand for Low-Type Seller 
Proposition 2 has proposed that the demand for the low-type seller who discloses his type 
will be higher with lower perceived risk of the product, and lower information search cost in the 
market. Table 2.5 shows the observed demand of the low-type seller who discloses his type.  
Table 2.5: Observed Demand of the Low-Type Seller (No Information Collusion) 
 
Higher  
Info Search 
Cost 
Lower  
Info Search 
Cost 
Without Risk Reducer:   
Demand 25 19 
% 16.2 12.3 
With Risk Reducer:   
Demand 82 77 
% 53.2 50.0 
NOTE: Percentage values are calculated based on the total market size of 154. 
According to the observed result, the demand for the low-type seller that reveals its type 
shows the predicted pattern only for perceived risk, as the demand is higher with lower perceived 
risk (53.2% > 16.2% and 50% > 12.3%) but also with higher information search cost (16.2% > 
12.3% and 53.2% > 50%). The results of two-way ANOVA with the demand as the dependent 
variable has shown that the effect of perceived risk (F(1,1) = 13225, p < 0.01) is significant, 
while the effect of information search cost (F(1,1) = 121, p = 0.058) is only weakly significant. 
Therefore, the prediction regarding the impact of perceived risk is shown to be consistent with 
actual behavior, while the prediction regarding information search cost shows a different pattern 
that is not strongly significant. This result suggests that the demand of the low-type seller who 
discloses quality information is affected by perceived risk, while the impact of the information 
search cost of the market is not obvious, providing partial support for Proposition 2. 
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2.3.2.2.2 Market Demand 
Proposition 3 has proposed that the market demand will be higher with lower perceived 
risk of the product of a low-type seller, and lower information search cost in the market, when 
the low-type seller reveals its type. Table 2.6 shows the size of market demand when a low-type 
seller shares quality information, observed from the experiment.  
Table 2.6: Observed Market Demand (No Information Collusion) 
 
Higher  
Info Search 
Cost 
Lower  
Info Search 
Cost 
Without Risk Reducer:   
Demand 89 92 
% 57.8 59.7 
With Risk Reducer:   
Demand 113 120 
% 73.4 77.9 
NOTE: Percentage values are calculated based on the total market size of 154. 
According to the observed result, the market demand shows the predicted patterns. First, 
the market demand is higher with lower perceived risk of the low-type seller’s product (73.4% > 
57.8% and 77.9% > 59.7%), as predicted by the analytic model. Moreover, the market demand is 
higher with lower information search cost (57.8% < 59.7% and 73.4% < 77.9%), which is also 
consistent with the prediction. We have also checked these results with two-way ANOVA with 
the demand as the dependent variable. ANOVA has shown that the observed effect of perceived 
risk is significant (F(1,1) = 169, p < 0.05), while the effect of information search cost is not 
(F(1,1) = 6.25, p = 0.242). Therefore, the market demand under no information collusion is 
affected by the level of perceived risk of the low-type seller’s product, but the effect of 
information search cost does not seem to be significant, providing partial support for Proposition 
3. 
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2.3.2.2.3 Demand for the Seller Claiming High Quality 
Finally, Proposition 4 has proposed that the demand for the firm which claims high 
quality will be higher with higher perceived risk of the low-type seller’s product, and lower 
information search cost in the market. Table 2.7 shows the demand of the firm that claims high 
quality observed from the experiment.  
Table 2.7: Observed Demand of the Seller Claiming High Quality (No Information 
Collusion) 
 
Higher  
Info Search 
Cost 
Lower  
Info Search 
Cost 
Without Risk Reducer:   
Demand 64 73 
% 41.6 47.4 
With Risk Reducer:   
Demand 31 43 
% 20.1 27.9 
NOTE: Percentage values are calculated based on the total market size of 154. 
According to the observed result, the demand for the firm that maintains the high-quality 
claim shows the predicted pattern. First, the demand is higher with lower information search cost 
in the market (47.4% > 41.6% and 27.9% > 20.1%) and higher perceived risk of the low-type 
seller’s product (41.6% > 20.1% and 47.4% > 27.9%). The results of two-way ANOVA with the 
demand as the dependent variable has shown that the effect of perceived risk is significant (F(1,1) 
= 441, p < 0.05) while the effect of information search cost is weakly significant (F(1,1) = 49, p 
< 0.1). These results suggest that, when a low-type seller discloses the quality of its product, the 
demand of the product that maintains a high-quality claim is strongly affected by the perceived 
risk of the low-type seller and also affected by the information search cost of the market, 
providing support for Proposition 4. 
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2.3.2.3 Impact of Low-Type Seller’s Information Disclosure 
 So far we have investigated two different markets (with and without information 
collusion) and examined whether the sizes of demand observed from the experiments show the 
predicted patterns from the analytic model. We have found that the effect of the perceived risk 
has been consistent with the predictions in all cases. Now we attempt to test the most important 
propositions of this essay and see how the low-type seller’s information disclosure impacts the 
market. We focus on the change in demand between the market with information collusion and 
the market with no information collusion to understand what happens to market outcomes when 
a low-type seller deviates from the original information collusion situation and decides to 
voluntarily disclose its type. 
2.3.2.3.1 Impact on Low-Type Seller’s Demand 
Proposition 5 has provided the most important prediction of this essay, as it has explained 
what happens to the demand for the low-type seller’s product when he discloses quality 
information, examining the economic incentive for a low-type seller to reveal his type. The 
analytic model has proposed that the change in demand for the low-type seller’s product will be 
higher with lower perceived risk of the product, and the absolute size of the change will be 
higher with lower information search cost in the market. By investigating the experiment results, 
we can observe whether the impact of low-type seller's information disclosure shows the 
predicted patterns. Table 2.8 presents the observed change in demand for the low-type seller’s 
product.  
  
 61 
 
Table 2.8: Observed Change in Demand for the Low-Type Seller with Information 
Disclosure 
 
Higher  
Info Search 
Cost 
Lower  
Info Search 
Cost 
Without Risk Reducer:   
Change in Demand -3 -15 
%p
11
 -1.9 -9.7 
With Risk Reducer:   
Change in Demand 55.5 36 
%p 36 23.4 
NOTE: Percentage values are calculated based on the total market size of 154. 
As is shown in the table, the change in demand for the firm that shares negative 
information only partially shows the predicted pattern of the analytic model. The change in 
demand is higher with lower perceived risk (36%p > -1.9%p and 23.4%p > -9.7%p), but the 
absolute size shows mixed patterns with the size of information search cost (-1.9%p > -9.7%p 
but 36%p > 23.4%p). The results of two-way ANOVA with the change in demand as the 
dependent variable has shown that the effect of perceived risk (F(1,1) = 213.16, p < 0.05) is 
significant, while the effect of information search cost (F(1,1) = 17.64, p = 0.149) is not 
significant. This suggests that the change in demand for the low-type seller’s product when he 
discloses quality information is strongly affected by the level of perceived risk of the product, 
but we cannot say that the effect of information search cost has a significant effect on the change 
in demand, providing partial support for Proposition 5.  
One important observation from these results is that when the perceived risk is 
appropriately reduced, the low-type seller actually enjoys positive change in demand by 
disclosing the quality of his product. Therefore, we can say that full disclosure can help low-type 
sellers as long as they can decrease perceived risk with information disclosure, and this result 
                                                 
11
 %p means percentage point, the unit for the arithmetic difference of two percentage values. 
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verifies that there exists the economic incentive for low-type sellers to fully disclose quality 
information. On the other hand, Table 2.8 also shows that this low-type seller actually loses 
customers by disclosing true quality if perceived risk is not sufficiently reduced, both in high and 
low information search cost cases. Therefore, we can say that the incentive for low-type sellers 
to disclose quality information depends on the effectiveness of risk intermediary in reducing 
perceived risk of customers. Essay 2 explains this more in detail with actual market data. 
2.3.2.3.2 Impact on Market Demand 
Proposition 6 has also proposed some predictions on how the market demand is impacted 
when a low-type seller discloses quality information. More specifically, the model has proposed 
that the change in market demand caused by the low-type seller’s information disclosure will be 
higher with lower perceived risk of the low-type seller’s product, and the absolute size of the 
change will be higher with lower information search cost in the market. Table 2.9 shows the 
change in market demand with low-type seller’s information disclosure, observed from the 
experiment.  
Table 2.9: Observed Change in Market Demand with the Low-Type Seller’s Information 
Disclosure 
 
Higher  
Info Search 
Cost 
Lower  
Info Search 
Cost 
Without Risk Reducer:   
Change in Demand 33 24 
%p 21.4 15.6 
With Risk Reducer:   
Change in Demand 60 38 
%p 39.0 24.7 
NOTE: Percentage values are calculated based on the total market size of 154. 
As is shown in the table, the change in market demand only partially shows the predicted 
patterns from the analytic model. The change in demand is higher with lower perceived risk 
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(39.0%p > 21.4%p and 24.7%p > 15.6%p), but the absolute size of the change is higher with 
higher information search cost (21.4%p > 15.6%p and 39.0%p > 24.7%p). However, the results 
of two-way ANOVA with change in demand as the dependent variable has shown that neither 
the effect of perceived risk (F(1,1) = 9.947, p = 0.195) nor the effect of information search cost 
(F(1,1) = 5.686, p = 0.253) is significant. This suggests that the impact of the low-type seller’s 
information disclosure on market demand is not strongly affected by either the level of perceived 
risk of the product or information search cost of the market, although the experiment results 
show the predicted pattern for the effect of perceived risk. The results thus provide no support 
for Proposition 6.  
However, there is one important observation from the results, as market demand 
increases in all four cases when a low-type seller discloses quality information, regardless of the 
variation in two factors. Therefore, although the result is not consistent with the predictions from 
the analytic model, it presents some important implications about consumer welfare as the low-
type seller’s voluntary disclosure is shown to help the entire market by attracting more customers, 
providing some interesting research questions regarding marketing and public policy. We 
investigate the relationship between information disclosure and social welfare more in detail in 
Essay 3. 
2.3.2.3.3 Impact on High-Type Seller’s Demand 
We also have some predictions on the change in demand for the seller claiming high 
quality when a low-type seller discloses his type. Proposition 7 has predicted that the change in 
the demand for the firm which maintains a high-quality claim will be higher with higher 
perceived risk of the low-type seller’s product, and the absolute size of the change will be higher 
with lower information search cost in the market. By analyzing the experiment results, we can 
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tell whether the low-type seller’s information disclosure has impacted the demand for the seller 
claiming high quality as predicted. Table 2.10 shows the change in the demand for the seller 
claiming high quality when one low-type seller reveals its type, observed from the experiment.  
Table 2.10: Observed Change in Demand for the High-Quality Claim Seller with the Low-
Type Seller’s Information Disclosure 
 
Higher  
Info Search 
Cost 
Lower  
Info Search 
Cost 
Without Risk Reducer:   
Change in Demand 36 39 
%p 23.4 25.3 
With Risk Reducer:   
Change in Demand 4.5 2 
%p 2.9 1.3 
NOTE: Percentage values are calculated based on the total market size of 154. 
As is shown in the table, the change in demand for the product with high-quality claim 
only partially shows the predicted patterns of the analytic model. While the change in demand is 
higher with higher perceived risk (23.4%p > 2.9%p and 25.3%p > 1.3%p) as predicted by the 
model, the pattern shows mixed result for the effect of information search cost (25.3%p > 
23.4%p and 1.3%p < 2.9%p). The results of two-way ANOVA with the change in demand as the 
dependent variable has shown that the effect of perceived risk (F(1,1) = 155.12, p = 0.051) is 
nearly strongly significant while the effect of information search cost (F(1,1) = 0.008, p = 0.942) 
is not. This suggests that the change in demand for the product claiming high quality is strongly 
affected by the level of perceived risk of the low-quality seller, while the effect of the 
information search cost is negligible.  
One important observation from these results is that demand for the product claiming 
high quality always increases when a low-type seller fully discloses quality information. This 
supports the finding from the analytic model that the low-type seller’s full disclosure even helps 
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the firm that maintains a high-quality claim. This is a very interesting result and the analytic 
model explains that low-type’s information disclosure will drive less risk-sensitive customers 
away from the low-type seller, resulting in the increased demand for the seller claiming high 
quality.  
2.3.3 Alternative Experiment Design 
In addition to the experiment analyzed above, we have also run alternative experiments 
using 2-by-2 within-subjects design with 356 subjects under the same setting. Although repeated 
observation through manipulated factors of interest may provide some noise to the results, a 
within-subjects design has a benefit of maintaining the distribution of risk sensitivities among the 
subjects. Therefore, we will only examine the results from this alternative design to see whether 
the outcome is consistent, and to check the robustness of our main results. 
Table 2.11: Observed Impact of the Low-Type Seller’s Information Disclosure (Within-
Subjects Experiments) 
  
Demand for Low-Type 
Seller’s Product 
Market Demand 
Demand for High-Claim 
Seller’s Product 
Higher  
info search 
cost 
Lower  
info search 
cost 
Higher  
info search 
cost 
Lower  
info search 
cost 
Higher  
info search 
cost 
Lower  
info search 
cost 
Without Risk Reducer:       
Change in Demand -17 -72.5 91 65 108 137.5 
%p -3 -12.9 16.1 11.5 19.1 24.4 
With Risk Reducer:       
Change in Demand 273 185.5 240 202 -33 16.5 
%p 48.4 32.9 42.6 35.8 -5.9 2.9 
NOTE: Percentage values are calculated based on the total market size of 356.  
While the patterns were not exactly same with the results from between-subjects 
experiments, the main results regarding the change in demands were overall consistent in these 
experiments too. When a low-type seller disclosed quality information, the effects of perceived 
risk on the change in demand for the low-type seller (F(1,1) = 293.266, p < 0.05), the change in 
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market demand (F(1,1) = 568.028, p < 0.05), and the change in demand for the seller claiming 
high quality (F(1,1) = 171.61, p < 0.05) are all in the predicted patterns and significant while the 
effects of information search cost were all insignificant. Therefore, we can conclude that the 
findings from the analytic model and experimental analysis that the level of perceived risk 
strongly affects the market outcome when a low-type fully discloses quality information are 
robust and consistent.  
2.3.4 Conclusion 
 We have used experimental analysis to determine whether the findings from the analytic 
model are consistent with what we observe in reality and investigated whether two factors of 
interest actually affect the market outcomes as predicted by the analytic model. More specifically, 
we have looked at the impact of perceived risk and information search cost in three 
circumstances: i) the market equilibrium when everyone is claiming high quality, ii) the market 
equilibrium when one low-type seller is disclosing quality information, and iii) the impact of the 
low-quality seller’s information disclosure on market outcomes (i.e., change between i) and ii)). 
The experiments have shown that when one low-type seller discloses quality information, the 
market outcome is significantly affected by the level perceived risk of the low-type seller while 
the effect of information search cost is a little unclear. The results of the experimental analysis 
are summarized in Table 2.12. 
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Table 2.12: Summary of the Results of Experimental Analysis 
 Circumstance 
Demand of 
Interest 
Prediction on 
Perceived Risk 
Prediction on 
Information 
Search Cost 
Proposition 1 
Market under 
information 
collusion 
Market N/A Supported
Proposition 2 
Market under no 
information 
collusion 
Low-type product Supported Not supported
Proposition 3 Market Supported Not supported
Proposition 4 High-type product Supported Supported
Proposition 5 
Impact of low-
type seller’s 
information 
disclosure 
Low-type product Supported Not supported
Proposition 6 Market Not Supported Not supported
Proposition 7 High-type product Supported Not supported
 
 One possible reason why the effect of information search cost does not seem to be 
consistent with the predictions of the analytic model is because the difference in information 
search cost the subjects of the experiments perceived between two settings (accident history vs. 
noise) could have been insufficient. In other words, as much as it is hard for customers to figure 
out past accident history of a used car without the help of third-party certification, they may also 
have felt that figuring out noise of the car before purchase is not easy without help from someone 
with sufficient knowledge about car mechanisms. Therefore, the information search cost could 
have been almost as high in the low-cost condition as in the high-cost condition. Replacing the 
noise with some other product attributes with much lower information search cost, such as car 
appearances or mileage, might more strongly differentiate the information search cost across two 
settings and provide better understanding about the effect of information search cost.  
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 Overall, the experimental analysis has provided strong supports for the finding that low-
type seller’s disclosure can actually increase demand if perceived risk can be appropriately 
reduced, verifying the existence of the incentive for low-type sellers to fully disclose quality 
information. Therefore, we can say that disclosing low-quality can actually help low-type sellers 
even in the short run as long as they can reduce perceived risk, even without considering the long 
term relations with customers or the impact from seller reputation.   
2.4 Discussion 
This essay has attempted to provide a different theoretical understanding about the 
information asymmetry in markets by showing that a low-type seller’s information disclosure 
can increase demand even in the short run and verifying the existence of economic incentives for 
low-type sellers to fully disclose their types. More specifically, this essay has explained the 
circumstances whereby a low-type seller’s information disclosure can enhance sellers’ 
profitability and customers’ welfare and shown that a low-type seller’s information disclosure 
can also increase the market demand and the demand for the seller claiming high quality. The 
fundamental rationale behind this result is that customers do not have to spend the information 
search cost when a low-type seller voluntarily shares quality information, and thus everyone in 
the market can benefit from the decreased search cost. Moreover, the fact that prices have been 
fixed throughout our analysis shows that a low-type seller does not have to reduce prices to make 
up for its full disclosure.  
Therefore, this essay can provide an important theoretical basis to solve various market 
dilemmas under information asymmetry. As is explained in a previous chapter, information 
disclosure literature has long debated whether voluntary disclosure can solve adverse selection 
issues (Grossman and Hart 1980; Grossman 1981; Jovanovic 1982; Milgrom 1981; Viscusi 1978) 
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or mandatory disclosure is necessary (Bar-Isaac, Caruana, and Cuñat 2012; Board 2009; Cheong 
and Kim 2004; Fishman and Hagerty 2003; Gavazza and Lizzeri 2007; Grubb 2011; Guo and 
Zhao 2009; Harbaugh, Maxwell, and Roussillon 2011; Hirshleifer, Lim, and Teoh 2004; Hotz 
and Xiao 2013; Matthews and Postlewaite 1985; Schwartz 2008; Shavell 1994; Stivers 2004; 
Verrecchia 1983). However, most of the literature has focused on the information disclosure of 
the sellers with high-quality products, and the information disclosure of the sellers with low-
quality products has been generally overlooked. By focusing on the economic incentive for low-
type sellers’ information disclosure, this essay provides an important implication regarding 
whether, when, and how low-type sellers fully disclose quality information, which can possibly 
support the literature on voluntary disclosure. In addition to its contribution to the information 
disclosure literature, this study can provide some useful knowledge to marketing managers 
regarding marketing communications strategy using risk intermediaries such as quality 
certifications. For example, marketing managers may learn that voluntarily sharing unfavorable 
information about their products or services can actually increase profit if such a disclosure is 
accompanied by an appropriate risk intermediary. Future research can develop the idea presented 
in this essay in various directions, such as expanding the analytic model or adopting a more 
realistic distribution of risk propensities.  
The following essays develop the theoretical findings from this essay and explore more 
about the economic incentive for low-type sellers to disclose quality information and the effect 
of quality certifications on market outcomes, through observing actual market data and 
conducting controlled economic experiments.  
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3. ESSAY 2: “TO HIDE, OR NOT TO HIDE—THAT IS THE QUESTION”: SELLERS’ 
ECONOMIC INCENTIVES FOR FULL VS. FRAUDULENT DISCLOSURE 
3.1 Introduction 
3.1.1 Motivation 
As Essay 1 has presented a theoretical model explaining the economic incentive of low-
type sellers to fully disclose quality information along with some evidence from experimental 
analysis, this essay now attempts to check whether those findings are consistent with what we 
observe in a real market through analyzing actual sales data of several different products. By 
analyzing two different empirical models with sales data from three product categories, this 
essay checks the prediction from the analytic model that low-type sellers can increase demand by 
disclosing quality information. The first model employs the original assumption of uniform 
distribution of customers’ risk sensitivity (basic specification), while the second model relaxes 
the original assumption and substitutes a more realistic distribution, with a larger number of risk-
sensitive customers than risk-insensitive customers (alternative specification). Overall, the result 
from our analysis confirms that low-type sellers can increase demand by full information 
disclosure if proper risk-reducing methods are employed. We focus on the effect of third-party 
product certification because other signaling methods are not as easy to establish or as 
trustworthy as quality certifications, as is explained above, and our empirical results also show 
that third-party certification is the only risk intermediary that has significant effects across all 
three product categories observed in our analysis. Moreover, a lot of previous studies on 
information disclosure have also focused on the effect of certification and how it solves adverse 
selection issues in markets.  
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Our primary results show that the certification works as an effective signaling method 
and provides incentives to low-type sellers to disclose quality information in real markets, which 
is consistent with the findings from Essay 1. Moreover, we have also found that the sizes of the 
incentives differ across different product categories and therefore the certification does not 
encourage low-type sellers to voluntarily disclose quality information in certain product 
categories. We assume that the varying quality of certification is possibly one of the reasons of 
this heterogeneous impact, and thus analyze the effect of various certification qualities on market 
outcomes in Essay 3. We find another interesting aspect from out analysis as the result from the 
alternative model shows that the impact of disclosing unfavorable information differs according 
to the original quality level. More specifically, disclosing the same unfavorable information 
provides higher incentives when the actual quality level is higher. Therefore, although the 
empirical finding from the basic specification confirms the existence of the incentive for a low-
quality seller to fully disclose quality information and provides supports for voluntary disclosure, 
the finding from the second specification shows that the size of the incentive differs according to 
the level of true quality, possibly providing support for both voluntary and mandatory disclosure.  
3.1.2 Related Literature 
This essay follows the stream of empirical studies on information disclosure and quality 
signaling in online auction environment. Lewis (2011), Li et al. (2009), and Jin and Kato (2006) 
have provided some important findings regarding information disclosure in an online auction 
setting, and therefore are closely related with this essay. Lewis (2011) and Li et al. (2009) have 
investigated the effect of various risk intermediaries and contributed to the literature as most 
other online auction literature has only focused on seller feedback mechanism. More specifically, 
Lewis (2011) has examined the effect of online information disclosure through observing nearly 
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50,000 car transactions on eBay Motors and found that text and photos posted online work as 
enforceable contract and alleviate information asymmetry through influencing prices. By 
observing eBay’s paintings and silver plates market, Li et al. (2009) have also investigated how 
product quality indicators such as picture postings and money-back guarantees along with seller 
credibility indicators such as seller rating and third-party payment alleviate information 
asymmetry. They have found that those indicators encourage bidder participation, and the effect 
is even stronger when both types of indicators are used simultaneously. However, these studies 
have not considered the effect of claimed quality, as the data does not provide appropriate 
variables indicating the quality levels of the products. Therefore, these studies have not 
examined the relationship between the seller’s claimed quality and information disclosure and 
how the quality of product affects the seller’s information disclosure, which is the main question 
of the current essay. Jin and Kato (2006) is different in this perspective as their data includes the 
variable indicating the quality of the products. They have looked at the collectible baseball card 
market to examine the relationship between price, quality, seller claims, and seller reputation in 
Internet auctions and shown evidence that voluntary disclosure may not work in an online setting. 
More specifically, by investigating the sales data of collectible baseball cards and also 
purchasing and analyzing actual products, they have provided an interesting observation about 
online auction market: while cards with higher quality claims yield price premium, actual 
average quality from high-claim cards is indistinguishable from the cards with more modest 
claims. Therefore, they have shown that there is actually a considerable amount of fraud in the 
market as false claim seems to provide more profit, and the information disclosure mechanisms 
do not work properly to prevent adverse selection issues in this online market. 
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Among these studies, Jin and Kato (2006) share some similarities with the current essay, 
as both use the data from same product category and investigate the relationship between 
claimed quality and information disclosure. However, the focus and findings of this dissertation 
are very different from Jin and Kato (2006)’s, and the theoretical approach of Essay 1 and the 
empirical results of Essay 2 provide contradictory findings about seller’s incentive for 
information disclosure. We explain the differences between two studies more in detail as follows. 
First, while Jin and Kato (2006) basically show how low-type sellers fraudulently claim higher 
quality (i.e., conceal their types) and achieve higher profit, this essay explains how low-type 
sellers fully disclose quality information and increase profit. Second, this paper also looks at 
additional product categories such as collectible coins and collectible stamps and attempt to 
understand how the effect of risk intermediaries on information disclosure differs across different 
product categories. This essay has actually found that the basic finding of Jin and Kato (2006) is 
not replicated in some other product categories: although Jin and Kato's (2006) key finding is 
also shown to be valid with this paper’s analysis of baseball card data as the potential demand 
increases with bold claims without certification, the potential demand does not increase with 
bold claims in the coin market (i.e., “cheap talk”), showing that fraudulent claim does not always 
help sellers in some markets. Therefore, this essay has found that Jin and Kato's (2006) finding 
of the positive effect of dishonesty can only be applied to limited product categories. Third, 
many factors of the model, such as dependent variable, key independent variables, and 
estimation method, are different between the two papers and thus show distinct perspectives. 
Fourth, this essay is based on the analytic model predictions from Essay 1 and thus provides its 
own theoretical explanations on the empirical finding, while Jin and Kato (2006) is mainly 
empirically focused. The bottom line is that, although Jin and Kato (2006) and this essay observe 
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similar product categories and variables, the finding is almost the opposite as one shows that 
fraudulent claim helps low-type sellers and supports mandatory disclosure, while the other 
verifies economic incentives for low-type seller’s full disclosure and supports voluntary 
disclosure.  
Overall, the contribution of this paper to the related empirical literature on information 
disclosure in an online auction environment is to provide a different perspective by focusing on 
the relationship between claimed quality and information disclosure and showing evidences of 
the incentive for the low-type sellers to disclose quality information. Table 3.1 compares these 
related studies.  
 75 
 
Table 3.1: Comparison of Information Disclosure Literature on Online Auction 
 Lewis (2011) Li et al. (2009) Jin and Kato (2006) This Essay 
Risk Intermediary 
Text and photos 
posted online 
Picture postings, 
money-back 
guarantees, seller 
rating, and third-
party payment 
Third-party 
certification 
Third-party 
certification 
Product Category Used cars 
Paintings and silver 
plates 
Collectible baseball 
cards 
Collectible baseball 
cards, coins, and 
stamps 
Consideration of 
Claimed Quality 
No No Yes Yes 
Main Findings 
  Text and photos 
posted online 
alleviate information 
asymmetry and 
influence prices.  
 
  Disclosure cost 
affects how much 
information a seller 
decides to post. 
Product quality 
indicators and seller 
credibility indicators 
alleviate dual 
information 
asymmetry. 
There is a 
considerable amount 
of fraud in the 
market and false 
claims provide more 
profit to sellers. 
 Revealing low 
quality increases 
demand with third-
party certification. 
 
 The effect of 
certification on 
information 
disclosure differs 
across product 
categories. 
Supporting 
Disclosure Scheme 
Voluntary disclosure Voluntary disclosure 
Mandatory 
disclosure 
Voluntary disclosure 
 
3.2 Data 
This essay attempts to check the theoretical predictions from Essay 1 through analyzing 
whether market data actually corresponds with the prediction that disclosing low-type can 
increase demand. After investigating various product categories, we have chosen three product 
categories as our primary targets for empirical analysis: collectible baseball cards, collectible 
coins, and collectible stamps. First of all, the markets for collectible baseball cards, coins, and 
stamps have clear information asymmetry, since customers rarely have the capability to 
accurately evaluate the quality of products, in most cases even after purchase. Second, collectible 
 76 
 
baseball cards, coins, and stamps have different levels of perceived risk since some sellers are 
more trusted than others, and some products’ qualities are professionally verified while others 
are not. Third, the quality of the products can be easily compared, as all of the baseball cards, 
coins, and stamps in the market are measured by their respective universal grading standards. 
Finally, all baseball cards, coins, and stamps under the same product group are basically identical 
and only differ in quality, price, and risk level.  
Unlike previous studies on quality signaling under the Internet auction setting listed 
above, we observe three different product categories to see whether the findings are consistent 
across different product categories. We are interested in understanding how the impact of third-
party certification on market outcomes differs across different product categories, assuming that 
the characteristics and quality of third-party certifications all vary in these different product 
categories.  
Among numerous kinds of collectible baseball cards and coins, we have picked Ken 
Griffey, Jr.’s 1989 Upper Deck card and the 1921 Morgan silver dollar (Figure 3.1) since they 
are some of the most actively traded products in their respective markets. As the stamp market 
has a lot more variety and each different product has only a limited number of trades, we have 
collected data from 15 different product types (1901 Pan-American Issue, 1904 Louisiana 
Purchase Issue, Washington-Franklin Era 1908-09 Regular Issue, Washington-Franklin Era 1909 
Commemorative Issue, Washington-Franklin Era 1913-15 Panama-Pacific Issue, 1934 National 
Parks Issue, 1936-37 Army-Navy Issue, 1938 Presidential Issue, 1939 Presidential Coil Issue, 
1940 Famous Americans Issue, Airmail 1941-44 Rotary Issue, 1944 Overrun Countries Issue, 
First Airmail Issue, Graf Zeppelin Issue, and Special Delivery Rotary Press Issue). We have 
collected sales data from eBay from February 2013 to May 2013 for baseball cards, from 
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December 2014 to February 2015 for collectible coins, and from September 2015 to December 
2015 for stamps. We have only included baseball cards graded by Beckett Grading Services 
(BGS), coins graded by NGC Coin Grading System (NGC), and stamps graded by Professional 
Stamp Experts (PSE), for the professionally graded products since they are some of the most 
trusted professional grading services in their respective industries. In total, we have collected 
sales data of 456 collectible baseball cards (225 professionally graded and 231 not professionally 
graded), 438 collectible coins (224 professionally graded and 214 not professionally graded), and 
349 collectible stamps (101 professionally graded and 248 not professionally graded).  
Figure 3.1: Ken Griffey, Jr.’s 1989 Upper Deck Card and 1921 Morgan Silver Dollar 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3.3 Model 
3.3.1 Variables 
Based on previous studies on Internet auctions and our own judgment, we have carefully 
selected the variables that fit the purpose of our essay. The following variables have been 
considered for all three product categories.  
First, since this essay’s main interest is to understand how demand shifts with respect to 
the changes in various factors, the number of unique bidders is chosen as a dependent variable. 
We use the number of bidders as a proxy to estimate the size of demand for each product since 
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each bid in an eBay auction is regarded as a legal contract to purchase the product.
12
 As each 
bidder has actually agreed to purchase the product (i.e., had a buyer not had the intention to 
purchase the item, he or she would not have made a bid on the item in the first place), it is logical 
to think of the number of bidders a reasonable construct to capture the underlying size of 
potential demand for each product. Although the number of bidders has been treated as 
exogenous in traditional auction theory literature, it has been considered as endogenous in online 
auction studies (Bapna et al. 2004). Next, the variables that we believe to influence the number 
of bidders in this empirical application are selected as potential candidates for independent 
variables and classified into four groups: variables representing perceived risk, claimed quality, 
price of the product, and others. 
The first variable measuring perceived risk is the dummy variable showing whether the 
product on sale is professionally graded or not. As the physical condition of the product is very 
important in deciding the quality level, high-resolution pictures of the product can be a good risk 
reducer, and thus how many sides of the product are shown with high-resolution pictures is also 
used as an independent variable. Variables measuring the trustworthiness of a seller are the 
feedback score, a dummy for 100 percent positive feedback ratings, and a dummy for whether 
the seller is “Top Rated.” The feedback score is calculated and displayed by eBay through 
subtracting the number of negative feedback ratings from the number of positive feedback 
ratings, and “Top Rated Seller” is entitled by eBay to the sellers who meet several requirements, 
such as having an eBay account that has been active for at least 90 days, a positive feedback 
rating of at least 98 percent, and at least 100 transactions and $1,000 in sales with U.S. buyers 
over the most recent 12-month period. The claimed quality of the product is measured by the 
                                                 
12
 When you bid on a product at eBay, you see a message that says, “By clicking Confirm bid, you commit to buy 
this product from the seller if you are the winning bidder.” 
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standard grade claimed by the seller, which ranges from one (Poor) to ten (Gem Mint) for 
baseball cards, from one (Poor) to seventy (Mint State, Uncirculated) for coins, and from five 
(Poor) to one hundred (Super Gem) for stamps. We measure price of the products through both 
starting price and shipping price, while final price of an auction is not used as an independent 
variable as a seller does not have a direct control over this variable. The auction literature also 
regards the final price as the outcome of auction competitiveness, not as the predictor (Bapna, 
Jank, and Shmueli 2008; Pinker, Seidmann, and Vakrat 2003; Reddy and Dass 2006). Finally, 
we include the length of an auction, delivery time, return period, and the dummies to measure 
whether the auction ends during the prime time or the weekend (Melnik and Alm 2002).  
In addition to those common independent variables explained above, there are several 
other variables that are product category specific. For the estimation of collectible coins data, we 
have included two additional dummies for whether a coin is produced in Denver or San 
Francisco
13, thus where it was produced is a very important factor in deciding a coin’s value. For 
stamp data, we have included dummies for product types, as we have observed sales data of 
several different product types, unlike baseball card and coin data. Moreover, the dummies for 
whether the product is encapsulated, cancelled, or hinged are also included, since these factors 
affect perceived value of the stamps. We have observed that some stamps have buy-it-now 
options and thus added a dummy for whether the product is sold with a buy-it-now option. On 
the other hand, no products have shown a buy-it-now option in baseball card and coin data. The 
summary statistics for these variables are represented in Table 3.2, Table 3.3, and Table 3.4. 
  
                                                 
13
 The coins in our data were produced in one of the Mint facilities in three cities: Denver, San Francisco, or 
Philadelphia. 
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Table 3.2: Summary Statistics: Collectible Baseball Cards 
 Mean Median S.D. Max Min OBS 
Dependent Variable        
 Number of bidders 5.26 6 3.94 27 0 456 
Perceived Risk        
 
Dummy = 1 if professionally graded 0.49 0 0.50 1 0 456 
Number of card sides clearly shown 1.21 1 0.57 2 0 456 
Feedback score 13383 783 38935 197107 1 456 
Dummy = 1 if only positive feedback 0.77 1 0.42 1 0 456 
Dummy = 1 if the seller is “top rated” 0.21 0 0.41 1 0 456 
Claimed Quality        
 Claimed card grade 8.44 8.5 0.83 10 5 456 
Price        
 
Auction starting price ($) 17.02 1.99 34.96 200 0.01 456 
Shipping price ($) 2.72 2.95 1.46 13 0 456 
Other        
 
Dummy = 1 if ends in weekend 0.39 0 0.49 1 0 456 
Dummy = 1 if ends in prime time 0.39 0 0.49 1 0 456 
Auction duration (days) 6.11 7 1.97 10 1 456 
Estimated delivery time (days) 4.78 4 1.78 15.5 3 456 
Return period (days) 8.49 14 6.92 30 0 456 
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Table 3.3: Summary Statistics: Collectible Coins 
 Mean Median S.D. Max Min OBS 
Dependent Variable        
 Number of bidders 4.96 5 4.14 16 0 438 
Perceived Risk        
 
Dummy = 1 if professionally graded 0.51 1 0.5 1 0 438 
Number of coin sides clearly shown 1.95 2 0.27 2 0 438 
Feedback score 8845.51 3974 14778.27 126950 6 438 
Dummy = 1 if only positive feedback 0.54 1 0.5 1 0 438 
Dummy = 1 if the seller is “top rated” 0.44 0 0.5 1 0 438 
Claimed Quality        
 Claimed coin grade 61.07 63 5.29 67 50 438 
Price        
 
Auction starting price ($) 28.67 0.995 62.72 1069 0.01 438 
Shipping price ($) 1.59 1.95 1.47 7.99 0 438 
Other        
 
Dummy = 1 if ends in weekend 0.3 0 0.46 1 0 438 
Dummy = 1 if ends in prime time 0.38 0 0.49 1 0 438 
Auction duration (days) 5.41 7 2.34 10 1 438 
Estimated delivery time (days) 5.46 6 1.45 14 3 438 
Return period (days) 12.51 14 7.09 60 0 438 
 Coin produced in Denver 0.15 0 0.36 1 0 438 
 Coin produced in San Francisco 0.11 0 0.32 1 0 438 
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Table 3.4: Summary Statistics: Collectible Stamps 
 Mean Median S.D. Max Min OBS 
Dependent Variable        
 Number of bidders 2.7 1 3.21 16 0 349 
Perceived Risk        
 
Dummy = 1 if professionally graded 
0.29 0 0.45 1 0 349 
Number of stamp sides clearly shown 1.38 1 0.49 2 1 349 
Feedback score 18438.74 7384 23917.19 79319 13 349 
Dummy = 1 if only positive feedback 0.70 1 0.46 1 0 349 
Dummy = 1 if the seller is “top rated” 0.05 0 0.22 1 0 349 
Claimed Quality        
 Claimed stamp grade 
82.54 80 10.86 100 30 349 
Price        
 
Auction starting price ($) 39.74 1.75 113.84 850 0.01 349 
Shipping price ($) 1.14 1 1.30 15.99 0 343 
Other        
 
Dummy = 1 if ends in weekend 0.52 1 0.50 1 0 349 
Dummy = 1 if ends in prime time 0.43 0 0.50 1 0 349 
Auction duration (days) 6.88 7 1.24 10 1 349 
Estimated delivery time (days) 4.86 5 1.05 9 3 343 
Return period (days) 17.72 14 8.14 30 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 if the stamp is encapsulated 0.09 0 0.28 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 if the stamp is cancelled 0.18 0 0.38 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 if the stamp is hinged 0.41 0 0.49 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 for buy-it-now option 0.04 0 0.19 1 0 349 
Product Type       
 Dummy = 1 for product type 1 0.15 0 0.35 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 for product type 2 0.05 0 0.22 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 for product type 3 0.06 0 0.23 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 for product type 4 0.05 0 0.22 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 for product type 5 0.04 0 0.19 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 for product type 6 0.03 0 0.18 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 for product type 7 0.03 0 0.16 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 for product type 8 0.10 0 0.30 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 for product type 9 0.05 0 0.22 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 for product type 10 0.07 0 0.25 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 for product type 11 0.04 0 0.20 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 for product type 12 0.07 0 0.25 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 for product type 13 0.16 0 0.36 1 0 349 
 Dummy = 1 for product type 14 0.06 0 0.24 1 0 349 
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3.3.2 Model Specification 
3.3.2.1 Count Model Selection 
Our dependent variable, the number of bidders, has actually been treated as exogenous in 
most previous auction literature. As most auction literature considers traditional auction settings, 
not online auctions as in this essay, the number of bidders has usually been considered as fixed 
and commonly known to every participant (Athey and Haile 2002; Bapna et al. 2004). However, 
the understanding of the number of bidders in online auction studies is different from those 
traditional auction studies. Online auction studies have considered the number of bidders as 
random and some have assumed the arrival of buyers or the number of bidders to follow a 
Poisson process (Ackerberg, Hirano, and Shahriar 2006; Bajari and Hortacsu 2003; Etzion, 
Pinker, and Seidmann 2006; Hong and Nekipelov 2012). Since this essay also considers an 
online auction setting, we adopt this approach from online auction studies and consider this 
estimation as the analysis of count data.  
3.3.2.1.1 Over-dispersion 
We first check over-dispersion in the data to find out whether Poisson distribution or 
negative binomial distribution is more appropriate. In the baseball card data, the likelihood ratio 
test of over-dispersion parameter alpha shows a very low chi-squared value (0.0000046 with one 
degree of freedom). Since over-dispersion alpha is not significantly different from zero (p = 
0.499), the result suggests that negative binomial distribution is equivalent to a Poisson 
distribution and over-dispersion is not an issue. In the coin data, the likelihood ratio test of over-
dispersion parameter alpha also shows an extremely low chi-squared value (0 with one degree of 
freedom). Since over-dispersion alpha is not significantly different from zero (p = 0.5), the result 
also suggests that negative binomial distribution is equivalent to a Poisson distribution and over-
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dispersion is not an issue in this case either. However, in the stamp data, the likelihood ratio test 
of over-dispersion parameter alpha shows high chi-squared value (39.53 with one degree of 
freedom). Since over-dispersion alpha in this case is significantly different from zero (p = 0.000), 
the result suggests that negative binomial distribution is not equivalent to a Poisson distribution 
and over-dispersion is an issue. Therefore, a Poisson regression seems to be appropriate for 
baseball card and coin data while a negative binomial regression is more appropriate for stamp 
data.  
3.3.2.1.2 Zero-Inflation 
We also checked if we have to use zero-inflated model for the data through examining 
both theoretical and model fits. We have first tried to understand whether a separate process is at 
work for the products with zero number of bidders and if customers automatically avoid bidding 
on some items since they are considered as “not for sale.” We also checked the model fit 
between normal count models and zero-inflated models using a Vuong test (Vuong 1989). 
Greene (1994) has suggested using the Vuong test for non-nested models as normal count 
models and zero-inflated models are not nested. The Vuong test compares two non-nested 
models and finds which model better fits the data through the following process (Long and 
Freese 2006). Let’s assume that           is the predicted probability of observing y in the zero-
inflated model and           is the predicted probability of observing y in the standard count 
model. We can define the following. 
      
         
         
  
Let   be the mean and let    be the standard deviation of  . Then the Vuong statistic 
which tests the hypothesis that        is 
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 If V > 1.96, the zero-inflated model is preferred, and if V < -1.96, the standard count 
model is preferred. However, the literature has also suggested corrections to the Vuong test 
statistic because the zero-inflated models involve several more parameters than normal count 
models (Desmarais and Harden 2013), and even Vuong (1989) has recommended adjusting his 
test for the number of parameters. Therefore, we have also tested zero-inflation using the 
corrected Vuong statistics based on the Akaike and Bayesian (Schwarz) information criteria 
(AIC and BIC).  
In total, 80 of 456 total observations of baseball card data (17.54%), 123 of 438 total 
observations of coin data (28.08%), and 110 of 349 total observations of stamp data (31.52%) 
show zero unique bidders. First, in terms of the theoretical fit, there is no reason to believe that a 
separate process is at work for these products with zero bidders. We believe that all baseball 
cards, coins, and stamps listed on eBay have one same purpose of being sold, and there is no 
separate category of products which customers automatically avoid bidding since sellers post 
them for other purposes than selling them. Second, in terms of the model fit, we have checked 
the uncorrected Vuong statistic along with the Vuong statistics with the AIC and BIC corrections 
(using the ZIPCV and ZINBCV procedure provided in STATA 13.1), and the results are 
summarized in Table 3.5. While the uncorrected Vuong test favors zero-inflated models for 
baseball cards (p = 0.03), coins (p = 0.02), and stamps (p = 0.01) data, both the AIC-corrected 
Vuong test and the BIC-corrected Vuong test show support for neither the zero-inflated model 
nor the standard count model. In particular, BIC-corrected Vuong test shows support for standard 
count models for baseball cards and stamps with the test statistic being -0.84 and -0.75 
respectively, although these are not significant (p = 0.2 and 0.226, respectively).  
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Therefore, there is no theoretical evidence for using the zero-inflated model, and various 
Vuong tests do not provide support for zero-inflated models for baseball card, coin, and stamp 
data. 
Table 3.5: Vuong Tests of Zero-Inflated Models vs. Standard Count Models 
 Baseball Cards Coins Stamps 
Vuong test 
without correction 
z = 1.94 
 
Pr>z = 0.0264 
Pr<z = 0.9736 
z = 2.06 
 
Pr>z = 0.0198 
Pr<z = 0.9802 
z = 2.46 
 
Pr>z = 0.0070 
Pr<z = 0.9930 
Vuong test 
with AIC correction 
z = 1.03 
 
Pr>z = 0.1521 
Pr<z = 0.8479 
z = 1.54 
 
Pr>z = 0.0620 
Pr<z = 0.9380 
z = 1.36 
 
Pr>z = 0.0875 
Pr<z = 0.9125 
Vuong test 
with BIC (Schwarz) 
correction 
z = -0.84 
 
Pr>z = 0.7996 
Pr<z = 0.2004 
z = 0.48 
 
Pr>z = 0.3168 
Pr<z = 0.6832 
z = -0.75 
 
Pr>z = 0.7743 
Pr<z = 0.2257 
 
3.3.2.1.3 Final Model Selection 
In summary, we have found that over-dispersion cannot be ignored in the stamp data, 
while it is not a serious issue with baseball card and coin data. Moreover, we have checked that 
zero-inflation is not supported in all of the product categories. Based on these considerations, we 
run a Poisson regression for the baseball and coin data and a negative binomial regression for the 
stamp data.  
3.3.2.2 Multicollinearity 
 When we have first estimated the suggested models with the variables defined above, our 
primary results show some possibilities of multicollinearity, as only 4 out of 13 independent 
variables for baseball card data, 4 out of 15 independent variables for coin data, and 6 out of 31 
independent variables for stamp data have been found to be significant. Therefore, we have 
examined if there are any multicollinearity issues among the independent variables in our model. 
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For the baseball card data, none of the correlation coefficients between independent variables 
seems to be strong and worrisome. The highest correlation is 0.4144 between TOPRATED 
(whether a seller is “Top Rated”) and RETURN (return period), and most other correlation 
coefficients are lower than 0.2. We also directly check for multicollinearity by observing VIF 
(variance inflation factor) values of the independent variables, and the result is shown in Table 
3.6. As we can see, none of the VIF values is higher than 1.5, and thus there seems to be no need 
for further investigation of multicollinearity in our model for baseball card data.  
Table 3.6: Variance Inflation Factors (Baseball Cards) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
FEEDBACK 1.46 0.6858 
TOPRATED 1.45 0.6891 
RETURN 1.4 0.7157 
DELIVERY 1.27 0.7863 
PRO_GRADE 1.27 0.7904 
FEEDBACK_100 1.25 0.7998 
PRICE_START 1.21 0.8246 
GRADE 1.19 0.8424 
PRICE_SHIPPING 1.07 0.9311 
SIDES_LEGIBLE 1.07 0.9331 
DURATION 1.07 0.9336 
PRIMETIME 1.07 0.9342 
WEEKEND 1.05 0.9554 
Mean VIF 1.22  
 
For the coin data, none of the correlation coefficients seems to be strong and worrisome 
either. The highest correlation is 0.416 between TOP_RATED (whether a seller is “Top Rated”) 
and RETURN (return period), and most other correlation coefficients are lower than 0.2. We also 
observe VIF values of the independent variables, and the result is shown in Table 3.7. As we can 
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see, none of the VIF values is higher than 1.8, and thus there is no need for further investigation 
of multicollinearity in this case.  
Table 3.7: Variance Inflation Factors (Coins) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
TOP_RATED 1.75 0.573039 
PRO_GRADE 1.61 0.621864 
GRADE 1.47 0.681368 
RETURN 1.41 0.707161 
FEEDBACK 1.23 0.811432 
DELIVERY 1.2 0.835809 
FEEDBACK_100 1.19 0.838145 
PRICE_SHIPPING 1.19 0.843298 
DURATION 1.16 0.865051 
PRICE_START 1.14 0.877785 
MINT_S 1.13 0.882421 
MINT_D 1.1 0.907904 
SIDES_SHOWN 1.09 0.920004 
PRIME_TIME 1.06 0.941922 
WEEKEND 1.05 0.955748 
Mean VIF 1.25  
 
Finally, for the stamp data, the investigation of the correlation coefficients does not 
caution any multicollinearity either. The highest correlation is 0.463 between PRO_GRADE 
(whether the product is graded by professional grading service) and FEEDBACK (seller’s 
feedback score), and most other correlation coefficients are lower than 0.2. We also observe VIF 
values of the independent variables, and the result is shown in Table 3.8. As we can see, the 
highest VIF value is 5.45, and thus multicollinearity does not seem to be a serious issue for 
stamp data.   
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Table 3.8: Variance Inflation Factors (Stamps) 
Variable VIF 1/VIF 
PRODUCT_13 5.45 0.183364 
PRODUCT_01 3.94 0.253755 
PRO_GRADE 3.54 0.282776 
ENCAP 3.1 0.322636 
PRODUCT_08 2.92 0.34302 
PRODUCT_12 2.6 0.385352 
FEEDBACK 2.56 0.390496 
PRODUCT_03 2.47 0.404345 
PRODUCT_14 2.47 0.405284 
PRODUCT_05 2.42 0.413335 
PRODUCT_10 2.42 0.413374 
HINGED 2.21 0.45198 
PRODUCT_02 2.21 0.453097 
RETURN 2.19 0.457486 
PRICE_START 2.18 0.459423 
PRODUCT_11 2.1 0.475559 
FEEDBACK_100 2.08 0.480774 
PRODUCT_04 2.02 0.496231 
GRADE 2.01 0.498291 
PRODUCT_09 1.99 0.502131 
PRODUCT_06 1.99 0.502464 
CANCEL 1.98 0.504386 
PRICE_SHIP~G 1.98 0.505165 
SIDES_SHOWN 1.67 0.599679 
PRODUCT_07 1.61 0.619761 
WEEKEND 1.57 0.635846 
PRIME_TIME 1.55 0.644857 
DELIVERY 1.52 0.655845 
BUY_IT_NOW 1.35 0.743029 
DURATION 1.34 0.743865 
TOP_RATED 1.18 0.847754 
Mean VIF 1.25  
 
Judging by these results, we can conclude that multicollinearity is not an issue for any of 
the product categories observed in our analysis.  
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3.3.2.3 Model Comparison 
As we have confirmed that multicollinearity is not an issue for all three product 
categories, we have decided to check whether the variables included in the primary analysis are 
all necessary. If some variables are added in the model without contributing toward better model 
fit, they may just increase the size of standard errors, reducing the precision of all our estimates. 
Among those 13 independent variables for baseball card data, 15 independent variables for coin 
data, and 31 independent variables for stamp data, the primary analysis shows that 8 variables 
(feedback score, the dummy for 100% positive feedback, shipping price, the duration of the 
auction, delivery time, return period, and the dummies to measure whether the auction ends 
during the prime time or the weekend) do not seem to be significant in any of the product 
categories observed. As their insignificance is universal among all product categories, it seems 
logical to remove those variables which do not contribute to the model fit and only increase 
standard errors. Among these variables, we still believe that there are theoretical grounds to 
include the feedback score, the dummy for 100 percent positive feedback, and shipping price as 
they are related with the factors considered in our analytic model explaining perceived risk and 
price of the product. Therefore, we have estimated new parsimonious models for baseball card, 
coin, and stamp data that exclude the following 5 variables: the duration of the auction, delivery 
time, return period, and the dummies to measure whether the auction ends during the prime time 
or the weekend.   
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Table 3.9: Model Fit Comparisons 
  
Primary Model Parsimonious Model 
Difference 
(Primary – Parsimonious) 
Baseball 
Cards 
AIC 1959.858 1956.252 3.606 
 BIC 2021.53 1997.367 24.163 
Coins AIC 1875.43 1874.104 1.326 
 BIC 1944.789 1923.091 21.698 
Stamps AIC 1171.964 1169.08 2.884 
 BIC 1302.447 1280.374 22.073 
 
 Table 3.9 shows the model fit comparison between the primary model and the 
parsimonious model. Both AIC and BIC provide evidence that the parsimonious model has a 
much better fit. The differences in BIC statistics are bigger than 20 in all three product categories, 
suggesting that the parsimonious model is very strongly preferred over the primary model. In 
other words, we can see that those excluded 5 variables do not contribute toward better model fit 
and just increase the size of standard errors and reduce the precision of all our estimates. 
Therefore, we decide to run our analysis with parsimonious models for all three product 
categories. Table 3.10 shows the definitions of variables finally selected for the estimation.  
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Table 3.10: Definitions of Variables 
Variables Definition 
Estimation 
Baseball 
Cards 
Coins Stamps 
Potential Demand    
 NO_BIDDER 
The number of buyers who have bid for the item 
before the auction ends 
O O O 
Perceived Risk    
 PRO_GRADE 
Dummy variable indicating whether the product was 
graded by a third-party professional grading service 
O O O 
SIDES_SHOWN 
Number of product sides shown with high-resolution 
pictures so that customers can evaluate the appearances 
O O O 
FEEDBACK 
Total feedback score calculated and displayed by eBay 
through subtracting the number of negative feedback 
ratings from the number of positive feedback ratings 
O O O 
FEEDBACK_100 
Dummy variable indicating whether the seller has a 
100% positive feedback score 
O O O 
TOP_RATED 
Dummy variable indicating whether the seller satisfies 
certain requirements and is thus entitled as “Top Rated 
Seller” by eBay 
O O O 
Claimed Quality    
 GRADE 
The quality level of the product claimed by the seller 
by the grading standard commonly used in the product 
category 
O O O 
Price    
 PRICE_START The initial price for the auction item set by the seller O O O 
PRICE_SHIPPING The shipping price for the auction item set by the seller O O O 
Other    
 MINT_D 
Dummy variable indicating whether the coin is 
originally produced in Denver 
 O  
MINT_S 
Dummy variable indicating whether the coin is 
originally produced in San Francisco 
 O  
ENCAP 
Dummy variable indicating whether the stamp is 
protected in a firm and clear holder made of inert 
styrene plastic 
  O 
CANCEL 
Dummy variable indicating whether the stamp has a 
postal marking or postal stationery applied on it to 
deface the stamp and prevent its re-use 
  O 
HINGED 
Dummy variable indicating whether the stamp had 
been affixed onto a stamp album and thus has folded, 
transparent, and rectangular pieces of paper coated 
with a mild gum 
  O 
 BUY_IT_NOW 
Dummy variable indicating whether the seller offers a 
buy-it-now option 
  O 
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3.4 Results 
3.4.1 Basic Specification 
3.4.1.1 Estimation Procedure 
Based on the considerations discussed above, we estimate our data from three product 
categories with the variables defined above.  
3.4.1.1.1 Baseball Cards  
Let’s assume that the number of unique bidders for the auction item j sold by seller i is 
drawn from a Poisson distribution where the mean of the distribution is shown by the parameter 
   : 
              
 
       
 
  
,  
where q = 0, 1, 2, …, and              . 
We use the following specification for the independent variables:  
βXij = β0 + β1Dummy for Professional Gradingij 
+ β2Number of Card Sides Shown with High-Resolution Picturesij 
+ β3Feedback Scoreij + β4Dummy for Positive Feedback Onlyij 
+ β5Dummy for “Top Rated” Sellerij + β6Claimed Card Gradeij 
+ β7Auction Starting Priceij + β8Shipping Priceij 
Table 3.11 shows the result of the estimation.
14
 We can do some primary analysis by 
examining whether this result corresponds with the main proposition, which has made 
predictions about the incentive for the low-type sellers to disclose quality information. First, we 
check whether the demand for the product increases with lower perceived risk. The result shows 
                                                 
14
 Total observation is 451 for this estimation since 5 observations without seller information have been excluded for 
panel data analysis.  
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that the coefficients for two variables representing perceived risk—whether the card is 
professionally graded and the number of sides clearly shown—are both significant and positive. 
Therefore, the estimation result regarding the effect of perceived risk follows the prediction of 
the main proposition. Second, we can check whether the demand for the product increases with 
higher claimed quality. The result shows that the coefficient for the variable representing claimed 
quality—claimed card grade—is significant and positive. Therefore, the effect of claimed quality 
also follows the prediction of the main proposition. Third, the variable representing auction 
starting price is negative and strongly significant as indicated by the analytic model. Overall, our 
analytic model seems to work well in predicting the real market situations in the baseball card 
market, according to the estimation results. 
Table 3.11: Estimation Results for Baseball Cards (Basic Specification) 
Perceived Risk   
 
Dummy = 1 if professionally graded 
0.1279 *** 
(0.0499)  
Number of card sides clearly shown 
0.0845 ** 
(0.0427)  
Feedback score 
0.00000156 * 
(0.000000808)  
Dummy = 1 if only positive feedback 
0.0404  
(0.0576)  
Dummy = 1 if the seller is "top rated" 
0.0619  
(0.0622)  
Claimed Quality   
 Claimed card grade 
0.2377 *** 
(0.0303)  
Price   
 
Auction starting price ($) 
-0.0548 *** 
(0.0031)  
Shipping price ($) 
-0.0054  
(0.0170)  
    
Observations 451   
Chi-squared 459.48  *** 
d.f. 8   
 * p<0.1. 
** p<0.05. 
*** p<0.01.  
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3.4.1.1.2 Coins 
For the coin data, we again run a Poisson regression with the variables defined above and 
assume that the number of unique bidders for the auction item j sold by seller i is drawn from a 
Poisson distribution where the mean of the distribution is shown by the parameter    : 
              
 
       
 
  
,  
where q = 0, 1, 2, …, and              . 
We use the following specification for the independent variables:  
βXij = β0 + β1Dummy for Professional Gradingij 
+ β2Number of Coin Sides Shown with High-Resolution Picturesij 
+ β3Feedback Scoreij + β4Dummy for Positive Feedback Onlyij 
+ β5Dummy for “Top Rated” Sellerij + β6Claimed Coin Gradeij 
+ β7Auction Starting Priceij + β8Shipping Priceij 
+ β9Dummy for Coin Produced in Denverij  
+ β10Dummy for Coin Produced in San Franciscoij 
Table 3.12 shows the result of the estimation for collectible coins data. Again, we can do 
some primary analysis by examining whether this result corresponds with the main proposition 
regarding the economic incentive for low-type sellers to disclose information. First, we check 
whether the demand for the product increases with lower perceived risk. The result shows that 
the coefficients for two variables representing perceived risk—whether the coin is professionally 
graded and number of sides clearly shown—are both significant and positive. Therefore, the 
estimation result regarding the effect of perceived risk follows the prediction of the main 
proposition. Second, we can check whether the demand for the product increases with higher 
claimed quality. The result shows that the coefficient for the variable representing claimed 
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quality—claimed coin grade—is positive. However, the effect of this variable is not significant, 
unlike the case of baseball card data. Therefore, the effect of claimed quality does not correspond 
with the prediction of the main proposition. This is also different from the findings from Jin and 
Kato (2006), who have shown that a higher claimed grade always helps sellers, even when the 
claim is not true. Third, the variable representing auction starting price is negative and strongly 
significant, as indicated by the analytic model. Overall, the coin data shows that our analytic 
model again seems to work fine in predicting the real market situations, although the effect of 
claimed quality is not significant. The effect of claimed quality will be analyzed again with an 
alternative specification, where it shows some significant effects through interaction. 
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Table 3.12: Estimation Results for Coins (Basic Specification) 
Perceived Risk   
 
Dummy = 1 if professionally graded 
0.3553 *** 
(0.1127)  
Number of coin sides clearly shown 
0.4098 ** 
(0.1997)  
Feedback score 
-0.000000698  
(0.0000037)  
Dummy = 1 if only positive feedback 
-0.1584  
(0.1068)  
Dummy = 1 if the seller is "top rated" 
0.1826 * 
(0.1027)  
Claimed Quality   
 Claimed coin grade 
0.0109  
(0.0091)  
Price   
 
Auction starting price ($) 
-0.0293 *** 
(0.0037)  
Shipping price ($) 
-0.0175  
(0.0316)  
Other   
 
Dummy = 1 if produced in Denver 
0.0857  
 (0.0814)  
 
Dummy = 1 if produced in San Francisco 
0.0262  
 (0.0925)  
    
Observations 438  
Chi-squared 132.63 *** 
d.f. 10  
 * p<0.1. 
** p<0.05. 
*** p<0.01.  
3.4.1.1.3 Stamps 
For the stamp data, we run a negative binomial regression with the variables defined 
above and assume that the number of unique bidders for the auction item j sold by seller i is 
drawn from a negative binomial distribution where the mean of the distribution is shown by the 
parameter     : 
              
 
         
 
  
,  
where q = 0, 1, 2, …, and                 εij. 
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We use the following specification for the independent variables:  
βXij + εij = β0 + β1Dummy for Professional Gradingij 
+ β2Number of Stamp Sides Shown with High-Resolution Picturesij 
+ β3Feedback Scoreij + β4Dummy for Positive Feedback Onlyij 
+ β5Dummy for “Top Rated” Sellerij + β6Claimed Stamp Gradeij 
+ β7Auction Starting Priceij + β8Shipping Priceij 
+ β9Dummy for Encepsulated Stampij  
+ β10Dummy for Cancelled Stampij 
+ β11Dummy for Hinged Stampij 
+       
  
   Stamp Type
k
ij + εij 
Table 3.13 shows the result of the estimation for collectible stamp data. Again, we can do 
some primary analysis by examining whether this result corresponds with the main proposition 
regarding the economic incentive for low-type sellers to disclose information. First, we check 
whether the demand for the product increases with lower perceived risk. The result shows that 
the coefficient for the dummy variable for whether the coin is professionally graded is significant 
and positive. Therefore, the estimation result regarding the effect of perceived risk follows the 
prediction of the main proposition. Second, we can check whether the demand for the product 
increases with higher claimed quality. The result shows that the coefficient for the variable 
representing claimed quality—claimed stamp grade—is significant and positive. Therefore, the 
effect of claimed quality also follows the prediction of the main proposition. Third, the 
coefficient for the variable representing auction starting price is negative and strongly significant 
as predicted by the analytic model. Overall, the stamp data shows that our analytic model again 
seems to work fine in predicting the real market situations.  
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Table 3.13: Estimation Results for Stamps (Basic Specification) 
Perceived Risk   
 
Dummy = 1 if professionally graded 
0.5979 ** 
(0.2521)  
Number of stamp sides clearly shown 
0.0254  
(0.1720)  
Feedback score 
0.0000108  
(0.00000734)  
Dummy = 1 if only positive feedback 
-0.1982  
(0.3132)  
Dummy = 1 if the seller is "top rated" 
-0.0442  
(0.3718)  
Claimed Quality   
 Claimed stamp grade 
0.0144 ** 
(0.0061)  
Price   
 
Auction starting price ($) 
-0.0059 *** 
(0.0012)  
Shipping price ($) 
0.0890  
(0.0814)  
Other   
 
Dummy = 1 for encapsulated stamp 
-0.5779  
 (0.6642)  
 
Dummy = 1 for cancelled stamp 
-0.4843 ** 
 (0.1896)  
 
Dummy = 1 for hinged stamp 
0.0922  
 (0.1138)  
 
Dummy = 1 for buy-it-now option 
-30.0338  
 932279.1000  
Stamp Type   
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 1 
0.4365 * 
 (0.2581)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 2 
-0.0655  
 (0.3648)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 3 
0.1601  
 (0.3505)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 4 
-0.3370  
 (0.3667)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 5 
0.5613  
 (0.3730)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 6 
-0.4910  
 (0.4633)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 7 
0.1168  
 (0.2784)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 8 
0.5455 ** 
 (0.2343)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 9 
0.0224  
 (0.2589)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 10 
-0.0055  
 (0.2513)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 11 
0.0845  
 (0.2565)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 12 
0.3947  
 (0.2859)  
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Dummy = 1 for stamp type 13 
1.2549 *** 
 (0.3037)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 14 
-0.0495  
 (0.2673)  
Observations 343  
Chi-squared 89.33 *** 
d.f. 26  
 * p<0.1. 
** p<0.05. 
*** p<0.01.  
3.4.1.2 Check for Endogeneity  
The primary estimation results of three different product category all show that the effect 
of third-party certification is always positive and significant, suggesting that an economic 
incentive for the low-type seller to disclose information may be present in real markets. However, 
before we do more analysis on this, we should first investigate potential endogeneity in this 
model. In particular, it is possible that the seller’s decision to use a professional grading service 
is not exogenous, but is actually affected by some omitted factors. More specifically, it is 
possible that a seller with a high-quality product may be motivated to seek third-party 
certification as it is more likely to get a good grade. On the other hand, it is also possible that a 
seller with a high-quality product may be less motivated to seek third-party certification as other 
factors are already communicating its quality information with bidders. Either way, some 
omitted factors may affect the potential demand of the product. We have therefore explicitly 
checked the endogeneity in our model using instrument variables.  
To find appropriate instruments, we have exploited the panel structure of the data with 
the focus on seller-specific behaviors to find appropriate instruments, applying the approach of 
Hausman, Leonard, and Zona (1994), Hausman (1997), and Nevo (2001). As these previous 
studies have assumed that the errors in demand are independent across markets and then used 
prices of the product in other markets as an instrumental variable for prices of the product in 
current markets, we have assumed that the errors in auction results are independent across 
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auctions in different periods and defined instrument variables from the auctions of the same 
seller (for sellers with multiple auctions) or the same type of sellers (for sellers with a single 
auction)
15
 in a different period. We thus have divided auctions into two periods based on the time 
and date the seller has listed each item, and measured two instruments from the auctions in each 
different period: the probability of being graded by professional grading service and the average 
number of high-resolution pictures posted. We have picked up these instruments since we 
believe that the probability of being graded by a professional grading service and the average 
number of high-resolution pictures shown for auctions by one seller or one type of sellers in one 
period are associated with the same seller or the same type of seller’s decision to use a 
professional grading service for the auctions in the other period. Therefore, we can say that these 
instruments satisfy instrument relevance condition. Moreover, since these variables observed 
from auctions in one period cannot affect the number of bidders for the auctions in a different 
period and thus are not related to the error term of the main estimation, these instruments also 
satisfy the instrument exogeneity condition. These conditions of valid instruments are again 
checked through some statistics in a following analysis.  
Although we now have valid instruments for endogeneity test, we cannot directly apply 
Wu-Hausman test or Durbin test for endogeneity since our main estimation assumes Poisson or 
negative binomial distribution and the potentially endogenous variable is not linear. Therefore, 
we have instead applied the endogeneity test for binary regressor in a count data regression 
suggested by Staub (2009) and Wooldridge (1997). We have first regressed the potentially 
endogenous variable, a dummy for whether the product is professionally graded or not, as a 
function of other independent variables used in the original estimation and two excluded 
                                                 
15
 We have classified these sellers with a single auction item into 16 groups according to their experiences on eBay, 
assuming that sellers with similar experiences show similar behaviors. According to the post analysis explained 
below, this has provided valid instruments that meet both instrument relevance and exogeneity conditions. 
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instruments (the probability of being graded by a professional grading service and the average 
number of high-resolution pictures posted, both measured in a different period), and predicted 
residuals from this estimation. We have then tested whether this residual is significant in the 
second-stage Poisson or negative binomial model.  
The results of these endogeneity tests have not rejected the null hypothesis that the 
variable in question is exogenous in baseball card, coin, and stamp data (p = 0.386, 0.950, and 
0.137, respectively). We have also observed some statistics to reconfirm relevance and 
exogeneity conditions of these instruments. First, the regression of the dummy for whether the 
product is professionally graded or not on all other explanatory variables including instruments 
has shown that the effect from these instrument are significant in explaining this dummy, 
satisfying instrument relevance condition in baseball card, coin, and stamp data (p = 0.00, 0.02, 
and 0.00, respectively). We have also run Poisson and negative binomial estimations with the 
main dependent variable (number of bidders) and all explanatory variables including these 
instruments, and found that these two instruments are not significant in explaining the main 
dependent variable (p = 0.162 and 0.988 for baseball card data, 0.158 and 0.323 for coin data, 
and 0.554 and 0.909 for stamp data), also satisfying the instrument exogeneity condition.  
Therefore, we can say that the potentially endogenous explanatory variable in question (a 
dummy for whether the product is professionally graded) is exogenous in all of the product 
categories we examine, and conclude that our results do not suffer from endogeneity bias. 
3.4.1.3 Analysis of the Results 
With the estimation results, we can explicitly investigate the most important but 
counterintuitive finding from the analytic model that there is an economic incentive to disclose 
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information about low-quality products. We have focused on the effect of third-party 
certification in providing this economic incentive.  
3.4.1.3.1 Baseball Cards 
In the baseball card case, the coefficient for whether the card is professionally graded is 
estimated to be 0.1279. The result suggests that the number of bidders increases by a factor of e 
(0.1279)
 ≈ 1.1364 if the card is professionally graded. Moreover, as the coefficient for claimed card 
grade is 0.2377, the data predicts the number of bidders to increase by a factor of e 
(0.2377)
 ≈ 
1.2683 if claimed card grade increases by one.  
Using these results, we can estimate the comprehensive effects from the changes in these 
variables and present whether disclosing information about low quality can benefit sellers or not. 
We have observed the estimated demand of sellers’ three different strategies: i) fraudulently 
claiming higher quality, ii) disclosing lower quality without certification, and iii) disclosing 
lower quality with certification. First, for the strategy of claiming higher quality, we assume that 
sellers bluff buyers and fraudulently increase the grade of their cards by one half. For example, 
when the actual grade of a card is seven, a seller may claim that the grade is seven and a half. 
Second, for the strategy of disclosing lower quality without certification, we assume that sellers 
reveal the true grade of their cards but do not use certification to support their claims. For 
example, when the actual grade of a card is seven, some sellers may claim that the grade is 
actually seven but do not use a professional grading service. Third, for the strategy of disclosing 
lower quality with certification, we assume that these sellers reveal the true grade of their cards 
and support their claims using certification. For example, when the actual grade of a card is 
seven, these sellers claim that the grade is actually seven and use a professional grading service. 
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For this analysis, all other continuous variables are fixed at mean values and all other dummy 
variables are fixed at zero.  
Figure 3.2: Plotted Demand of Baseball Cards (Basic Specification) 
 
Figure 3.2 shows this estimated demand of each different strategy. From these results, we 
can examine whether there exists an incentive to disclose information about low quality. For 
example, suppose there is a baseball card with an actual grade of seven. A seller can choose one 
of the three strategies as explained: he either fraudulently claims that the grade is seven and a 
half, shares the actual (low) grade of seven without certification, or shares the actual grade of 
seven and uses certification. According to the estimation results, if a seller fraudulently claims 
the actual value of this card to be seven and a half, without using a professional grading service, 
the number of bidders is estimated to be 2.23. If this seller shares the actual grade as seven but 
does not use certification, the demand is estimated to be 1.98, which is lower than the demand 
from higher-claim strategy. However, if the same seller chooses to get the professional grading 
service, the demand is expected to rise to 2.25, which is more than the expected demand when 
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claiming higher quality. Therefore, the predicted demand from empirical analysis shows that the 
demand for the product which discloses low quality and reduces risk can be higher than the 
demand for the product which fraudulently claims high quality. Although revealing low quality 
is not usually believed to be the best strategy to get an instant increase in sales under information 
asymmetry, our analysis of market data shows that it is possible to immediately generate higher 
demand by disclosing information about low quality, suggesting an economic incentive for low-
type sellers to disclose quality information. However, in the baseball card case, this economic 
incentive is relatively small, as the incentive from disclosing low quality with certification is not 
as strong as the incentive from fraudulently increasing the grade by, for example, one. For 
example, when the true quality is eight, fraudulently claiming the quality to be nine gives a 
bigger incentive (estimated demand of 3.19) to the seller than disclosing low quality with 
certification (estimated demand of 2.86). These economic incentives are summarized in Table 
3.14. The fact that the incentive for disclosing information about low quality is relatively small 
in the baseball card data may support the result from Jin and Kato (2006) that sellers overstate 
the value of their products and achieve higher profit in the baseball card market. 
Table 3.14: Estimated Demand of Baseball Cards (Basic Specification) 
 Actual Quality of Card 
 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 
Fraudulently increasing the grade by one half 2.23 2.51 2.83 3.19 3.59 
Disclosing true quality      
 Without certification 1.98 2.23 2.51 2.83 3.19 
 With certification 2.25 2.54 2.86 3.22 3.62 
 
Notes: All other continuous variables are fixed at mean values and all other dummy variables are fixed 
at zero. 
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3.4.1.3.2 Coins 
In the coin data estimation, the coefficient for whether the coin is professionally graded is 
estimated to be 0.3553. The result suggests that the number of bidders increases by a factor of e 
(0.3553)
 ≈ 1.4266 if the coin is professionally graded. However, the effect of the claimed coin 
grade is found to be insignificant in the coin data. This is not consistent with the finding from Jin 
and Kato (2006) that a higher claim will help sellers even when the claim is fraudulent. In other 
words, Jin and Kato (2006) have demonstrated that dishonesty generally helps sellers through 
observing market data and examining actual products, which our analysis of baseball card data 
has also shown to be true. However, our analysis of coin data seems to contradict the finding, as 
the seller simply claiming a higher grade does not affect the buyer’s behavior. In short, there 
seems to be no economic incentive for sellers of coins to overstate quality information. 
We can look at this argument more in detail by the following analysis. Just as we have 
done with the baseball card data, we have observed the estimated demand of sellers’ three 
different strategies: i) fraudulently claiming higher quality, ii) disclosing lower quality without 
certification, and iii) disclosing lower quality with certification. For this analysis, all other 
continuous variables are fixed at mean values and all other dummy variables are fixed at zero.  
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Figure 3.3: Plotted Demand of Coins (Basic Specification) 
 
Figure 3.3 shows this estimated demand of each different strategy. From these results, we 
can examine whether there exists an incentive to disclose information about low quality. For 
example, suppose there is a coin with an actual grade of 55. A seller can choose one of the three 
strategies as explained: he either fraudulently claims that the grade is 60, shares the actual (low) 
grade of 55 without certification, or shares the actual grade of 55 and uses certification. 
According to the estimation results, if a seller fraudulently claims the actual value of this coin to 
be 60, without using a professional grading service, the number of bidders is estimated to be 2.59. 
However, when this seller shares the actual grade of 55 but does not use certification, the 
demand is also estimated to be 2.59, as grade variable is not significant in the coin data. 
Therefore, there is no incentive for sellers of coins to inflate quality information, contrary to Jin 
and Kato (2006)’s finding and our analysis of baseball card data. On the other hand, if the seller 
shares the actual grade as 55 and chooses to get the professional grading service, the demand is 
expected to rise to 3.70, which is bigger than the expected demand when claiming higher quality. 
Therefore, the predicted demand from empirical analysis shows that the demand for the product 
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which discloses low quality and reduces risk can be higher than the demand for the product 
which fraudulently claims high quality. This analysis shows that it is possible to immediately 
generate higher demand by disclosing information about low quality, suggesting economic 
incentives for sellers to disclose information about low-quality products. We have also found that 
there is no incentive for the seller to claim higher quality in the case of coin data, indicating even 
stronger incentives for full disclosure of low-quality product. These economic incentives are 
summarized in Table 3.15. 
Table 3.15: Estimated Demand of Coins (Basic Specification) 
 Actual Quality of Coin 
 50 55 60 65 
Fraudulently increasing the grade by five 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 
Disclosing true quality     
 Without certification 2.59 2.59 2.59 2.59 
 With certification 3.70 3.70 3.70 3.70 
 
Notes: All other continuous variables are fixed at mean values and all other dummy variables are 
fixed at zero. 
 
3.4.1.3.3 Stamps 
In the stamp case, the coefficient for whether the stamp is professionally graded is 
estimated to be 0.5979. The result suggests that the number of bidders increases by a factor of e 
(0.5979)
 ≈ 1.8183 if the stamp is professionally graded. Moreover, as the coefficient for claimed 
stamp grade is 0.0144, the data predicts the number of bidders to increase by a factor of e 
(0.0144)
 
≈ 1.0145 if the claimed stamp grade increases by one.  
Using these results, we can estimate the comprehensive effects from the changes in these 
variables and present whether disclosing low quality can benefit sellers or not. We have again 
observed the estimated demand of sellers’ three different strategies: i) fraudulently claiming 
higher quality, ii) disclosing lower quality without certification, and iii) disclosing lower quality 
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with certification. For this analysis, all other continuous variables are fixed at mean values and 
all other dummy variables are fixed at zero.  
Figure 3.4: Plotted Demand of Stamps (Basic Specification) 
 
Figure 3.4 shows this estimated demand of each different strategy. From these results, we 
can examine whether there exists an incentive to disclose low quality. For example, suppose 
there is a stamp with an actual grade of 50. A seller can choose one of the three strategies as 
explained: he either fraudulently claims that the grade is 60, shares the actual (low) grade of 50 
without certification, or shares the actual grade of 50 and uses certification. According to the 
estimation results, if a seller fraudulently claims the actual value of this stamp to be 60, without 
using a professional grading service, the number of bidders is estimated to be 2.56. If this seller 
shares the actual grade of 50 but does not use certification, the demand is estimated to be 2.22, 
which is lower than the demand from the higher-claim strategy. However, if the same seller 
chooses to get the professional grading service, the demand is expected to rise to 4.03, which is 
higher than the expected demand from claiming higher quality. Therefore, the predicted demand 
from empirical analysis shows that the demand for the product which discloses low quality and 
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reduces risk can be higher than the demand for the product which fraudulently claims high 
quality. This shows that it is possible to immediately generate higher demand by disclosing low-
quality information, suggesting economic incentives to disclose information about low quality. 
In particular, in the stamp case, the economic incentive for making a low-quality claim is very 
big—disclosing true quality with certification has a bigger impact than fraudulently increasing 
the grade by 40. These economic incentives are summarized in Table 3.16. 
Table 3.16: Estimated Demand of Stamps (Basic Specification) 
 Actual Quality of Stamp 
 30 40 50 60 70 80 90 
Fraudulently increasing the grade by ten 1.92 2.22 2.56 2.96 3.41 3.94 4.55 
Disclosing true quality        
 Without certification 1.66 1.92 2.22 2.56 2.96 3.41 3.94 
 With certification 3.02 3.49 4.03 4.66 5.38 6.21 7.17 
 Notes: All other continuous variables are fixed at mean values and all other dummy variables are fixed at zero. 
3.4.1.4 Summary  
 We have investigated the economic incentives for sellers to disclose information about 
lower quality compared with the economic incentive for sellers to fraudulently claim higher 
quality. Although we have found that some economic incentives exist for disclosing low quality 
throughout all three product categories, the sizes of these incentives differ. In the baseball card 
case, the incentive for low-quality disclosure is relatively small and the incentive to fraudulently 
claim high quality is relatively high, which may encourage sellers to overstate their quality in the 
baseball card market, just like the findings from Jin and Kato (2006). However, in the coin case, 
there is almost no incentive for fraudulently claiming high quality and therefore the incentive for 
low-quality disclosure is apparent. In the stamp case, although the incentive to fraudulently claim 
high quality is strong enough, the incentive for low-quality disclosure is even stronger, 
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suggesting that it is definitely better for sellers to claim low quality with certification than to 
inflate quality claims. From these results, we can see that although a third-party certification 
always provides certain incentives to low-quality sellers to disclose quality information, the 
effectiveness of the incentive differs depending on the market circumstances, and this incentive 
for full disclosure is sometimes smaller than the incentive for fraudulent disclosure.  
3.4.2 Alternative Specification 
3.4.2.1 Motivation  
While the basic specification shows various aspects of the economic incentives for 
information disclosure by observing several different markets, this essay also attempts to attain a 
more precise understanding of the incentive structure by replacing the original assumption of the 
analytic model that customers are uniformly distributed according to their risk sensitivities with a 
more realistic assumption that the number of risk-sensitive customers is bigger than the number 
of risk-insensitive customers, based on the following logic. First, most empirical studies that 
have estimated the risk propensities of customers generally show that there are more risk-averse 
customers than risk-taking customers in markets. For example, when Binswanger (1980) has 
observed the risk attitudes of Indian households using an experimental gambling approach, the 
number of customers has generally increased as the level of risk propensity goes from risk-taking 
to risk-averse. In this observation, the subjects’ general tendency of risk aversion has even 
increased as the payoff size used in their gambling approach gets larger. To replicate the findings 
and confirm the new assumption, we have also observed the risk propensities of 718 
undergraduate students at a major public university in the southern United States through using a 
set of monetary gambles, which is the most commonly used method in economics literature to 
measure an individual’s risk propensity (Binswanger 1980; Holt and Laury 2002). When we 
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have measured the subjects’ risk propensities from 1 (extremely risk-averse) to 6 (extremely 
risk-taking), the number of risk-averse subjects has been shown to be generally higher than the 
number of risk-taking subjects, as shown in Table 3.17. Therefore, we have found supports for 
the alternative assumption of the model that the number of risk-sensitive customers is generally 
higher than the number of risk-insensitive customers, from both previous literature and our own 
observations.  
Table 3.17: Observed Distribution of Risk Propensities of Customers 
 
Extremely  
Risk-Averse  
Fairly 
Risk-Averse  
Moderately 
Risk-Averse 
Moderately 
Risk-Taking 
Fairly 
Risk-Taking 
Extremely 
Risk-Taking 
Observed Size 512 105 45 18 12 26 
% 71.31 14.62 6.27 2.51 1.67 3.62 
NOTE: Percentage values are calculated based on the total number of subjects. 
 To apply this alternative assumption to the original model, we have now added a factor of 
interaction between claimed product quality and the level of perceived risk. The rationale behind 
this interaction is as follows: since more customers are risk-sensitive, more people are interested 
in purchasing lower-risk products than higher-risk products. Therefore, the change in demand 
caused by the change in claimed product quality will be relatively lower for high-risk products 
than for low-risk products, as more customers are interested in low-risk products. For this reason, 
we hypothesize that there is an interaction between the claimed product quality and perceived 
risk of the products, since the impact on demand caused by same change in product quality 
differs depending on the level of the perceived risk of the product.  
The existence of an interaction effect between perceived risk and claimed card grade 
suggests some important implications regarding the incentive to disclose information about low 
quality. The theoretical analysis about this alternative specification can be summarized in Figure 
3.5. Figure 3.5 shows that the change in demand caused by the same amount of change in 
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claimed quality is higher for the product with low risk than for the product with high risk 
because of the interaction. Therefore, we can also see from this result that the increase in demand 
caused by the same reduction of risk is higher for the product with high claimed quality than for 
the product with low claimed quality. More specifically, in Figure 3.5, the increase in demand 
caused by same reduced risk is higher with high claimed product quality (ΔDemandH) than with 
low claimed product quality (ΔDemandL), because of the interaction effect. 
Figure 3.5: Interaction Between Perceived Risk and Claimed Quality 
 
Therefore, we can conclude that the effect of the same reduced perceived risk on demand 
is higher for high-quality products than for low-quality products. We have also learned from 
Essay 1 and the earlier sections of this essay that a certification provides economic incentives for 
the disclosure of low quality by reducing perceived risk. Judging from these, we can conclude 
that the seller’s incentive for disclosure of low quality is affected by the level of original quality. 
We will also examine this argument more in detail with the following analysis. 
3.4.2.2 Estimation Procedure  
We now explicitly check the interaction effect in our data and examine what impacts it 
has on the economic incentives for a seller’s information disclosure.  
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3.4.2.2.1 Baseball Cards  
For the alternative specification, most of the specification of the original model is applied, 
but we have added the interaction between the dummy variable showing whether the card on sale 
is professionally graded or not and the standard card grade claimed by the seller. With this new 
specification, it is assumed that the number of unique bidders for auction item j sold by seller i is 
drawn from a Poisson distribution where the mean of the distribution is shown by the parameter 
   : 
              
 
       
 
  
,  
where q = 0, 1, 2, …, and              . 
In this case, we use the following specification for the independent variables:  
βXij = β0 + β1Dummy for Professional Gradingij 
+ β2Number of Card Sides Shown with High Resolution Picturesij 
+ β3Feedback Scoreij + β4Dummy for Positive Feedback Onlyij 
+ β5Dummy for “Top Rated” Sellerij + β6Claimed Card Gradeij 
+ β7Auction Starting Priceij + β8Shipping Priceij 
+ β9Dummy for Professional Gradingij ⅹ Claimed Card Gradeij 
Table 3.18 shows the result of the estimation. Most of the variables that have shown 
significant effects in the original model (whether the card is professionally graded, claimed card 
grade, and auction starting price) are again significant under the alternative specification. 
Moreover, we can analyze the key consideration of the alternative specification by observing the 
changes caused by the newly added interaction effect. Table 3.18 shows that the interaction 
effect seems strongly significant (with p < 0.01) in this estimation. In other words, the effect on 
demand caused by the same change in the value of the product seems to be much bigger when 
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the certification is used. Therefore, the modified assumption applied in this alternative 
specification has shown to be much more realistic and true to the actual market situation. 
Table 3.18: Estimation Results for Baseball Cards (Alternative Specification) 
Perceived Risk   
 
Dummy = 1 if professionally graded 
-1.8781 *** 
(0.5173)  
Number of card sides clearly shown 
0.0812 * 
(0.0422)  
Feedback score 
0.00000161 ** 
(0.000000741)  
Dummy = 1 if only positive feedback 
0.0404  
(0.0576)  
Dummy = 1 if the seller is "top rated" 
0.0324  
(0.0605)  
Claimed Quality   
 Claimed card grade 
0.1304 *** 
(0.0403)  
Price   
 
Auction starting price ($) 
-0.0542 *** 
(0.0030)  
Shipping price ($) 
-0.0072  
(0.0167)  
Interaction   
 
Dummy = 1 if professionally graded * Claimed card grade 
0.2341 *** 
 (0.0601)  
    
Observations 451   
Chi-squared 497.16  *** 
d.f. 9   
 * p<0.1. 
** p<0.05. 
*** p<0.01.  
3.4.2.2.2 Coins  
As we have done with the baseball card case, most of the specification of the original 
model is applied here, but the alternative specification has added the interaction between the 
dummy variable showing whether the coin on sale is professionally graded or not and the 
standard coin grade claimed by the seller, as explained above. With this new specification, it is 
assumed that the number of unique bidders for auction item j sold by seller i is drawn from a 
Poisson distribution where the mean of the distribution is shown by the parameter    : 
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,  
where q = 0, 1, 2, …, and              . 
In this case, we use the following specification for the independent variables:  
βXij = β0 + β1Dummy for Professional Gradingij 
+ β2Number of Coin Sides Shown with High-Resolution Picturesij 
+ β3Feedback Scoreij + β4Dummy for Positive Feedback Onlyij 
+ β5Dummy for “Top Rated” Sellerij + β6Claimed Coin Gradeij 
+ β7Auction Starting Priceij + β8Shipping Priceij 
+ β9Dummy for Coin Produced in Denverij 
+ β10Dummy for Coin Produced in San Franciscoij 
+ β11Dummy for Professional Gradingij ⅹ Claimed Coin Gradeij 
Table 3.19 shows the result of the estimation. The dummy for whether the coin is 
professionally graded and auction starting price are again significant under the alternative 
specification and the claimed coin grade is not significant in this case either. Instead, the 
interaction between claimed coin grade and whether the coin is professionally graded is strongly 
significant (p < 0.01), and we can analyze the main consideration of the alternative specification 
by observing the changes caused by this newly added interaction effect. Since the interaction 
effect seems significant, we can say that the effect on demand caused by the same change in the 
value of the coin seems to be much bigger with lower perceived risk.   
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Table 3.19: Estimation Results for Coins (Alternative Specification) 
 
Perceived Risk   
 
Dummy = 1 if professionally graded 
-4.7811 *** 
(1.5752)  
Number of coin sides clearly shown 
0.3711 * 
(0.1911)  
Feedback score 
-0.00000103  
(0.00000319)  
Dummy = 1 if only positive feedback 
-0.1603 * 
(0.0943)  
Dummy = 1 if the seller is "top rated" 
0.1628 * 
(0.0918)  
Claimed Quality   
 Claimed coin grade 
0.0009  
(0.009)  
Price   
 
Auction starting price ($) 
-0.0317 *** 
(0.0032)  
Shipping price ($) 
-0.0125  
(0.0283)  
Interaction   
 
Dummy = 1 if professionally graded * Claimed coin grade 
0.0823 *** 
 (0.0253)  
Other   
 
Dummy = 1 if produced in Denver 
0.1247  
 (0.0795)  
 
Dummy = 1 if produced in San Francisco 
0.0343  
 (0.0892)  
    
Observations 438  
Chi-squared 202.39 *** 
d.f. 11  
 * p<0.1. 
** p<0.05. 
*** p<0.01.  
3.4.2.2.3 Stamps 
Again for the stamp data, most of the specification of original model is applied, but we 
have added the interaction between the dummy variable showing whether the stamp is 
professionally graded or not and the standard stamp grade claimed by the seller. With this new 
specification, it is assumed that the number of unique bidders for the auction item j sold by seller 
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i is drawn from a negative binomial distribution where the mean of the distribution is shown by 
the parameter     : 
              
 
         
 
  
,  
where q = 0, 1, 2, …, and                 εij. 
We use the following specification for the independent variables:  
βXij + εij = β0 + β1Dummy for Professional Gradingij 
+ β2Number of Stamp Sides Shown with High-Resolution Picturesij 
+ β3Feedback Scoreij + β4Dummy for Positive Feedback Onlyij 
+ β5Dummy for “Top Rated” Sellerij + β6Claimed Stamp Gradeij 
+ β7Auction Starting Priceij + β8Shipping Priceij + β9Dummy for Encapsulated Stampij  
+ β10Dummy for Cancelled Stampij + β11Dummy for Hinged Stampij 
+       
  
   Stamp Type
k
ij   
+ β26Dummy for Professional Gradingij ⅹ Claimed Stamp Gradeij + εij 
Table 3.20 shows the result of the estimation. With this alternative specification, now the 
dummy for whether the coin is professionally graded and the grade of the stamp are both 
insignificant, while auction starting price is still significant. Moreover, the interaction between 
claimed stamp grade and whether the stamp is professionally graded is not strongly significant 
either (p = 0.07). We can conclude that this newly added interaction effect does not seem to 
significantly affect the potential demand level of stamp market, not as in the baseball card and 
coin markets.  
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Table 3.20: Estimation Results for Stamps (Alternative Specification) 
Perceived Risk   
 
Dummy = 1 if professionally graded 
-1.3542  
(1.0924)  
Number of stamp sides clearly shown 
0.0593  
(0.1737)  
Feedback score 
0.0000102  
(0.00000743)  
Dummy = 1 if only positive feedback 
-0.2024  
(0.3184)  
Dummy = 1 if the seller is "top rated" 
-0.0369  
(0.3762)  
Claimed Quality   
 Claimed stamp grade 
0.0057  
(0.0078)  
Price   
 
Auction starting price ($) 
-0.0059 *** 
(0.0012)  
Shipping price ($) 
0.0804  
(0.0824)  
Interaction   
 
Dummy = 1 if professionally graded * Claimed stamp grade 
0.0232 * 
 (0.0126)  
Other   
 
Dummy = 1 for encapsulated stamp 
-0.5978  
 (0.6632)  
 
Dummy = 1 for cancelled stamp 
-0.4445 ** 
 (0.1919)  
 
Dummy = 1 for hinged stamp 
0.0693  
 (0.1149)  
 
Dummy = 1 for buy-it-now option 
-29.7368  
 785758.8000  
Stamp Type   
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 1 
0.4337 * 
 (0.2589)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 2 
-0.0654  
 (0.3657)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 3 
0.1555  
 (0.3521)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 4 
-0.3186  
 (0.3667)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 5 
0.5516  
 (0.3739)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 6 
-0.5149  
 (0.4624)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 7 
0.1585  
 (0.2794)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 8 
0.5436 ** 
 (0.2350)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 9 
0.0321  
 (0.2593)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 10 
-0.0073  
 (0.2516)  
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Dummy = 1 for stamp type 11 
0.0713  
 (0.2570)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 12 
0.3585  
 (0.2872)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 13 
1.2469 *** 
 (0.3048)  
 
Dummy = 1 for stamp type 14 
-0.0468  
 (0.2678)  
Observations 343  
Chi-squared 92.95 *** 
d.f. 27  
 * p<0.1. 
** p<0.05. 
*** p<0.01.  
3.4.2.3 Analysis of the Results 
3.4.2.3.1 Baseball Cards 
We now explore more about the findings from the alternative specification that the 
incentive for information disclosure differs according to the absolute quality levels. In this 
analysis, all other considerations are the same as the basic specification, but now we have to 
investigate the effect of interaction. More specifically, as the coefficient for the interaction is 
0.2341, the factor of e 
(0.2341)
 ≈ 1.2638 should also be considered when the card is professionally 
graded (and thus has lower risk).  
Using these results, we can estimate the comprehensive effects from the changes in these 
variables and figure out whether the incentive for either overstating quality or disclosing low 
quality is bigger than the other. Just as we have done with the basic specification, we have 
observed the estimated demand from sellers’ three different strategies: i) fraudulently claiming 
high quality, ii) disclosing low quality without certification, and iii) disclosing low quality with 
certification. First, for the strategy of fraudulently claiming high quality, we assume that sellers 
fraudulently increase the grade of their cards by one half. Second, for the strategy of disclosing 
low quality without certification, we assume that sellers disclose the true quality of their cards 
but do not use certification to support their claims. Third, for the strategy of disclosing low 
quality with certification, we assume that these sellers disclose the true, low quality of their cards 
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and support their claims using certification. We attempt to observe whether the incentive 
structure for information disclosure differs with respect to the absolute quality levels under this 
alternative specification. For this analysis, all other continuous variables are fixed at mean values 
and all other dummy variables are fixed at zero. 
Figure 3.6: Plotted Demand of Baseball Cards (Alternative Specification) 
 
Figure 3.6 shows the estimated demand of each different strategy. From these results, we 
can examine the incentives to disclose true quality. First, we can think of a case where the seller 
has a product with lower than average quality. For example, suppose there is a baseball card with 
an actual grade of seven.
16
 A seller can choose one of the three strategies as explained: he either 
fraudulently claims that the grade is seven and a half, discloses the actual grade of seven without 
any risk reducers, or discloses the actual grade of seven and uses certification. According to 
Figure 3.6, if a seller fraudulently claims the actual value of this card to be seven and a half, 
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 Although the grading system for collectible baseball cards ranges from 1 to 10, the value of most cards in the 
market stand between 7 and 10. Moreover, according to the summary statistics in Table 3-2, the average grade of the 
baseball cards in our data is 8.44, and the median value is 8.5. Therefore, a card with a value of 7 can be regarded as 
a lower than average quality product, while a card with a value 9 can be regarded as a higher than average quality 
product.  
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without offering professional grading, the number of bidders is estimated to be 2.46. If this seller 
discloses the actual quality as seven but does not use certification, the demand is estimated to be 
2.3, which is lower than the demand from the high-quality-claim strategy. Moreover, if this seller 
discloses the true quality and chooses to get certification, the demand is expected to decrease to 
1.81, which is even lower than the expected demand from disclosing quality information without 
certification. Therefore, the demand for the product which discloses true quality information 
cannot be higher than the demand for the product which fraudulently claims higher quality, even 
with certification, in this case of lower than average quality. Second, we can think of a case 
where the seller has a product of higher than average quality. For example, suppose there is a 
baseball card with an actual grade of nine.
 
A seller can choose one of the three strategies as 
explained: he either fraudulently claims that the grade is nine and a half, discloses the true grade 
of nine without certification, or discloses the actual grade of nine and uses certification. As 
shown in Figure 3.6, if a seller fraudulently claims the value of this card to be nine and a half, 
without offering professional grading, the number of bidders is estimated to be 3.19. If this seller 
discloses the true grade as nine but does not use certification, the demand is estimated to be 2.99, 
which is lower than the demand from the high-claim strategy. However, if the seller discloses the 
true quality and chooses to get the professional grading service, the demand is expected to rise to 
3.76, which is a lot higher than the expected demand from the high-quality-claim strategy. 
Therefore, the demand for the product which discloses true quality and reduces risk can be 
higher than the demand for the product which fraudulently claims high quality, when the product 
has a higher-than-average quality. These estimation results of both the lower-than-average-
quality and higher-than-average-quality cases show that the economic incentive for disclosing 
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true quality gets higher than the incentive for fraudulently claiming high quality, as the original 
quality level is higher. These economic incentives are summarized in Table 3.21.  
Table 3.21: Estimated Demand of Baseball Cards (Alternative Specification) 
 Actual Quality of Card 
 7 7.5 8 8.5 9 
Fraudulently increasing the grade by one half 2.46 2.63 2.80 2.99 3.19 
Disclosing true  quality      
 Without certification 2.30 2.46 2.63 2.80 2.99 
 With certification 1.81 2.18 2.61 3.13 3.76 
 
Notes: All other continuous variables are fixed at mean values and all other dummy variables are fixed 
at zero. 
 
 This asymmetric incentive for information disclosure is more noticeable if we compare 
Figure 3.2 and Figure 3.6. Figure 3.2 shows the estimated demand using the basic specification 
while Figure 3.6 shows the estimated demand using the alternative specification. As we can see 
from these graphs, when we assume uniform distribution of customers in terms of their risk 
sensitivities, the incentive for disclosing true quality is always bigger than the incentive for 
fraudulently claiming high quality, although it is not very strong, regardless of the true product 
quality level. However, when we assume that there are more risk-sensitive customers in the 
market, the incentive for disclosing true quality is bigger than the incentive for fraudulent claim 
when the product quality is higher than average, while fraudulently claiming high quality seems 
to be a better strategy when the product quality is lower than average. Overall, these results show 
that while there is an incentive for disclosing true quality, the incentive is more evident when the 
quality is higher than average. 
3.4.2.3.2 Coins 
Again, we explore the finding from the alternative specification that incentives for 
disclosing true quality differ according to the quality levels by analyzing the coin data. As the 
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coefficient for the interaction is .0823, the factor of e 
(.0823)
 ≈ 1.0858 should also be considered 
when the coin is professionally graded and thus has lower risk.  
Using these results, we can estimate the comprehensive effects from the changes in these 
variables and present whether the incentive for full disclosure differs according to the quality 
level. Just as we have done with basic specification, we observe the estimated demand from 
sellers’ three different strategies: i) fraudulently claiming high quality, ii) disclosing true quality 
without certification, and iii) disclosing true quality with certification. First, for the strategy of 
fraudulently claiming high quality, we assume that sellers inflate the grade of their coins by five. 
Second, for the strategy of disclosing true quality without certification, we assume that sellers 
disclose true quality but do not use any risk-reducing mechanism to support their claims. Third, 
for the strategy of disclosing true quality with certification, we assume that these sellers disclose 
the true quality of their coins and support their claims using certification. Most importantly, we 
attempt to observe whether the incentive for information disclosure is different according to the 
absolute quality levels of the coins under this alternative specification. For this analysis, all other 
continuous variables are fixed at mean values and all other dummy variables are fixed at zero.  
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Figure 3.7: Plotted Demand of Coins (Alternative Specification) 
 
 
Figure 3.7 shows the estimated demand of each different strategy observed from the 
estimation. From these results, we can examine whether the incentive to disclose true quality 
differs according to quality levels. First, we can think of a case where the seller has a product of 
lower than average quality. For example, suppose there is a coin with an actual grade of 50.
17 
A 
seller can choose one of the three strategies as explained: he either fraudulently claims that the 
grade is 55, discloses the true quality of 50 without any risk reducers, or discloses the true 
quality of 50 and uses certification. According to Figure 3.7, if a seller fraudulently claims the 
actual value of this coin to be 55, the number of bidders is estimated to be 2.41. If the seller 
discloses true quality of 50 but does not use any risk-reducing mechanism, the demand is 
estimated to be 2.40, which is almost the same as the demand from the high-claim strategy. 
Moreover, if the seller discloses true quality and chooses to get the professional grading service, 
the demand is expected to be 1.23, which is smaller than the high-claim strategy or the low-claim 
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 As shown in Table 3-3, the average grade of coins in our data is 61.07 and the median value is 63. Therefore, the 
coin with a value of 50 can be regarded as a lower than average quality product while the coin with a value 65 can 
be regarded as a higher than average quality product. 
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strategy without certification. Therefore, the demand for the product which discloses true quality 
does not seem to be higher than the demand for the product which fraudulently claims high 
quality even with reduced risk, in this case of lower than average quality. Second, we can think 
of a case where the seller has a product of higher than average quality. For example, suppose that 
there is a coin with an actual grade of 65.
 
A seller can choose one of the three strategies as 
explained: he either fraudulently claims that the grade is 70, discloses the actual grade of 65 
without any risk reducers, or discloses the actual grade of 65 and uses certification. As shown in 
Figure 3.7, if a seller fraudulently claims the actual value of this coin to be 70, the number of 
bidders is estimated to be 2.44. If this seller discloses the true grade as 65 but does not use any 
risk-reducing mechanism, the demand is estimated to be 2.43, which is almost the same as the 
demand from high-quality claim strategy. However, if the seller discloses the true quality and 
gets the professional grading service, the demand is expected to rise to 4.3, which is a lot higher 
than the expected demand from the high-quality claim strategy or low-quality claim without 
certification. Therefore, the demand for the product which discloses true quality and reduces risk 
can be higher than the demand for the product which does not, in the case of higher than average 
quality. These results show that the incentive for full disclosure is higher than the incentive for 
fraudulent disclosure when the product has higher than average quality. These results are 
summarized in Table 3.22.  
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Table 3.22: Estimated Demand of Coins (Alternative Specification) 
 Actual Quality of Coin 
 50 55 60 65 
Fraudulently increasing the grade by five 2.41 2.42 2.43 2.44 
Disclosing true quality     
 Without certification 2.40 2.41 2.42 2.43 
 With certification 1.23 1.87 2.84 4.30 
 
Notes: All other continuous variables are fixed at mean values and all other dummy variables are 
fixed at zero.  
 
Again, this asymmetric incentive for information disclosure is more noticeable by 
comparing Figure 3.3 and Figure 3.7. Figure 3.3 shows the estimated demand using the basic 
specification while Figure 3.7 shows the estimated demand using the alternative specification. As 
we can see from the graphs, when we assume uniform distribution of customers in terms of their 
risk sensitivities, the incentive for true quality disclosure is always higher than the incentive for 
fraudulent disclosure, regardless of the level of true quality. However, when we assume that 
there are more risk-sensitive customers in the market, the incentive for true quality claim is 
higher than the incentive for fraudulent quality claim when the quality is higher than average. 
Overall, these results show that voluntarily disclosing low quality is more effective when sellers 
are selling products with better than average quality than when they are selling products with 
lower than average quality. 
3.4.2.4 Summary of Results 
The alternative specification with the interaction between whether the product is 
professionally graded and claimed grade has provided us with a more realistic picture of the 
incentive for full disclosure. More specifically, the baseball card and coin data have shown us 
that there exists a significant interaction effect between certification and grade on the size of 
demand, and this result is consistent with the findings of Dewally and Ederington (2006) as they 
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have empirically shown the existence of the similar interaction effect on the final price of the 
online auction for comic books. We can conclude from this result that the incentive for true 
quality disclosure is much higher than the incentive for fraudulent disclosure as the quality gets 
higher. We believe this is due to the fact that there are more risk-sensitive customers than risk-
insensitive customers in most markets, and therefore fraudulently claiming higher quality is 
worse than full disclosure when the true quality is higher than average, while fraudulent claim 
seems to be an effective strategy when the product quality is lower than average.  
We can also say that, while the result from the basic specification supports the literature 
on voluntary disclosure as it shows that the incentive for full disclosure is generally higher than 
the incentive for fraudulent disclosure, the result from the alternative specification might provide 
support for both voluntary disclosure and mandatory disclosure arguments. More specifically, it 
has demonstrated that full disclosure is better than bluffing when the quality is higher than 
average, which verifies the incentive for voluntary disclosure, while the effect is the opposite 
when the quality is lower than average, suggesting the need for mandatory disclosure. As this 
interaction effect has not been shown to be significant in the stamp data, more studies are needed 
to understand this asymmetric incentive for full disclosure in other market environments.  
3.4.3 Other Specifications 
As is shown above, we have confirmed the interaction effect between the dummy 
variable showing whether the product is professionally graded and the standard product grade 
claimed by the seller. However, we can also think of some other interaction effects based on the 
same theoretical inference used to derive the primary moderator. For example, as the theory 
predicts that the level of perceived risk might work as a moderator between claimed product 
quality and number of bidders, we can also check interaction effects of some other variables that 
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are related to the level of perceived risk in our data. This empirical observation is also expected 
to work as a foundation for additional theoretical analysis and provide deeper understandings 
about the incentive for full disclosure.  
3.4.3.1 Preliminary Moderators 
Based on the theoretical analysis, we can consider the following possible moderators. 
First, number of high-resolution pictures shown might work as a moderator as this variable can 
work as a risk reducer and more customers might be affected by claimed product quality when 
the product has more high-resolution pictures. Second, a seller’s feedback score might work as a 
moderator since it might work as a risk reducer and thus more people will be affected by claimed 
quality when a seller’s feedback score is higher. Third, whether a seller is “Top Rated” or not 
might also work as a moderator in the same logic applied to the feedback score case. After 
establishing these hypotheses, we have investigated baseball card, coin, and stamp data to 
explicitly check the significance of these moderator variables.  
3.4.3.2 Estimation Results 
As we can see from Table 3.23, none of the additional moderator variables seem to be 
significant. Although the interaction between claimed product quality and professional grading, 
the primary moderating effect we have checked in the previous section, is again shown to be 
significant in this estimation, none of three other interaction effects we have hypothesized seem 
to have significant effects. The only exception is the interaction between feedback score and 
claimed quality in the stamp data, which shows a weakly significant effect. We can conclude that 
the effect of professional grading service is the only feasible moderator in our data, and future 
studies can investigate more about the moderating effect of a seller’s feedback score on claimed 
quality, especially in the stamp data.  
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Table 3.23: Effect of Moderator Variables 
Interactions Baseball Cards Coins Stamps 
 Dummy = 1 if professionally graded  
       * Claimed product grade 
0.2207 *** 0.0810 *** 0.0197  
 (0.0614)  (0.0262)  (.0138)  
 Number of card sides clearly shown  
       * Claimed product grade 
-0.0062  -0.2326  -0.0001  
 (0.0532)  (0.1662)  (0.0145)  
 
Feedback score 
       * Claimed product grade 
-0.0000001  0.0000008  0.000000607 * 
 (0.0000012)  (0.0000010)  (0.000000327)  
 
Dummy = 1 if the seller is "top rated"  
       * Claimed product grade 
0.1088  -0.0166  0.0254  
 (0.0764)  (0.0178)  (0.0318)  
 * p<0.1. 
** p<0.05. 
*** p<0.01.  
    
3.5 Discussion 
This essay has first confirmed the predictions from Essay 1 using real market data, and 
then applied a more realistic distribution of customers’ risk propensities to find more feasible 
implications for managers in terms of how to disclose true quality information. We have 
measured the effects of certification on demand through analyzing the sales data of collectible 
baseball cards, coins, and stamps from one of the major online sellers in the U.S. and verified the 
most important but counterintuitive finding from Essay 1 that there exist economic incentives for 
sellers to voluntarily disclose information about low quality. Moreover, relaxing the original 
assumption of uniform distribution of customers’ risk sensitivity and replacing it with a more 
realistic assumption that the number of risk-sensitive customers is higher than the number of 
risk-insensitive customers has provided us with more feasible implications about marketing 
communications strategy under information asymmetry. It has been shown that the incentive to 
disclose true quality information is higher than the incentive to fraudulently claim high quality 
when the product quality is higher than average, because of the interaction between product 
quality and perceived risk. For this reason, marketing managers might be more likely to hide 
unfavorable information when selling lower-quality products while they might voluntarily share 
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the same unfavorable information when it is related with higher-quality products. On the other 
hand, we can also say that customers must be more careful in terms of frauds or false claims 
when making purchase in a market with low-quality products. These results can also explain why 
frauds in product claims or exaggerations in advertising can be more frequently observed in the 
market for low-quality products than in the market for high-quality products.  
The observation from this essay provides various interesting perspectives to information 
disclosure literature. First of all, it has shown that the certification provides effective incentives 
for disclosing low quality and encourages full disclosure. As the incentive to disclose 
unfavorable information has rarely been considered in the literature, this finding contributes to 
the literature by providing a different perspective to the knowledge on information asymmetry in 
markets, generally supporting voluntary disclosure. However, the incentive might only be 
meaningful when the quality of the product is at least higher than average, and it might work 
better to fraudulently claim high quality when the product quality is less than average. Therefore, 
we can say that this essay actually supports the argument of both voluntary and mandatory 
disclosure, depending on the context of the situation. The dimensions covered in this essay may 
provide some public policy suggestions to solve fraud issues happening in many different 
markets.  
One more interesting finding from this essay is that the incentive for full disclosure 
differs across the market as using the certification sometimes provides a very strong incentive to 
disclose information about true quality (coin and stamp markets), while in some other markets 
the incentive is somewhat limited and may not seem to effectively promote full disclosure 
(baseball card market). We presume that one of the reasons of this heterogeneity is the variation 
in the quality and attributes of the certification across different product markets, and attempt to 
 132 
 
explicitly examine the effect of the certification quality on market outcomes more in detail using 
an analytic model and economic experiments in the following essay. 
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4. ESSAY 3: THE EFFECT OF NOISY CERTIFICATION ON INFORMATION 
DISCLOSURE 
4.1 Introduction 
The previous two essays have verified that there exist economic incentives for low-type 
sellers to fully disclose their types through analytic model and empirical observations. We have 
found that sellers may disclose low quality of their products and still expect increased profit by 
reducing perceived risk through available risk intermediaries such as third-party certifications. In 
Essay 2, we have also shown that the impact of this economic incentive may differ across 
different markets, and assumed that one of the possible reasons of this heterogeneity is the 
different characteristics of third-party certifications available in different markets. Therefore, in 
this essay, we attempt to understand the effect of different certification mechanisms on 
information disclosure by investigating how the certifications of different qualities affect the 
market outcome, such as seller’s profit, buyer’s profit, and the level of voluntary information 
disclosure. As is explained above, we focus on the effect of third-party certification among other 
risk intermediaries because reputation is not easy to establish in the short run, a seller’s own 
signaling is generally not trustworthy, and warranty is usually not appropriate for credence 
attributes that customers cannot evaluate. Moreover, the empirical observation in Essay 2 has 
also shown that third-party certification is the only risk intermediary that has significant effects 
across all three product categories analyzed. 
 The literature on certification has explained that various factors related with the certifier, 
customer, and market structure can harm the effectiveness of the certification mechanism and 
provides noise to the certification (Anderson, Daly, and Johnson 1999; Edelman 2009; Feinstein 
 134 
 
1989; Harbaugh, Maxwell, and Roussillon 2011; Hong and Kubik 2003; Lim 2001; Lizzeri 1999; 
Michaely and Womack 1999; Prendergast 2007; Waguespack and Sorenson 2011; Xiao 2010). 
However, although the sources of the certification errors have been studied by many of these 
studies, how these ineffective certification mechanisms impact market outcomes has not been the 
focus of the academic research so far. This essay tries to provide better understanding of the 
certification mechanism and its impact on information asymmetry in markets through analyzing 
the effect of certification errors or inaccurate certification on market outcomes. To the best of our 
knowledge, this is the first study that provides both theoretical and empirical analysis on specific 
consequences of inaccurate certification, and we expect that understanding how an inaccurate 
certification mechanism influences various market outcomes would provide important 
implications on how to use a certification system to solve adverse selection issues under 
information asymmetry.  
The inaccuracy of the certification can be either created by chance or affected by certain 
intentions of sellers or certifiers. In this study, we only consider the cases when the certification 
is “noisy”, in opposition to “biased”, as we are interested in the case where the inaccuracy is 
caused by random process. We have thus investigated the effect of noisy certification on various 
market outcomes using analytic models assuming three different market situations: i) when there 
is no certification, ii) when the accuracy of the certification is 50 percent, and iii) when the 
accuracy of the certification is 100 percent. In particular, we have assumed that when the 
certification is 50 percent accurate, it shows the true value of the product only 50 percent of the 
time while 100 percent accurate certification always discloses the true value. Although the level 
of inaccuracy is set at 50 percent for the inaccurate certification in this study, it can also be 
generalized as an alpha between 0 and 1. Future studies can address the sensitivity of the results 
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to various levels of alpha. For this analysis, we have also relaxed several assumptions of the 
previous analysis to consider more realistic settings. We have assumed that a seller can flexibly 
decide any price he wants to charge and that there is a certain cost for using the certification. On 
the other hand, we have assumed that the buyers in this market are all homogenous in terms of 
their risk sensitivities and are all risk-neutral, to focus on the effect of noisy certification on 
market outcomes. 
The results of the analytic model predict that, contrary to our expectations, the payoff for 
sellers will be the highest without certification and the lowest with 50 percent certification. The 
finding that a seller receives smaller profit with certification than without certification is quite 
surprising and somewhat different from the findings from previous essays, and we believe the 
discrepancy might originate from the assumption that all customers are risk-neutral and that there 
is a certain cost of using the certification. In fact, our experimental observation shows slightly 
different results from the analytic model, and we analyze these results more in detail in a 
following section. Another interesting finding from the analytic model is that sellers earn less 
profit with inaccurate certification than accurate certification, and we believe that this is due to 
the fact that the noise of certification causes some confusion and uncertainty in both sellers and 
buyers’ decision to maximize profit, making it hard for sellers to predict buyers’ behavior. In 
terms of buyers’ payoff, the model basically predicts that buyers’ profit is always zero, as sellers 
charge the maximum price the buyers are willing to pay. Again, the empirical observation shows 
different results about buyers’ profit, and we explain them in a following section.  
 We have then tested these predictions with incentive-based lab experiments. To do so, we 
have run several sessions of lab experiments in which we have randomly assigned subjects into 
the roles of buyers and sellers and matched them in pairs, to observe their decisions to maximize 
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their profits under various certification types. There are several advantages using this economic 
laboratory experiment. First, we can accurately observe whether sellers are disclosing 
information fully or not, which is rarely possible in other empirical studies on information 
disclosure. Second, the participants of the experiment were paid cash rewards according to how 
they performed in the business deals during the session. The subjects played the role of either a 
buyer or a seller, and their total payoff from the deals was summed up and converted into cash 
rewards. Therefore, we believe that this payoff structure can reproduce the actual decisions of 
buyers and sellers and the results thus have some feasible predictions about real market outcomes.  
Overall, the result of this experiment is not totally consistent with the prediction of the 
analytic model. Although seller’s profit is the smallest with 50 percent accurate certification as 
predicted, the profit is actually shown to be higher with 100 percent certification than with no 
certification, unlike the prediction of the analytic model. Moreover, the buyer’s profit is positive 
in all cases, showing the highest level with 100 percent certification and the lowest level with no 
certification. We believe this discrepancy between the prediction from the analytic model and the 
experimental results happens because we have assumed that buyers are homogenous in their risk 
sensitivities and all risk-neutral for the analytic model. In other words, the existence of risk-
sensitive buyers would make both sellers and buyers get more profit under 100 percent 
certification than under 50 percent certification or no certification. Moreover, unlike the 
assumption in the analytic model that buyers and sellers are smart and strategically predict each 
other’s behaviors, they have not been very strategic in actual experiments. We discuss this in 
more depth in a later section. Other than these main findings, we have also found various 
empirical regularities which provide interesting implications about market outcomes under 
information asymmetry, such as the effect of certification on social welfare and irrational 
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behaviors of sellers and buyers. Lastly, we have also checked whether the findings of Essay 2 are 
replicated with our experimental data.  
 The essay proceeds as follows. Section 4.2 introduces the analytic model and subgame 
perfect Nash equilibria predicted by the model. Section 4.3 explains the procedure of our 
economic experiments. Section 4.4 shows the experimental results and analyzes them in 
comparison with the results from the analytic model. The essay concludes with some discussion 
about the findings in Section 4.5.  
4.2 Model 
 Our model consists of buyers and sellers, where there is information asymmetry; only 
sellers know the true quality of the products, and buyers assume the quality depending on the 
sellers’ claims and whether the certification is used. We attempt to investigate the effect of 
certification on various market outcomes in three different conditions: i) when there is no 
certification, ii) when the accuracy of the certification is 50 percent, and iii) when the accuracy 
of the certification is 100 percent. We have assumed that when the certification is 50 percent 
accurate, it shows the true value of the product 50 percent of the times, and random value in the 
other 50 percent of the times. On the other hand, 100 percent accurate certification always 
discloses the true value. As is explained above, the price is flexible and sellers can determine the 
price level that maximizes profit. There is also a certain cost for using the certification and the 
buyers in this market are all homogenous in terms of risk sensitivity, and thus are all risk-neutral. 
The payoff structures of sellers and buyers are as follows. 
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4.2.1 Payoff Structure 
4.2.1.1 Buyer’s Payoff 
 There are two types of buyer’s payoff as there is information asymmetry in the market. 
More specifically, buyer’s expected payoff before purchase will not always be the same as the 
actual payoff from purchase.  
4.2.1.1.1 Expected Payoff 
Expected payoff for a buyer:            
The expected payoff for a buyer is decided by both the expected value of the quality 
       and the price of the product suggested by the seller ( ). In particular, the expected value 
of the product        can vary according to the characteristics of the available certifications. As 
buyers are all risk-neutral, there is no additional cost from perceived risk in this analysis. Let’s 
assume that the quality of the product   is uniformly distributed between 0 to   (i.e.,        ). 
4.2.1.1.1.1 The Market with 100 Percent Accurate Certification 
When the seller shows the certification. As the certification discloses the true quality with 
100 percent certification, the claimed value (  ) is the same as true value (  ), and it is what 
buyers expect from the product.  
              
When the seller does NOT show the certification. When the seller does not show the 
certification, then the buyer assumes that actual quality is the average of certain possible value 
range, regardless of the level of claimed value. Let’s assume that the range of the buyer’s 
perceived value follows        , where the maximum value is expected to be  . In this case, the 
expected value has the following value: 
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4.2.1.1.1.2 The Market with 50 Percent Accurate Certification 
When the seller shows the certification. The buyer knows that the certification is true 50 
percent of the time, and wrong the other 50 percent of the time. If the certification is correct, then 
the actual quality (  ) is the same as the certified quality (  ), which is also the same as the 
claimed quality (  ) (i.e.,         ). If the certification is incorrect, then the buyer assumes 
that actual quality is the average of entire possible value range, regardless of the level of claimed 
value. 
                        
                   
                
When the seller does NOT show the certification. When the seller does not show the 
certification, then the buyer assumes that actual quality is the average of a certain possible value 
range, regardless of the level of claimed value. Let’s assume that their perceived value has the 
range of        , where the maximum value is expected to be  . In this case, a buyer’s expected 
value has the following value: 
      
 
 
 
4.2.1.1.1.3 The Market Without Certification 
When there is no certification available and the seller thus does not show the 
certification, then the buyer assumes that actual quality is the average of entire possible value 
range, regardless of the level of claimed value. 
      
 
 
 
  
 140 
 
4.2.1.1.2 Actual Payoff 
For buyers, as explained above, expected payoff differs from actual payoff as there is 
information asymmetry in this market and a buyer cannot accurately evaluate the quality of the 
product. Therefore, the actual payoff will be decided by true quality (  ) and the price the buyer 
pays.  
Actual payoff for buyer:          
On the other hand, if a buyer does not make purchase, then the actual payoff will be zero. 
4.2.1.2 Seller’s Payoff 
The seller’s payoff structure is as follows: 
Payoff for seller:               
In the case of the seller,                as a buyer either purchases the product or not 
depending on the expected value and price. Although    is fixed cost and will always occur, we 
will assume that    is zero for simplicity as this assumption does not change our results.    is the 
cost of using the certification and will be zero if a seller does not use the certification. As we 
assume that sellers can use flexible pricing and charge the price that maximizes the payoff, a 
seller will charge       , where   is a very small value which is negligible and only makes 
the price slightly lower than      so that buyers decide to make a purchase.  
4.2.2 Market Equilibrium 
Based on the setup, we can find the subgame perfect Nash equilibria of this model and 
predict market outcomes depending on whether there is 100 percent certification, 50 percent 
certification, or no certification. We will first analyze the case of 100 percent certification, 
followed by the analysis of 50 percent certification case and no certification case.  
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4.2.2.1 The Market with 100 Percent Accurate Certification 
4.2.2.1.1 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium 
When the certification is 100 percent accurate, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
differs depending on the expected value of the product perceived by customers. In particular, we 
have to consider strategic considerations of the buyers and sellers as follows.  
At first, when the seller does not show the certification, the buyer assumes that actual 
quality can be any value and thus follows        . In this case,       
 
 
 when the seller does 
not show the certification. Now the expected payoff for a seller when a buyer purchases the 
product is       when he shows the certification, and 
 
 
 when he does not show the 
certification. Therefore, the seller will prefer to show the certification if       
 
 
. In this 
case, the maximum amount of    when the seller does not show the certification now becomes 
 
 
    . Considering this, the buyer now assumes that the range of true quality when the seller 
doesn’t show the certification actually follows      
 
 
    . In this case,      
 
 
  
 
 
     . 
Now, the seller shows the certification when       
 
 
  
 
 
     . Therefore, the maximum 
amount of    when a seller does not show the certification now becomes 
 
 
  
 
 
         . 
This strategic consideration can repeat many times until it converges. If this continues for k 
times, then     , the maximum amount of    when the seller does not show the certification, 
follows the subsequent process. 
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If we assume that both sellers and buyers are strategic and iterate this cognitive process 
infinitely, then the maximum amount of    when a seller does not show the certification can be 
calculated as the following.  
   
   
    
     
   
  
 
 
 
 
        
 
 
 
   
                
Therefore, the buyer finally assumes that the range of true quality actually follows 
          when the seller does not show the certification. In this case,      
 
 
        
when the seller does not show the certification.  
Figure 4.1 shows the game tree presenting this result. As the expected payoff for the 
seller is higher with certification shown when         , and higher without certification when 
       , the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium differs according to whether the true value of 
the product is higher than     or not. More specifically, when        , the subgame perfect 
Nash equilibrium is that a seller shows certification and a buyer purchases the product, and the 
seller receives       and the buyer receives 0 from this equilibrium. When        , the 
subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is that a seller does not show certification and a buyer still 
purchases the product, and the seller receives    and the buyer receives       from this 
equilibrium.
  
1
4
3
 
Figure 4.1: Game Tree of Market Outcomes when the Certification Is 100 Percent Accurate 
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4.2.2.1.2 Payoffs 
From analyzing these equilibria, we can find the average payoff for sellers and buyers 
when there is 100 percent accurate certification as follows. 
4.2.2.1.2.1 Average Payoff for Seller 
  
      
       
 
                                 
     
 
     
  
       
 
   
      
 
     
    
  
 
 
 
          
  
 
    
  
 
 
 
              
  
  
 
4.2.2.1.2.2 Average Actual Payoff for Buyer 
  
      
       
 
           
     
 
                               
    
     
 
    
    
 
        
4.2.2.2 The Market with 50 Percent Accurate Certification 
4.2.2.2.1 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium 
When the certification is 50 percent accurate, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium 
differs depending on the expected value of the product perceived by buyers. We have to consider 
strategic considerations of the buyer, just as we have done in the 100 percent certification case. 
We can calculate the actual      when sellers do not show the certification through the 
following process. 
When the seller does not show the certification, the buyer first assumes that actual quality 
can be any value and thus follows        . In this case,       
 
 
. Now the expected payoff for 
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the seller is                   when he shows the certification, and 
 
 
 when he does not 
show the certification. Therefore, the seller will show the certification if                
   
 
 
. In this case, the maximum amount of    when the seller does not show the certification 
now becomes   
 
 
      
 
 
     . Considering this, the buyer now assumes that the 
range of true quality actually follows      
 
 
       when the seller does not show the 
certification. In this case,      
 
 
  
 
 
      . Now, the seller shows the certification when 
                  
 
 
  
 
 
      . Therefore, the maximum amount of    when seller 
does not show the certification now becomes              . Again, considering this, the 
buyer now assumes that the range of true quality actually follows            when the seller 
does not show the certification. In this case,      
 
 
                . Now, the seller 
shows the certification when                       . Therefore, the maximum amount 
of    when the seller does not show the certification now becomes                    
     . 
If this process is iterated k times, then the maximum amount of    when the seller does 
not show the certification becomes  
    
                                     
As     
   ,  
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Since             ,     
  will converge to zero when this cognitive process 
repeats many times (i.e., as k increases). Therefore, the buyer finally assumes that the range of 
true quality when the seller does not show the certification is zero. In this case, the expected 
value when the seller does not show the certification has the following value: 
     
 
 
     
The game tree in Figure 4.2 explains this result. In this case, we consider two different 
cases according to whether the certification is showing the true quality or not. When the 
certification is showing the true quality (     ), the expected payoff for a seller is higher with 
certification shown. Therefore, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is that a seller shows 
certification and a buyer purchases the product, and the seller receives                   
and the buyer receives                from this equilibrium. When the certification is not 
showing the true quality (     ), the expected payoff for a seller is still higher with 
certification shown. Therefore, the subgame perfect Nash equilibrium is that a seller shows 
certification and a buyer purchases the product, and the seller receives                   
and the buyer receives                   from this equilibrium. 
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Figure 4.2: Game Tree of Market Outcomes when the Certification Is 50 Percent Accurate 
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4.2.2.2.2 Payoffs 
From analyzing these equilibria, we can find the average payoff for sellers and buyers 
when there is 50 percent accurate certification as follows. 
4.2.2.2.2.1 Average Payoff for Seller 
  
                                             
                                           
=                                                      
 
 
 
       
4.2.2.2.2.2 Average Actual Payoff for Buyer 
  
                                          
+                                                           
=                        +                              =   
4.2.2.3 The Market Without Certification 
4.2.2.3.1 Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibrium 
When there is no certification, a seller simply charges 
 
 
 and a buyer purchases it, and the 
seller receives 
 
 
  and the buyer receives    
 
 
, as is shown in Figure 4.3.  
Figure 4.3: Game Tree of Market Outcomes Without Certification 
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4.2.2.3.2 Payoffs 
From this market outcome, we can find the average payoff for sellers and buyers when 
there is no certification as follows. 
4.2.2.3.2.1 Average Payoff for Seller 
  
                  
 
 
 
4.2.2.3.2.2 Average Actual Payoff for Buyer 
  
                                        
 
 
 
  
 
 
   
 
 
   
4.2.3 Predictions  
The result of the analysis can be summarized as in Table 4.1. 
 
Table 4.1: Payoffs for Sellers and Buyers 
 Average Payoff for Seller Average Actual Payoff for Buyer 
Certification is 100% accurate 
              
  
  
   
Certification is 50% accurate 
 
 
        
There is no certification 
 
 
     
  
From this result, we can come up with the following implications about the profit of 
sellers and buyers according to the accuracy of certification.  
4.2.3.1 Seller’s Profit 
First, the relationship between the payoff under 100 percent certification and under 50 
percent certification is as follows. 
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Therefore, the payoff for a seller under 100 percent certification is higher than the payoff 
for a seller under 50 percent certification.  
Second, the relationship between the payoff under 50 percent certification and no 
certification is as follows. 
  
      
                 
 
 
      
 
 
          
Therefore, the payoff for a seller under 50 percent certification is lower than the payoff 
for a seller under 0 percent certification. 
Third, the relationship between the payoff under 100 percent certification and no 
certification is as follows. 
  
       
                
 
                
  
  
 
 
   
 
              
     
  
 
 
          
 
 
 
           
 
   
(∵            ) 
Therefore, the payoff for a seller under 100 percent certification is always lower than the 
payoff for a seller under no certification. 
From this result, we can find the relationship between payoffs for sellers as follows: 
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Therefore, the analytic model predicts that the payoff for sellers without certification is 
the highest, and the payoff for sellers with 100 percent certification is higher than the payoff for 
sellers with 50 percent certification. We can see that the major factor explaining this difference is 
the cost of certification (  ), as the seller profit will be the same in all three conditions if the cost 
of certification is zero (i.e., if    = 0). We believe this originates from the assumptions that 
buyers are all risk-neutral and that sellers and buyers are strategic. More specifically, a strategic 
and risk-neutral buyer considers the cost of certification when predicting the seller behavior and 
calculating the expected value of the product, and a strategic seller maximizes profit by charging 
the highest price possible according to the buyer’s expected value. Therefore, the cost of 
certification affects both the seller’s information disclosure and the buyer’s expected value 
calculation, ultimately leading to a decrease in seller’s profit when certification is available. 
Moreover, as 50 percent certification causes more uncertainty than 100 percent certification in 
terms of predicting the effect of certification cost, the seller’s expected profit is lower with 50 
percent certification than with 100 percent certification. This explains why seller profit is the 
highest with no certification and the lowest with 50 percent certification.  
4.2.3.2 Buyer’s Profit 
As is shown in Table 4.1, the payoff for a buyer will always be zero regardless of the 
accuracy of certification (i.e.,   
       
      
                
  ) when sellers can charge 
flexible price up to the buyer’s expected payoff and maximize their profits. Again, this is 
because we assume that buyers are all risk-neutral and both sellers and buyers are extremely 
strategic.  
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4.3 Experimental Analysis 
4.3.1 Outline 
We now observe the behaviors of sellers and buyers under information asymmetry using 
incentive-based economic experiments. Our experiments attempt to test the predictions from the 
model regarding the impact of the noise of certification on various market outcomes such as the 
profit of the seller and the buyer and the level of information disclosure. As is explained above, 
this method has several advantages that are especially helpful to the research question of this 
study. First, we can actually observe the level of information disclosure with this method, as we 
have information about both the true quality of products and the seller’s claimed quality. 
Although understanding the actual level of information disclosure is important in the related 
studies, there have rarely been similar attempts to examine it. As our economic experiments can 
accurately measure the level of information disclosure, it provides some important implications 
regarding sellers’ behavior under information asymmetry. This is, to the best of our knowledge, 
the first study of certifications and information disclosure that employs an economic laboratory 
experiment and observes whether the seller fully discloses or not. Second, as the participants of 
the experiment have actually been paid cash rewards according to how they perform in the 
business deals during the experiment sessions, we believe it can reproduce the actual decisions of 
buyers and sellers in real market settings. Therefore, the results of the experiments are expected 
to provide us with useful observations regarding the behavior of sellers and buyers under 
information asymmetry.  
4.3.2 Procedure 
The participants consist of 58 undergraduate students at a private university located in 
one of the major cities in the U.S.. The participants were given a course credit for participating in 
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the experiments, and cash rewards were also provided at the end of the experiment sessions 
according to their performances. We have conducted three experimental sessions in total and 18 
to 20 subjects have participated in each session. Within each experimental session, three 
treatment conditions—a market without certification, a market with 50 percent accurate 
certification, and a market with 100 percent accurate certification—have been tested. We have 
varied the orders of treatments for each different session to avoid any bias from carryover effect. 
The first session starts with no certification and ends with 50 percent certification, the second 
session starts with 50 percent certification and ends with 100 percent certification, and the third 
session starts with 100 percent certification and ends with no certification. Each treatment 
consists of 15 decision rounds, and thus each subject participated in 45 decision rounds in total, 
providing 2,610 observations of buyer and seller decisions from 1,305 transactions in total. For 
each decision round, we have randomly and anonymously assigned the subjects into the roles of 
buyers and sellers and matched them in a pair, and observed their decisions to maximize their 
profits under various certification types. The matching procedure was repeated every round, and 
the participants were re-matched with another player for each of the 45 decision rounds. 
Moreover, the roles of the participants were also randomly switched. In other words, each 
participant played a role of either buyer or seller for every different decision round. The 
experiments were implemented using z-Tree software (Fischbacher 2007). Before beginning the 
experiments, we loudly read the instructions with the participants and help them understand the 
procedure. We also provided two practice decision rounds for every treatment (i.e., six practice 
rounds in total for each participant) so that participants could get used to the decision-making 
procedure and their payoff structure before beginning actual experiments.  
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For the experiment, we have set the maximum quality level of the product as 180 (i.e., 
     ), and the cost of certification as 20 (i.e.,      ). We have intentionally set the cost of 
certification to stay within the boundary condition of the model (           ) but not to be 
too low, as the model shows that if the effect of certification cost is very low, then the impact of 
certification will not differ much across different treatments. We have not indicated the type of 
the product to avoid any potential bias related to a specific product category. The final cash 
rewards for the participants were calculated by converting the sum of their points for the 45 
decision rounds at a rate of $1.00 per every 100 points.  
Each decision round starts with the seller offering an item to the matched buyer and ends 
with the buyer choosing whether to purchase the item. Before offering an item, the seller first 
observes its true value randomly assigned between 0 to 180, where each number between 0 and 
180 has an equal chance of being drawn by the software. After observing the true value of the 
item, the seller chooses to certify the value when the certification is available, or just announces 
the value without certification, and the cost of 20 is incurred when the seller certifies the value, 
which is deducted from the participant’s points. The seller then chooses the price of the item that 
will be offered to the buyer between 0 and 180 in decimals up to two places. Upon receiving the 
information about either the certified value or the announced value of the item and the price, the 
buyer chooses whether to purchase the item at the price offered by the seller or not. The buyer 
does not know the true value before purchase but only observes either the certified or announced 
value, and the certified value can be either equal to true value or not depending on the types of 
certification (i.e., according to whether the certification is 100% or 50% accurate). 
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4.3.3 Payoff Calculation 
The seller’s points in each round are calculated as follows. If the seller chooses to certify 
and the buyer purchases the item, then the seller’s points is equal to price – 20 (certification cost). 
If the seller chooses to certify and the buyer does not purchase the item, then the seller’s point is 
equal to -20, which is lower than zero. If the seller chooses not to use certification and the buyer 
purchases the item, then the seller’s point is equal to the price. If the seller chooses not to use 
certification and the buyer does not purchase the item, then the seller’s point is equal to zero. 
Therefore, the seller’s points increase with a higher price as long as the buyer purchases the 
product. However, the seller also needs to consider whether the buyer will purchase the product 
or not.  
The buyer’s points in each round are calculated as follows. If the buyer purchases the 
item, then the buyer’s point is equal to the true value – price. Note that the true value, not 
certified or announced value, determines the buyer’s points. If the buyer does not purchase the 
item, then the buyer’s point is equal to zero. 
4.4 Experimental Results 
The experimental analysis has provided us with 2,160 observations of buyer and seller’s 
decisions in 1,305 individual transaction rounds in total. We now analyze the behaviors of sellers 
and buyers observed from the experiment by investigating the profit of sellers and buyers, the 
level of information disclosure, and other empirical regularities. As the participants in the study 
make multiple decisions, we cluster the standard errors at the subject level in all following 
statistical analysis to control potential within-subject correlation.  
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4.4.1 Seller’s Profit 
4.4.1.1 Primary Observation 
 We first observe sellers’ average profits across three different conditions of certification. 
The result shows that sellers have earned 26.55, 18.76, and 32.81 on average when there is no 
certification, when the certification has 50 percent accuracy, and when the certification has 100 
percent accuracy, respectively. This result is also presented in Figure 4.4.  
Figure 4.4: Average Profit of Sellers Across Three Conditions
 
The ordinary least square (OLS) regression of seller’s profit on certification types shows 
that the observed impact on seller profit is significant, as the seller profit is significantly higher 
with no certification than with 50 percent certification (p = 0.005), and significantly higher with 
100 percent certification than with no certification (p = 0.025), as is shown in Table 4.2. 
Therefore, this result is only partially consistent with the model prediction. First, the model 
predicts that seller profit with 50 percent certification will be the lowest, and the experimental 
result is consistent with this prediction. However, although the model predicts that seller’s profit 
will be lower with 100 percent certification than with no certification, the experimental results 
show that the seller profit is actually the highest with 100 percent certification. Therefore, we 
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now try to understand the reason for this discrepancy between the model and actual behavior of 
seller and buyer, by exploring what actually drives the profit for 100 percent certification, and 
why the profit is the lowest with 50 percent certification. 
Table 4.2: Regression of Seller’s Profit on Certification Types  
(# obs. = 1,305) Coefficient Standard Errors z-stat. p-value 
Constant 
(Base=No Certification) 
26.47 2.141 12.37 0.000 
50% Accurate 
Certification 
-7.74 2.780 -2.79 0.005 
100% Accurate 
Certification 
6.24 2.779 2.25 0.025 
 
4.4.1.2 Profit Variation Conditional on Purchase 
 Now, we attempt to compare the profit across three conditions conditional on whether a 
buyer makes a purchase or not, in order to figure out what is actually driving the profit variation. 
The regression results are shown in Table 4.3. We can find some interesting observations about 
the patterns in seller profit here. First, when buyers do not make purchase, the profit is highest 
with no certification (p = 0.000), but the profits from 100 percent certification and 50 percent 
certification do not differ from each other (p = 0.175). This is consistent with the explanation 
from the analytic model: as sellers have to pay the certification cost even when buyers do not 
purchase the product, the profit should be higher with no certification than with certification 
when buyers do not purchase the product. Second, when buyers do make purchase, the seller 
profit is not significantly different across all three conditions (p = 0.051 and 0.875). This is a 
somewhat surprising result, as sellers do not seem to make more profit with more accurate 
certifications. So the regression conditional on purchase shows that the absolute level of profit 
from purchase does not contribute to the overall profit difference, while the cost of certification 
does make the profit under no certification higher than the other cases, when buyers do not 
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purchase. Therefore, we can conclude that there should be some factors that drive the profit 
variation found across three conditions, other than the absolute size of profit conditional on 
purchase.  
Table 4.3: Regression of Seller’s Profit on Certification Types Conditional on Purchase 
 Coefficient Standard Errors z-stat. p-value 
Conditional on No Purchase (#obs. = 686)     
 
Constant 
(Base=50% Accurate Certification) 
-8.66 0.554 -15.64 0.000 
 
 
No Certification 8.67 0.688 12.59 0.000 
 
 
100% Accurate  
Certification 
1.02 0.748 1.36 0.175 
Conditional on Purchase (#obs. = 619)     
 
Constant 
(Base=No Certification) 
63.09 3.199 19.72 0.000 
 
50% Accurate  
Certification 
-6.93 3.558 -1.95 0.051 
 
100% Accurate  
Certification 
0.52 3.312 0.16 0.875 
 
4.4.1.3 Purchase Probability 
4.4.1.3.1 The Effect of Purchase Probability 
As the absolute size of profit does not contribute to the variation in overall profit, we can 
guess that purchase probability might be the reason behind profit differences across three 
conditions. We now check this conjecture with some statistical analysis. We first run a logistic 
regression of purchase probability on certification types, and the result is shown in Table 4.4. 
The result provides an important finding, as the purchase probability of a 100 percent 
certification case is significantly higher than other cases (p = 0.000), while the purchase 
probability between no certification and 50 percent certification is not different (p = 0.945). 
Therefore, buyers make purchases much more frequently when the certification available is 100 
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percent accurate than when it is 50 percent accurate or when there is no certification, but buyers’ 
purchase incidences do not differ between when the certification is 50 percent accurate and when 
there is no certification. As we have also found from previous analysis that the size of profit 
when buyers make purchases does not differ across all three conditions, we can conclude from 
this result that what drives the variation in seller profit is actually the impacts of different 
certification types on purchase probability. In other words, seller profit is the highest with 100 
percent certification as buyers purchase products much more frequently than with 50 percent 
certification or no certification.  
Table 4.4: Regression of Purchase Probability on Certification Types 
 Coefficient Standard Errors z-stat. p-value 
Constant 
(Base=No Certification) 
-0.31 0.110 -2.83 0.005 
50% Accurate 
Certification 
0.01 0.140 0.07 0.945 
100% Accurate 
Certification 
0.60 0.140 4.29 0.000 
         # obs. = 1,305     
 Therefore, this also provides some clues on why the prediction from the analytic model is 
different from experimental results. The model anticipates that buyers will always purchase the 
product as sellers will always offer a price that is lower than the expected value. As it turns out 
that buyers do not always make a purchase and purchase probability systematically varies with 
respect to the certification accuracy, we can think of the following reasons regarding the 
discrepancies between the model prediction and experimental results. First, the buyer’s reaction 
to the seller’s suggested price and claimed value might differ from the model assumption as they 
are not homogenous in terms of risk sensitivity and there are risk-sensitive buyers in the market. 
Therefore, some buyers do not purchase even when the expected value is higher than the 
suggested price because of risk sensitivity, and therefore purchase probability should actually 
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differ across different certification types. It is also consistent with the findings from Essay 1 that 
the distribution of customers’ risk sensitivity provides the incentive for low-type sellers to 
disclose quality information. Second, although the model assumes that both sellers and buyers 
are strategic and consider the other player’s potential reaction when making decisions, it may be 
possible that they are not that strategic and only use limited cognitive processes. Therefore, it is 
possible that sellers cannot fully understand buyers’ expected value as buyers are not very 
strategic either. Hence, with 50 percent certification, this effect of bounded rationality can be the 
highest as there are a lot more uncertainties in both buyers’ and sellers’ behavior, resulting in the 
lowest profit for sellers. Based on this understanding, we explore more about seller and buyer 
behavior under information asymmetry.  
4.4.1.3.2 Factors Affecting Purchase Probability 
 As purchase probability is found to be the main driver of seller profit, we now investigate 
what is then affecting purchase probability in each of three cases, in order to more accurately 
understand the effect of certification on seller and buyer behavior.  
 No certification case. We first run a logistic regression of purchase probability on various 
factors when there is no certification. As is shown in Table 4.5, when there is no certification, 
purchase probability is significantly affected by the suggested price (p = 0.000), but claimed 
value does not have a significant effect (p = 0.17). Therefore, when there is information 
asymmetry but no certification mechanism is available, then buyers only decide to purchase 
based on the price of the item. This is consistent with the model assumption that buyers only 
assume the average value and do not regard the seller’s claimed value as important when there is 
no certification. In other words, any quality claim is “cheap talk” when there is no certification 
mechanism available.  
    
161 
 
50 percent certification case. We then run a logistic regression of purchase probability on 
various factors when there is 50 percent certification. As is shown in Table 4.5, when there is 50 
percent certification, purchase probability is significantly affected by the claimed value (p = 
0.012), suggested price (p = 0.000), and whether certification is used by the seller (p = 0.000). 
Among these factors, whether the seller has used certification or not has a dominant effect on 
purchase probability. Therefore, buyers will purchase more when the claimed value is higher, the 
price is lower, and the seller offers certification. Again, this result is inconsistent with the model 
prediction, as the model predicts that the buyer will always purchase the product as sellers offer 
the product at a price lower than the expected profit of the buyer. As is explained, we believe that 
some of the reasons for the discrepancy are the existence of risk-sensitive buyers and incomplete 
strategic considerations of buyers and sellers.  
100 percent certification case. Now we run a logistic regression of purchase probability 
on various factors when there is 100 percent certification. As is shown in Table 4.5, when there 
is 100 percent certification, purchase probability is significantly affected by the claimed value (p 
= 0.000), suggested price (p = 0.000), and whether certification is used by the seller (p = 0.000). 
Among these factors, whether the seller has used the certification or not has a dominant effect on 
purchase probability. Therefore, when there is 100 percent certification available, buyers will 
purchase more when the claimed value is higher, the price is lower, and the seller offers 
certification. This result is again inconsistent with the model result as the model predicts that the 
buyer will always purchase the product since sellers will sell the product at a price lower than 
expected profit of the buyer. Again, we believe that possible reasons for the discrepancy are the 
existence of risk-sensitive buyers and incomplete strategic considerations of buyers and sellers. 
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Table 4.5: Regression of Purchase Probability on Various Factors 
 Coefficient Standard Errors z-stat. p-value 
No Certification (#obs. = 435)     
 Claimed value 0.01 0.004 1.37 0.170 
 
 
Suggested price -0.26 0.005 -5.43 0.000 
50% Certification (#obs. = 435)     
 Claimed value 0.01 0.005 2.51 0.012 
 Suggested price -0.03 0.006 -4.56 0.000 
 Use of certification  1.53 0.254 6.03 0.000 
100% Certification (#obs. = 435)     
 Claimed value 0.02 0.005 4.16 0.00 
 Suggested price -0.04 0.007 -5.52 0.000 
 Use of certification  3.44 0.359 9.56 0.000 
 
4.4.1.3.3 Comparison of the Factors Affecting Purchase Probability  
 The preceding analysis on the factors affecting purchase probability has shown that 
claimed quality, suggested price, and whether to use certification all affect buyers’ purchase 
decisions. Therefore, we now compare those factors across three conditions to understand what 
makes the differences in purchase probability.  
Claimed quality. One interesting aspect of claimed quality is the possibility that a quality 
claim without certification is regarded as “cheap talk” by buyers. As is discussed above, Jin and 
Kato (2006) have shown that some sellers actually overstate their quality claims and buyers trust 
them, showing that the quality claim without certification actually has significant impact on 
buyer decisions in the baseball card market. Essay 2 has shown similar findings, as the quality 
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claim without certification actually increases potential demand level in the baseball card market. 
However, Essay 2 has also found that claims without certification have not affected the demand 
in the collectible coin market, meaning that those claims are regarded as “cheap talk.” Therefore, 
it is interesting to see that whether a quality claim without certification is “cheap talk” in our 
case. Although the analysis of the no certification case above shows that quality claims of sellers 
do not affect purchase probability, we haven’t checked the same effect for 50 percent and 100 
percent certification cases. Therefore, we run additional regressions for 50 percent and 100 
percent certification, using those transactions where no certification is used. According to Table 
4.6, when no certification is used, the seller’s claimed value does not affect the decision to 
purchase in both the 50 percent and the 100 percent certification cases (p = 0.802 and 0.997, 
respectively). Therefore, we can say that any claim without certification always works as “cheap 
talk” in all three conditions in our data.  
Table 4.6: Regression of Purchase Probability When Certification Is Not Used 
 Coefficient Standard Errors z-stat. p-value 
50% Certification (#obs. = 253)     
 Claimed value 0.001 0.006 0.25 0.802 
 Suggested price -0.02 0.008 -2.80 0.005 
100% Certification (#obs. = 149)     
 Claimed value -0.00002 0.006 -0.00 0.997 
 Suggested price -0.011 0.009 -1.34 0.181 
 
Suggested price. We also try to check whether sellers charge different prices to buyers in 
different certification conditions. For this analysis, we first define two new variables regarding a 
seller’s pricing policy. The first variable is consumer surplus, which is defined as true product 
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value – suggested price. In order to consider the scale effect from the size of true value, we 
define the second variable, surplus ratio, as surplus ÷ true product value. After creating these 
variables, we run OLS regressions of these price variables on different certification conditions. 
The result in Table 4.7 shows that the seller’s pricing scheme does not differ with respect to the 
certification types. More specifically, consumer surplus with no certification is same with 50 
percent certification (p = 0.991) and 100 percent certification (p = 0.424) cases, and the surplus 
ratio is also same across different certification types (p = 0.657 and 0.367). Therefore, we can see 
that pricing policy is not the main driver of the difference in the seller’s profit.  
Table 4.7: Regression of Consumer Surplus on Certification Types 
 Coefficient Standard Errors z-stat. p-value 
Regression of Surplus  
(True Value – Suggested Price)  (#obs. = 1,305) 
    
 Constant (base=no certification) 13.29 2.03 6.54 0.000 
 50% accurate certification 0.03 2.87 0.01 0.991 
 100% accurate certification -2.29 2.87 -0.80 0.424 
Regression of Surplus Ratio 
(Surplus/True Value)  (#obs. = 1,298) 
    
 Constant (base=no certification) -0.55 0.18 -3.05 0.002 
 50% accurate certification -0.11 0.25 -0.44 0.657 
 100% accurate certification 0.23 0.25 0.90 0.367 
 
Frequency of using certification. The analysis above has shown that whether a seller has 
used certification or not is a dominant factor in a buyer’s decision to purchase. Therefore, we 
attempt to compare the frequency of certification usage between 50 percent certification and 100 
percent certification cases by observing the logistic regression results of the probability of using 
certification. According to Table 4.8, sellers with 100 percent certification use certification much 
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more frequently than sellers with 50 percent certification (p = 0.000).
18
 As the seller’s claimed 
quality without certification is “cheap talk” and does not affect purchase probability and 
suggested price is also the same across all conditions, we can conclude that the frequency of 
using certification is the main driver of the difference in purchase probability between the 100 
percent case and the 50 percent case.  
Table 4.8: Regression of the Probability of Using Certification on Certification Types 
(#obs. = 870) Coefficient Standard Errors z-stat. p-value 
Constant  
(Base=50% Accurate Certification) 
-0.36 0.14 -2.59 0.010 
100% Accurate Certification 1.10 0.15 7.27 0.000 
 
4.4.1.4 Summary  
 Overall, the analysis has found various interesting patterns about seller profit under 
different certification conditions. First of all, seller profit is the highest with 100 percent 
certification and the lowest with 50 percent certification, unlike the predictions from the analytic 
model. Our analysis shows that seller profit does not differ across three cases when buyers 
purchase the product, while the no certification case brings the highest profit when buyers do not 
purchase the product because of the certification cost. We have also shown that the difference in 
profit is caused by purchase probability rather than the absolute size of profits. Moreover, while 
purchase probability is driven by claimed quality, price, and certification usage, the only factor 
that is significantly different between different certification conditions is the frequency of 
certification usage.  
                                                 
18
 Based on this result, we also run another regression of the probability of using the certification in the 50 percent 
certification case and find that sellers use 50 percent certification more frequently when the actual value of the 
product is higher (p = 0.000). 
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Therefore, from this analysis, we can conclude that sellers with 50 percent certification 
do not use certification as often as sellers with 100 percent certification, and this leads to both 
lower purchase probability and lower seller profit in the 50 percent case. On the other hand, 
sellers with 100 percent certification use certification a lot more frequently and thereby have 
higher purchase probability than the no certification case and the 50 percent certification case, 
which also leads to the highest seller profit among all three conditions. This empirical result also 
provides some self-explanation of why the results deviate from model prediction, as the 
overlooked factors such as bounded rationality of sellers and buyers or the existence of risk-
sensitive buyers may be related to the fact that the purchase probability is generally much higher 
with the certification shown and that sellers with 50 percent certification do not use certification 
as often as sellers with 100 percent certification. Therefore, future research can extend this 
analytic model to relax those assumptions and come up with more feasible predictions.  
4.4.2 Buyer’s Profit 
4.4.2.1 Primary Observation 
We observe buyers’ average profits across three different conditions of certification. The 
primary observation shows that buyers have earned 6.92, 9.82, and 13.54 on average when there 
is no certification, when the certification has 50 percent accuracy, and when the certification has 
100 percent accuracy, respectively. This result is presented in Figure 4.5.   
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Figure 4.5: Average Profit of Buyers Across Three Conditions 
 
We run an OLS regression of buyer’s profit on certification types and find that the above 
mentioned impact of certification types on buyer profit is significant, as it is significantly higher 
with 50 percent certification than with no certification (p = 0.048), and significantly higher with 
100 percent certification than with 50 percent certification (p = 0.050), as is shown in Table 4.9. 
Therefore, unlike the model finding that buyer profit will all be same and zero, experimental 
results show that buyer profit is always positive and different across certification types. We 
believe the positive profit originates from the fact that sellers do not actually charge maximum 
price to buyers as assumed in the model. We have actually found from observing the variables 
created in 4.4.1.3.3 (surplus and surplus ratio) that the seller’s suggested price is generally lower 
than true value and thus consumer surplus is always positive on average across all conditions. 
Therefore, the model assumption that sellers will charge maximum price is not actually feasible 
in real market settings. In the next section, we also explore the reason why buyer profit shows 
varying patterns across three conditions.   
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Table 4.9: Regression of Buyer’s Profit on Certification Types 
(# obs. = 1,305) Coefficient 
Standard 
Errors 
z-stat. p-value 
Constant 
(Base=50% Accurate Certification) 
9.80 1.37 7.14   0.000 
No Certification -3.77 1.91 -1.98 0.048 
100% Accurate Certification 3.73 1.91 1.96 0.050 
 
4.4.2.2 Profit Variation Conditional on Purchase 
 When buyers do not purchase, their profit will always be zero. Therefore, here we run a 
separate regression of buyer profit on the condition that buyers have made purchases, in order to 
understand what drives the variation in buyers’ profit. The results from Table 4.10 shows that 
when buyers purchase the product, buyer profit is significantly lower with no certification case 
than with 50 percent or 100 percent certification (p = 0.025) cases, and the buyer profit is not 
different across 50 percent and 100 percent cases (p = 0.769). Therefore, the buyer gets more 
profit from purchase when there is certification of any type than when there is no certification. 
The fact that buyer profit from purchase is actually the same between the 50 percent case and the 
100 percent case is also supported by the finding from the analysis on the level of information 
disclosure in a following section. More specifically, we also analyze whether sellers fully 
disclose quality information across all three conditions and find that the seller’s level of 
dishonesty is same across the 50 percent certification case and the 100 percent certification case, 
but it is the highest with no certification. This may explain why buyer profit does not differ 
between 50 percent and 100 percent conditions, but is lower with no certification, when they 
make purchases. We explain more about the level of dishonesty in the following section.  
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Table 4.10: Regression of Buyer’s Profit on Certification Types When Purchased  
(# obs. = 619) Coefficient 
Standard 
Errors 
z-stat. p-value 
Constant 
(Base=50% Accurate Certification) 
23.06 2.92 7.89   0.000 
No Certification -8.82 3.94 -2.24 0.025 
100% Accurate Certification 1.08 3.69 0.29 0.769 
 
 As there is no profit difference across three conditions when buyers do not make a 
purchase, and the profit is also the same across 50 percent and 100 percent certification cases 
when buyers make a purchase, we can conclude that the difference in buyer profit between 50 
percent certification and 100 percent certification is again due to the fact that the purchase 
probability is significantly higher with 100 percent certification than with other two cases. 
Therefore, the findings from the section 4.4.1.3 about various factors affecting purchase 
probability can also be applied to explain the variation in buyer profit.  
4.4.2.3 Summary 
When buyers make purchases, the case of no certification gives them the smallest profit, 
possibly due to incomplete information disclosure (explained in the next section), and 100 
percent certification gives the highest profit as buyers purchase most frequently in this case. This 
is why buyer profit is the highest with 100 percent and the lowest with no certification.  
4.4.3 Level of Information Disclosure 
 Buyer profit from purchase may depend highly on whether the seller has made full 
disclosure or not, since buyers cannot evaluate the actual value of the product before purchase 
and only make decisions based on the seller’s claimed value. Therefore, if a seller has made less 
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than full disclosure and overstate the quality, the buyer’s actual profit from purchase should be 
lower than the case where the seller has made full disclosure.  
 As is mentioned, one interesting aspect of our economic experimental method is that we 
can actually observe the level of information disclosure as we know both the true value of the 
product and the seller’s claimed value. Therefore, we have created a new variable measuring the 
level of dishonesty of the sellers by subtracting true quality from the seller’s claimed quality 
based on the understanding that if the seller’s claimed quality is higher than the true quality, then 
the seller is not fully disclosing quality and being dishonest. The regression result of dishonesty 
level on certification types is shown in Table 4.11. In this regression, we have also controlled for 
the true value of the product.  
 The results show that sellers exaggerate the quality significantly more when certification 
is not available (p = 0.041). However, the level of information disclosure is not significantly 
different between 50 percent certification and 100 percent certification (p = 0.924). In other 
words, sellers tend to disclose more if there exist any types of certification mechanism in the 
market regardless of its quality, while they tend to bluff more if there is no certification available. 
This also explains the result from 4.4.2 that buyer profit from purchase is significantly lower 
with no certification but does not differ between 50 percent and 100 percent certification. As 
sellers tend to fully disclose with certification regardless of the accuracy, buyer profit is also 
higher with any types of certification conditional on purchase.   
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Table 4.11: Regression of Dishonesty on Certification Types 
(# obs. = 1,305) Coefficient 
Standard 
Errors 
z-stat. p-value 
Constant 
(Base=50% Accurate Certification) 
58.79 3.11 18.89 0.000 
No Certification 4.78 2.33 2.05 0.041 
100% Accurate Certification -0.22 2.33 -0.10 0.924 
True Value of the Product -0.47 0.02 -25.75 0.000 
 
4.4.4 Other Empirical Findings 
 Other than checking the main predictions of the model about seller profit and buyer profit 
and explaining the discrepancy between model and experimental results, the data also provides 
many other interesting findings, some of which we explore in the following sections.  
4.4.4.1 Certification Cost as Threshold 
 One of the analytic model’s main assumptions is that certification cost affects the 
behavior of sellers and buyers, and it actually is the main driver explaining the difference in 
seller profit across three conditions. The model has also predicted that, when there is 100 percent 
accurate certification available, sellers will use certification when the true value is higher than 
two times the value of the cost of the certification (i.e.,    ). We try to check if the threshold 
actually exists in the data. First, we run a simple logistic regression of the usage of 100 percent 
certification on whether true value is higher than the threshold level, which is 40 in this case. The 
results shows that sellers uses the certification significantly more often if the true value is higher 
than 40. However, this does not mean that the threshold level is 40, and we have also plotted the 
frequency of certification usage with respect to the true value of the product in Figure 4.6. 
Although we can see that sellers use certification more with higher product value, we cannot 
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confirm that there is a clear threshold level in terms of the certification cost. Future research may 
consider more about the threshold level and its implications for certain market outcomes. 
Figure 4.6: Frequency of Certification Usage (with 100% Accurate Certification) 
 
4.4.4.2 Social Welfare 
We have found from the previous analysis that seller profit shows the following pattern: 
100 percent > no certification > 50 percent, while buyer profit shows the following pattern: 100 
percent > 50 percent > no certification. Based on these results, we can also measure the level of 
entire social welfare. We thus create welfare variable by adding seller profit and buyer profit 
from each transaction and run a regression of this variable on the types of certifications. The 
result in Table 4.12 shows that the entire social welfare is the highest with 100 percent 
certification, but does not differ between 50 percent certification and no certification. This 
provides some interesting policy implications, as inaccurate certification does not seem to 
increase the entire social welfare since it provides the lowest seller profit, although it is shown to 
at least increase buyer profit. Therefore, if a new certification mechanism is being considered for 
an industry where there is no certification system available, they should carefully consider the 
quality of the certification as inaccurate certification may decrease entire social welfare, when 
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considering the cost to establish a new certification system. However, it should help to introduce 
this noisy certification, if the principal purpose is to increase consumer welfare.  
Table 4.12: Regression of Social Welfare on Certification Types 
(# obs. = 1,305) Coefficient 
Standard 
Errors 
z-stat. p-value 
Constant 
(Base=50% Accurate Certification) 
28.52 2.78 10.25 0.000 
No Certification 4.07 3.69 1.10 0.270 
100% Accurate Certification 17.69 3.68 4.80 0.000 
 
4.4.4.3 Irrational Behaviors 
 The experimental results also provide some interesting findings regarding the behaviors 
of sellers and buyers. We can observe some irrational behaviors from the experimental results 
that are not consistent with the basic assumptions of economics that individuals maximize utility. 
Here we investigate those irrational behaviors of sellers and buyers.  
4.4.4.3.1 Lower Claimed Value of Sellers 
 While we have analyzed the degree of dishonest claims above, we can also find some odd 
decisions of sellers regarding their claimed value of products. In 166 out of 1,305 total 
transactions, we can observe that sellers actually claim the value as lower than the actual value. 
This does not seem like a logical decision, as a high claim is generally regarded as the way to 
attract more customers or increase purchase probability, and even when the seller is being honest 
with good intentions, he does not have to claim lower than actual value.  
The reason for this irrational behavior can be presumed as follows (For this analysis, we 
only observe the cases when sellers do not use the certification or there is no certification 
available). First, some sellers may believe that, when without certification, claiming too high 
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quality may discount the trustworthiness of the claim (“too good to be true”), especially when the 
actual product quality is high. Therefore, sellers with higher-quality products may want to lower 
their claims when there is no certification or they do not use certification. Our statistical analysis 
supports the claim and shows that it is significantly more likely for sellers to claim lower than 
true quality as true quality gets higher, in 100 percent certification (p = 0.000), 50 percent 
certification (p = 0.000), and no certification (p = 0.000) cases. Second, sellers may also claim 
lower than actual quality when they decide to increase purchase probability with lower price. As 
price is found to be a significant factor affecting purchase probability when without certification, 
sellers may want to decrease price and also lower the quality claim in order to make their pricing 
strategy more trustworthy. This is also supported by our statistical analysis, as it is significantly 
more likely for sellers to claim lower than true quality as their suggested price gets lower, in 100 
percent certification (p = 0.002), 50 percent certification (p = 0.000), and in no certification (p = 
0.000) cases. Therefore, while it may look pointless for sellers to claim lower than actual quality, 
there are possibly several logical reasons behind this irrationality.  
4.4.4.3.2 Abandonment of Buyer Profit 
 We also observe irrational decisions of buyers, as some buyers abandon obvious profit 
during the experiments. More specifically, when there is 100 percent certification and sellers 
show the certification, buyers also have the correct information about the true value of the 
product before purchase. However, even when buyers know that the suggested price is lower 
than the true value, in some cases they have not purchased the product and abandoned obviously 
certain profit. Among the 271 transactions where sellers show 100 percent certification and the 
suggested price is lower than actual value, 55 buyers (20.3%) do not purchase the product. This 
seems absurd as these buyers could have increased their profit by simply purchasing the products. 
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We believe that this is due to the fact that they regard fairness as more important than profit in 
certain cases, as they do not want to help sellers who offer only a very small amount of buyer 
surplus. For example, among the 29 transactions where consumer surplus is less than 5, 15 
buyers (51.7%) decide not to purchase the item. Our statistical analysis also supports this claim, 
as lower consumer surplus has a significant impact on increasing buyer’s irrationality (p = 0.000). 
One interesting fact is that buyers can actually punish those stingy sellers by not purchasing their 
products, as sellers have to pay the certification cost regardless of buyer’s purchase decisions. 
For some buyers, those punishments might have mattered much more than earning small profits.  
4.4.5 Robustness Check of Previous Models 
 We have also run some robustness checks for our empirical analysis in Essay 2 by 
running similar regressions with our experimental data. Although Essay 2 has used number of 
bidders as the dependent variable and run a count data regression, we instead use purchase 
probability as the dependent variable and run a logistic regression to check whether those 
variables in Essay 2 again show significant effects with this data. The results from Table 4.13 
shows that most of the key variables from Essay 2 have also shown the same significant effects 
in the experimental data. Whether the seller uses the certification or not, claimed value, and 
suggested price are all significant in the basic models for both the 50 percent certification and the 
100 percent certification cases. Moreover, the interaction effects in the alternative specification 
are also all significant in both the 50 percent and the 100 percent cases. These results suggest that 
the empirical results from Essay 2 are feasible in our experimental data, and the findings of 
Essay 2 regarding the economic incentive for low-type sellers to disclose quality information are 
all robust and authentic. Moreover, the significance of the interaction effect shows that the 
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asymmetric effect of certification also exists in our experimental data and thus sellers with higher 
than average quality gain more from revealing weaknesses.  
Table 4.13: Regression of Previous Model Specifications with Experimental Data 
 50% Certification  100% Certification  
 Basic Model Alternative Model Basic Model Alternative Model 
Dummy for Certification Usage 
1.529 *** 0.117  3.435 *** 1.714 *** 
(0.254)  (0.561)  (0.359)  (0.635)  
Claimed Value 
0.012 ** 0.006  0.023 *** 0.018 *** 
(0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.006)  
Suggested Price 
-0.028 *** -0.029 *** -0.037 *** -0.046 *** 
(0.006)  (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.008)  
Interaction Between Certification 
Usage and Claimed Value 
N/A 
0.014 *** 
N/A 
0.019 *** 
(0.005)  (0.006)  
         
Observations 435   435  435  435  
Chi-squared 46.8  *** 49.14 *** 92.5 *** 86.45 *** 
d.f. 3   4  3  4  
* p<0.1. 
** p<0.05. 
*** p<0.01. 
4.5 Discussion 
 In this essay, we have tried to determine the effect of noisy certification on various 
market outcomes such as seller profit, buyer profit, and the level of information disclosure. The 
analytic model has predicted that seller profit will be the lowest with 50 percent certification and 
the highest with no certification mostly due to the certification cost, and that buyer profit will 
always be zero. This is somewhat surprising result as certification helps neither sellers nor 
buyers, suggesting that there is no need to use certification in a market with information 
asymmetry when we consider the certification cost. However, our experimental analysis has 
shown different results and suggested that there should be more factors determining the effect of 
certification on market outcomes than certification costs. We have come up with the following 
observations. 
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First, the seller profit is actually the highest with 100 percent certification and the lowest 
with 50 percent certification. The reason behind this pattern is twofold. Seller profit is highest 
with 100 percent certification because buyers purchase more frequently with 100 percent 
certification than with 50 percent or no certification. Seller profit is also the lowest with 50 
percent certification as sellers have to pay for the certification cost although buyers do not 
purchase more with 50 percent certification than with no certification. Second, buyer profit is the 
highest with 100 percent certification and the lowest with no certification. This is again due to 
the fact that buyers purchase more frequently with 100 percent certification, and that the level of 
the seller’s dishonesty is much higher with no certification. In other words, buyer profit is the 
lowest with no certification because sellers exaggerate the quality more (i.e., are more dishonest) 
than when certification of either type is available.  
Therefore, we have found that inaccurate certification does not help sellers, as it provides 
the lowest profit. On the other hand, inaccurate certification actually helps buyers, as sellers 
disclose more information even with inaccurate certification and thus buyer profit is higher than 
with no certification. Sellers thus might want to have either a highly accurate certification or no 
certification at all, as inaccurate certification is worse than no certification. However, it is 
different for buyers, as even an inaccurate certification mechanism would help buyers by 
providing higher profit. In terms of a public policy point of view, we have found that overall 
social welfare increases only with 100 percent certification, and 50 percent certification does not 
really affect social welfare compared with no certification. Therefore, policy makers or other 
third-party certification providers should carefully consider the quality of the certification system 
before introduction, as inaccurate certification may actually decrease entire social welfare, 
especially when considering the cost to establish the new system. This essay also provides 
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specific strategies for marketing managers on how to deal with information asymmetry in 
markets. When there is no certification available in a market under information asymmetry, it is 
better for sellers to focus on pricing strategy then on overstating the quality, as the quality claim 
is not trusted by buyers (“cheap talk”). When there is certification available, using the 
certification and disclosing more information contributes a lot toward increasing the profit 
regardless of its accuracy, since any quality claim without certification does not affect buyer 
behavior (“cheap talk,” again), and the use of certification significantly increases purchase 
probability. Other than these main findings, this essay has also provided various interesting 
implications about market outcomes under information asymmetry, such as the effect of 
certification on social welfare and irrational behaviors of sellers and buyers. We have also 
confirmed that the findings of Essay 2 are replicated with our experimental data. 
 Overall, the findings from the analytic model and the experimental analysis agree that an 
inaccurate certification does not help sellers as much as an accurate certification does, and is 
even worse than no certification. This finding is somewhat counterintuitive, as people believe 
that certification generally helps sellers, and it may be able to provide some important 
implications to certain sellers who attempt to manipulate the certification system to increase 
short-term profit, as any noise added to the certification system will eventually work against the 
sellers. The result of this essay that it is better for everyone (i.e., both sellers and buyers) to have 
a solid and accurate certification system is consistent with the findings from Essay 1 in that the 
certification may provide economic incentives for sellers to fully disclose quality information 
and increase social welfare. Moreover, the variation in the effects of different certification 
systems found from this essay may also provide an explanation about the empirical results of 
Essay 2 where the economic incentive for information disclosure differs across different product 
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categories. Future research may extend the findings from this essay and provide more evidence 
regarding the effect from the noise of the certification on various market outcomes by exploring 
other observational market data.  
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5. CONCLUSION 
This dissertation has provided a framework for understanding information asymmetry in 
markets by verifying the economic incentives for low-type sellers to fully disclose their types 
through analytic models, experimental analysis, and market data analysis. This study has 
attempted to achieve this goal by focusing on how risk intermediaries such as third-party 
certifications can reduce perceived risk of customers and encourage sellers to voluntarily reveal 
weaknesses, and provided several important findings.  
Essay 1 has explained whether, when, and how a low-type seller’s information disclosure 
can enhance the seller’s profitability and also increase the market demand through an analytic 
model and experiments. Essay 2 has confirmed the predictions of Essay 1 by comparing the 
economic incentives for disclosing and concealing low-quality information through the sales data 
of various collectible items. This essay has also shown that voluntarily revealing weakness is 
more effective when sellers are selling products of higher than average quality than when they 
are selling products of lower than average quality, and that the incentive for information 
disclosure differs across different market circumstances. Essay 3 has explicitly investigated the 
effect of the certifications of different qualities on various market outcomes through an analytic 
model and an economic experiment, and shown that an inaccurate certification is worse than no 
certification for sellers but beneficial to buyers. This essay has also found that using the 
certification and disclosing quality information is the best strategy to increase profit under 
information asymmetry. With these results, this dissertation is expected to present an important 
theoretical basis and empirical evidences to solve various market dilemmas under information 
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asymmetry. This study also supports the literature on voluntary disclosure as the findings suggest 
that mandatory disclosure or government intervention might not be necessary to solve adverse 
selection issues in markets. 
Therefore, this dissertation aims to contribute to both academia and industry with 
important implications ranging from the analysis of “lemons” markets to regulatory policies 
about market frauds, as this is one of the first attempts to analyze the economic incentives for 
low-type sellers to voluntarily reveal their types and understand how to design optimal 
certifications, to the best of our knowledge. For researchers, this dissertation may provide new 
explanations about some market phenomena under information asymmetry that have not been 
fully understood so far, such as why some online sellers do not restrict negative product reviews 
posted by customers. For managers, this dissertation provides specific guidelines about how to 
communicate weaknesses of their products and services, by showing how and when voluntarily 
disclosing low quality benefits the seller. The universality of this dissertation makes the findings 
applicable to most market situations, as no product or service is perfect in customers’ eyes and 
sellers always have to deal with unfavorable information about their product or services. For 
example, as for the firms mentioned in the introduction of this dissertation, automobile 
manufacturers might want to share the information about accurate MPG but instead release 
related documents or videos of their mileage tests at the same time as “certifications” of quality, 
and olive oil sellers can also frankly and explicitly communicate the actual grades of their oils 
and provide customers opportunities to fully evaluate the product. This dissertation may even 
provide some implications to certain non-market settings such as public policies, political 
campaigns, and personal communications, because of the universality in the contexts used in the 
analysis. After all, this dissertation suggests that the most effective strategy under information 
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asymmetry is not to conceal weaknesses, but to employ appropriate risk-reduction methods and 
fully disclose the truth. Honesty might be the best policy.  
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